National Defence Committee on Nov. 24th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Hello, everyone.

I call to order the 40th hearing of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, February 23, 2009, we are doing our study on Arctic sovereignty.

We have with us two witnesses from the Department of National Defence. We have Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Commander, Canada Command. We also have Commander Dermot Mulholland, Director of Maritime Policy, Operations, and Readiness and Chief of the Maritime Staff.

First of all, you'll have five to seven minutes to make a presentation. After that, the members will ask you questions.

I want to thank you for your availability today. The floor is yours now.

[Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Commander, Canada Command, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chair. It's great to see you and the members of the committee once again.

I understand that I'm here today to help answer your questions related to the protocols governing the movement of submarine traffic. I bring with me Commander Dermot Mulholland, who is the subject matter expert on water-space management within the offices of the Chief of the Maritime Staff. For any of the more technical aspects of submarine movement you wish to discuss, I will happily turn to Commander Mulholland and allow him to provide you with his expertise.

I know that in the past this committee has expressed a great deal of interest on the topic of submarines in Canada's north. It is certainly very timely, as there has been a fair amount of media interest generated on this. I'm sure you've seen the media coverage of the Russian Akula submarines off the coast of the United States that occurred in early August of this year, and more recently, the news that the USS Texas transited through the Arctic and broke through the ice near the North Pole.

While submarines sightings in this part of the world are noteworthy and can generate a great deal of media attention, they do not necessarily pose a threat to Canada. Submarines have a number of routing options while transiting the Arctic that do not require entering Canadian territorial waters. The North Pole is approximately 225 nautical miles away from the boundary of our exclusive economic zone, and we recognize the right of all nations to exercise freedom of navigation in international waters according to international law. The movement of submarines is no exception.

It would be useful at this point to contextualize our discussion with some basic information on how we govern submarine movement within Canada.

Due to the classification of information, it is a matter of policy that we do not discuss the movements of allied submarines, nor do other allied nations discuss ours. However, what I can tell you is that as a partner in NATO, Canada maintains regular direct liaison between our submarine operating authorities, or SUBOPAUTHs, which are located on each coast, and other allied SUBOPAUTHs. The SUBOPAUTH is a national authority responsible for all aspects of the employment of submarines, and it is our connection to other submarine operators for day-to-day at-sea operations.

NATO has also established a submarine movement advisory authority that acts as the central repository for all submarine movement for a given area. What this regular communication with our allies does is reduce the possibility of a collision between submerged submarines. The submarine movement advisory authority implements a number of safety protocols and plays a critical role in reducing the possibility of collision between submerged submarines.

This process I have just described to you deals with the movement of allied submarines only. But we also closely monitor non-NATO submarine activity. Canada Command and its subordinate Maritime Component Commands in the Atlantic and Pacific maintain close cooperation with U.S. Northern Command in collaborative surveillance of non-NATO submarine activity in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. Activities of non-NATO submarines in the world's oceans, in international waters, do not violate international maritime law and are within normal practice.

The Canadian Forces routinely monitor the waters off our coasts, and we will continue to monitor any vessel of interest during transit while recognizing that all nations have freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. And we have a number of very effective mechanisms in place to monitor the activity off our shores.

In terms of aerial surveillance, one of our most effective capabilities is RADARSAT-2, which is a polar orbiting satellite that provides regular marine surveillance coverage of Canada's Arctic region. This capability greatly increases our situation awareness of what is occurring in our Arctic domain.

Equally important is the coastal and inland water surveillance conducted by our Canadian Rangers in the north. As you are aware, the Canadian Rangers are the eyes and ears of the Canadian Forces in the Arctic. About 1,600 Rangers from numerous communities across the north provide presence and surveillance in some of Canada's most remote areas. I have met with many members of this unique organization and I can assure you that the Rangers have proven time and again to be an invaluable asset when it comes to monitoring activities on the land and waters of northern communities. Because of their unique traditional knowledge and expertise, they're usually the first to notice and report any unusual activity in the area.

Finally, we utilize the marine security operations centres to great effect in order to build what we know as maritime domain awareness. These centres enable departments and agencies to work collaboratively to collect and analyze intelligence and other information in an effort to develop solid all-source awareness of activity in the maritime approaches to Canada.

The Canadian Forces work with our inter-agency partners to ensure a whole-of-government approach to monitoring Canada's waters and to bring together a common understanding of the activities taking place in our waters.

The increased amount of activity that we can expect to see in the Arctic as it becomes more navigable may lead to security considerations, but we also need to be mindful of the impact this will have on the safety of navigation in the Arctic.

