National Defence Committee on Dec. 1st, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Good morning to all and welcome to the Standing Committee on National Defence. This is our 42^nd meeting. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study of the recruitment and retention strategy of the Canadian Armed Forces.

We are most pleased to welcome you here. Today, we will be hearing two witnesses, Major-General Frédéric Mariage and Colonel Marcel Belleau. Thank you for being with us. I will give you the floor for 10 minutes, after which time committee members will be able to have a discussion with you.

[Major-General, Retired) Frédéric Mariage (President, Réserve 2000 Québec]

Mr. Chairman, we would like to thank you and the members of your committee for giving us the opportunity to appear before you.

I am retired Major-General Frédéric Mariage. I proudly consider myself a citizen soldier. Please remember this qualification, “citizen soldier”, as it represents the main reason for our presence here today.

In my civilian career, I held different executive responsibilities with MacMillan Bloedel, a forest company from Vancouver. I was also president, CEO, and shareholder of Bois Degro lumber in Montreal.

Before retirement on the army side, I was appointed chief of reserves from 1990 to 1993, and I finished my military career as colonel commandant of the infantry corps, the first reservist to be appointed to this position.

I will now turn to my distinguished colleague to introduce himself.

[Colonel, Retired) Marcel Belleau (Vice-president, Réserve 2000 Québec]

Good morning.

I am Colonel Marcel Belleau. I also was a citizen soldier for a long time. I had the honour to command a prestigious unit, the Regiment de la Chaudière, and also number three militia district in Quebec.

In my civilian life, I made a career in the university world, mainly in administration. I was a vice-director at Université du Québec à Montréal and also a researcher in strategic studies.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

Contrary to one's belief, we are not retirees longing for the uniform, nor are we nostalgic about the past. We are individuals who have undertaken a mission to defend and promote the interests of the armed forces in general and, more specifically, the interests and values of the citizen soldiers and units of the land force reserve, the so-called militia.

Who are we and what do we represent? We represent a significant number of former senior officers in Quebec: 12 general officers and 65 colonels, regrouped under Reserve 2000 Quebec, and Reserve 2000 for our colleagues in English Canada, who are unfortunately unable to be here today given the short notice for this appearance.

We share the same problems, and they're sorry not to be here to voice their concern.

Now, what is the rationale behind our request to appear? The militia and its citizen soldiers are an endangered species as they become more and more soldier citizens. The army, the land force, is operating beyond its capability. This situation was confirmed in a report given to the CDS by the Chief of the Land Staff, entitled “Strategic Operations and Resource Plan 2008-09”.

In particular, there is a serious deficiency in the number of capable personnel available to serve in the infantry. This is clearly outlined in an article published by Professor Granatstein on November 20, 2009, in The Globe and Mail:

The land force infantry's nine battalions are all seriously under strength, and some warrant officers have already been to Kandahar three or four times, with yet another rotation staring them in the face.

The expedition in Afghanistan is serving as a drain on our available resources. With 60,000 regulars in the army, navy, and air force, it is all we can do to sustain and maintain 2,800 men and women abroad. That includes 20% to 25% reservists.

Military leaders as well as the Department of National Defence lack an understanding of the culture and history of the Militia and their policies could contribute to the disappearance of this institution. If some of them are aware of this, they do not show it through their actions.

Militia units are being depleted and deprived of their leaders, who are serving full time in a different class of service. More than one-third of militia paid strength is serving under this class of service, and they are not available for training with their respective units. On the roles assigned to the militia, there is a divergent view between headquarters and the militia environment. We have become a source of immediately available manpower for plugging holes in staffing deficiencies in the regular force.

Although this role is rewarding to those militia soldiers so employed, the way it is carried out is very insidious. It has a very insidious impact, slowly and surely driving the militia soldier away from his primary role of serving as a citizen soldier and not as a soldier citizen. This role is the only one that receives almost all the attention. It is the first and only role really taken seriously by authorities.

The militia is treated as a source of cheap labour, having 30% of the total reserve strength actually on full-time service. Therefore, the only role that appears to be treated somewhat seriously is as individual reinforcement. The land force reserve strength is about 20,000 people. Each year, about 20% of that establishment leaves the force for different reasons. About 3,500 soldiers must also receive basic training every year, which requires instructors—more than often, not available—and we are left with 12,000 effectively trained people, but we then must discount the non-effective and the already deployed abroad.

Militia units cannot replenish themselves because of this exodus of leaders. We are therefore left with militia units that cannot replenish and are incapable of facing a domestic crisis. Today they would be incapable of responding to a national emergency or to a call to assist civil authority, as opposed to the excellent and invaluable response to the 1998 ice storm in Quebec.

What is alarming is that the militiaman is rapidly losing his or her status as a citizen soldier, and it is now nearly impossible to maintain a civilian career while active in militia service. Asking a militia soldier to attain the same skill levels as the regular force if they volunteer to deploy abroad is understandable and necessary, but applied to everyone in the reserve, this concept fails to take into consideration the logic of the militia soldier's status of citizen soldier.