In the event of an incident, be it from a marine vessel of any kind or a major air disaster, the Canadian Forces will have a role to play, either directly or in supporting other government departments and agencies in providing such disaster assistance, when required, as part of a whole-of-government ability to respond quickly and effectively to whatever should occur in our northern region.

Let me conclude by saying that the changes under way in the Arctic undoubtedly necessitate increased whole-of-government vigilance in order to ensure the safety and security of Canada's Arctic. We are working closely with our federal and territorial partners, as well as with the peoples of the north, to safeguard this precious inheritance and to ensure that Canada fulfills its responsibilities as an Arctic nation. This responsibility also means looking beyond Canada and fostering cooperative and meaningful relations with our Arctic neighbours in order to address the ever-changing environment in the north.

Thank you very much for your attention. Both Commander Mulholland and I would be happy to take your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Vice-Admiral Donaldson.

I will now give the floor to Mr. Wilfert for seven minutes.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you gentlemen, for coming. I apologize in advance that I have to go to the House at ten o'clock. But I appreciate your being here.

The twin issues that we're obviously dealing with in the Arctic are the issues of sovereignty and security, issues on surveillance and enforcement capabilities. Clearly the Canadian navy, it has been suggested--and I'd like you to respond to this, Admiral--needs to relearn how to have a greater significant role in the Arctic. What's the best way to achieve that when there's only a certain amount of resources, a certain amount of capability?

For government, government is about prioritizing. If in fact we are serious about sovereignty and security in the north, then we have to look at what kind of equipment we need in the north and how much of the existing capabilities that are needed have to be surrendered in order to provide the kinds of tools we need. There's the type of submarines, if we're going to go into that, or if we're going to deal with surveillance in space, or whatever we're doing, we have to be able to prioritize. Obviously the recommendations from the navy are absolutely critical. Then there's the delivery of those operational capabilities down the road.

Can you respond to, first of all, the notion that we have to relearn how to play a greater role in the Arctic? How would we achieve this?

If you were able to put on the table to government your wish list and say, these are the objectives that government has set out--which is sovereignty and security--and this is the best way to achieve it, by using the navy.... At one time, I know we joined exercises with the other branches of the force as well as the RCMP, as well as Customs, etc. If you were to outline to us the best way to go about doing this, what would you suggest?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Sir, first of all, I agree that this is an important area for us to be considering. It is the changes taking place in the north, I think, that cause us to look ahead and ask how we need to position ourselves to be able to respond to the safety and security threats of the future. I can't really give advice for the navy--my counterpart, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, commands the navy--but I certainly can talk about what I need as the commander of Canada Command in actually delivering capability in the north.

Do we need to relearn how to operate in that environment? I would say that in terms of naval experience, in terms of Canadian Forces experience on the water, we have been constrained from a lot of naval presence on the water in the Arctic. However, the Canadian Coast Guard has significant presence in the Arctic. They understand the region, they know how to operate up there, and I would say it's important at this stage--as we see a change in the environment that increases the level of activity and perhaps the frequency of naval presence that we wish to have up in the Arctic--that transfer of knowledge is very important.

We're looking at putting our folks into coast guard ships when they're conducting operations in the Arctic; we're looking at operating more frequently with the coast guard, and we do that every year up in the Arctic; we're looking at working with other navies, such as the Danish navy, that have experience up in that region so that we can get knowledge transfer there; and we're looking at continuing to exercise to push ourselves farther and farther north as conditions permit so that we get more awareness of the factors that we have to take into consideration as we adjust how we do our business.

I don't think we need to reinvent how we do our business. I think we have to be realistic about the navy's role in the Arctic, because there's really not a conventional military threat facing us up there. What that means is that we have to be prepared to have a presence. We have to be prepared to cooperate with others and, quite often, to deliver a capability that's needed to address safety concerns or security concerns early that are really within the mandates of other government departments.

Do we have to relearn how to do this? No, I think we know how to do this, but more of us need to get smart on it, and we need to be sharing information that we have and we need to be continuing to stay abreast of changes that are happening in the north.

How do we go about that? I've described some of the mechanisms, but I think it's really through collaboration and cooperation that we will develop the types of capacities that we need to operate up in the north.

We also need to look at our basic footprint as we move ahead, and there are some initiatives that have been described to this committee before to address that. We need to look at the types of vessels that would be available, and there are initiatives that have been described at this committee before that do that as well.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Through you, Mr. Chairman, I raise the question because last month I spent some time with the head of the Danish navy, Nils Wang. As for what they are doing and the techniques they are using, they've completely remodelled.... In fact, they've mothballed their submarines and have taken a different approach in terms of their Arctic waters.

I just wondered what, without necessarily commenting on what they've done but in terms of the sharing of information.... They've decided they want to be very specific, have a niche, in terms of what they do. They've said they can't be all things to all people. And the admiral was pointing out that although they got rid of the submarines, they became much more proficient in other areas of operation.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

We have a very good relationship with the Danish navy and with the Danish armed forces. As you know, our chiefs of defence met in the Arctic last summer. We were looking at a number of ways to cooperate, to share information, to share perspectives.

I would hazard, sir, that Canadians expect us to have a capability in the Arctic, but I would say they don't expect it to be at the expense of our capabilities on our other ocean spaces. So with the size of our ocean spaces, we have to be smart about what we're investing in. We have to be smart about how we set ourselves up, not so much to have a ring of steel around our ocean spaces, which is impossible, but rather to have a network of systems that informs us to allow us a response capability where it's needed on time, and also to allow us to develop the types of new capabilities we'll need to apply. And I believe we're on the right track for that.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would also like to welcome our two witnesses. I attended Mr. Donaldson's change of command ceremony when he took over at Canada Command. I also salute my commander, Mr. Mulholland. In fact, I was embedded on the HMCS Winnipeg, when Mr. Mulholland was commander. I thank him for the wonderful experience I had. I even piloted the frigate at 4 o'clock in the morning. When I told the soldiers about that the next day, many of them said that had they known, they would have prepared their wills the night before. Mr. Mulholland was very patient with me, and it was a wonderful experience.

Now I'd like to ask some questions, especially about the USS Texas. The situation seemed to surprise a number of observers, because many did not expect that type of submarine to be able to travel in Arctic waters.

We are trying to do a study on sovereignty. Professor Pharand, who appeared before us a few months ago, explained that we must exercise some control over submarines in the high Arctic, because different countries could use their presence and the number of times they have travelled there to claim sovereignty. Therefore, it is important to control submarine movements.

An analyst said that there was a third incursion in the region this year. Do you know if there were any others?

I know that when the USS Texas surfaced at the North Pole, it was far from our coast, in international waters. However, before moving into international waters, did it travel through Canadian territorial waters? Is it required to signal its presence there? Did it do so? It is important for us to know that.

I will start with those questions. After that I will see if I have time for any more.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman.

I would say, first of all, in terms of the surprise of seeing the new class of submarine in the Arctic, that it is really an issue for the Americans as to why it is that the submarines surfaced at the North Pole. Clearly, they wished to make a point by doing so, and I think they were successful.

Concerning submarine control in the Arctic, first of all I'm not convinced that submarine movement actually does bolster any national claims. Submarine movement is transitory. There is a legal regime to control this that does not prejudice states' claims to anything. In the Arctic, outside of territorial waters and outside of currently established exclusive economic zones, I'm aware of quite a lot of scientific work going on to see what other claims could be made by states in the region. I'm not of the opinion that submarine movements materially affect that type of work.

We heard about a submarine placing a flag on the seabed. I think that was far more for public consumption than it was for any legal claim. And we see other types of demonstrations of Arctic presence and capability that sound impressive but really don't substantively amount to very much more. In fact, we have done similar types of things in the past.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

May I add something?

You could continue your explanation, but I want to move you in another direction. As you know, our committee conducted a study on submarines following the fire on board the HMCS Chicoutimi. I clearly remember them telling us how important it was for our navy to have submarines, because they were part of a fellowship, and that any movements in Canadian territorial waters required notification.

I would like you to answer the following question: were any of the incursions, the USS Texas or the other three, in territorial waters reported to the government one way or another?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Well, sir, first of all, Texas was not in our territorial waters. But had she been, it would have been clear to us that she was. We have a way of managing these things in which I have every confidence.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

But you will not explain it to us.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

If you look at a map and look for the best and safest way for a submarine to get to the North Pole, it is not through the Canadian Arctic. There are much easier ways of getting to the Arctic. Submariners are practical folks, like my friend Mr. Mulholland, and they wish to avoid hazardous areas. They wish to travel undetected—and as quickly as they can undetected—to get where they're going. If you look at the Canadian Arctic, everything in the Canadian Arctic argues against that kind of direct, unimpeded route and forces submarines into places they don't want to be in the first place.

You've talked about incursions this year. I know of no incursions this year in our waters by submarines.

You talked about the importance of having submarines, because of the regime that gives us. I will say that it is because we have submarines that we profit in two respects.

First, we are party to the movements of other submarines so as to deconflict movements and avoid collisions. There is a very high interest in the allied community, and in fact amongst all submariners, in avoiding collisions between submarines.

Second, it is because we have submariners that we can form the very close relationships with our allies that give us far more information exchange and understanding of one another and mutual respect, which makes for control mechanisms for movements within our waters and exchange of information. It gives us that much more confidence in the measures. It allows us a transfer of knowledge about operating in different areas that makes us better at what we do and makes others better at what they do. Wherever we wish to transfer that knowledge, it also allows us to share information on other submarines, because the whole community keeps track of this.

So we have a very effective method, first, of controlling the movements of submarines and making sure we understand where submarines will go and that we control submarines that need to be controlled in our waters, and second, for exchanging information on other submarine movements that we all track.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Yes, thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and welcome to our guests. It's good to have you here.

I was interested in your comments that the Americans and any submariners wish to travel as quickly as possible and undetected. I assume that's one of the major reasons for having submarines in the first place.

You also indicated that what was important in the Arctic, from our point of view, was information, not necessarily a show of force. I wonder, given the tools that you have, whether you have adequate information. You have mentioned RADARSAT-2, you've mentioned the Canadian Rangers, and you've mentioned the marine security operations centres, which I gather do data collection and review as opposed to a surveillance type of operation.

Can RADARSAT-2 determine what the movement of submarines is underwater and under ice to the Northwest Passage, for example?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Sir, thank you for your question.

RADARSAT-2 is really about imaging objects on the surface. In that respect, it is not an effective surveillance mechanism for submarines that are transiting underwater or under ice. Having said that, RADARSAT-2 is but one of a large number of sources of information that we base this on. What RADARSAT-2 enables us to do is focus our observation in specific areas of the north in response to other information that tells us we should be looking carefully at what's going on there. I guess that's what I would say in response to your question.

The MSOCs are really information exchange centres, yes, but they allow us to bring all sources of information together, not just military information but information from across government, so that we have all the information we hold on what is going on in a maritime domain and can make sense of it. Vessel reports, radar data, reports from vessels we have and aircraft we have on patrol, and that type of thing are all brought together, with a single understanding of what's happening in our maritime domain.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I gather from this that it is perhaps relatively easy for anyone wanting to traverse the Arctic undetected; if their intelligence is good and they don't emit radio traffic and they follow whatever measures they have to avoid detection, it would be fairly easy for a sophisticated country to traverse the Arctic without being detected. Am I right about that? I think the Texas demonstrated that they could get to where they got without anyone knowing they were there until they surfaced.

How many countries have a capability of operating in the Arctic, say, through the Northwest Passage or under ice? Could you tell us that? Are there a lot? How many of them are allies? How many of them are countries other than our allies?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Well, sir, there are two questions.

First, in terms of the ability to traverse the Arctic undetected, if you're talking about the Arctic Ocean, yes, it would be relatively easy to traverse the Arctic Ocean undetected, particularly if no one was really looking for you and expecting you to be there. Having said that, when you look within our maritime areas of responsibility, I would argue it would be very difficult to transit that undetected.

Why is that? It is a very challenging region of the world from a navigational standpoint. There are many areas that are not very well charted. The extent of the ice is unknown, and submarines don't like to experiment by feel, which is essentially what they'd be forced to do.

Do I expect that there are lots or any submarines transiting through our archipelago clandestinely, sneaking around under the ice? I do not. In fact, I think it would be reckless. I also believe that submarines that operate in the north, like anywhere else, do so respecting international law. As such, I do not think it would be easy for submarines to transit these areas undetected. I think it would be extremely challenging.

In terms of the number of countries that operate submarines under the ice, I think testimony was given earlier about six that can operate under the ice, including the British, French, Americans, Russians, I think Chinese, and German. But I would say not many of those countries are likely to operate under the ice.

It's not only a matter of being able to hold your breath; it's really a matter of being able to deal with the unique environment that is encountered underneath the ice. I can get Commander Mulholland to speak a little about that environment, if you like. If not, suffice it to say that it's not like having a submarine somewhere else. Somewhere else you always have a way out, which is up. Under the ice you do not, and that requires levels of proficiency, an understanding of the environment, and a sensor package that allows you to operate without getting yourself into trouble, that allows you to get out of trouble if you get into trouble.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Can you tell us what nations are trying to achieve that level of proficiency or experience? I'm assuming the Russians are and the Americans are.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

I would say that the Russians have it. Clearly, the Americans have it. And I would say the British and French have it; they may have it in different degrees. I really can't say about the other nations.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

There was some discussion earlier, and I know you're being recalled on this point because--

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Excuse me, sir. To clarify, what I'm saying they have is the ability to operate under ice. I'm not saying they have the ability necessarily to operate under the ice that's within our sovereign waters. I think that's under ice generally. It's another layer of complexity that I'm not sure any one of them is comfortable with.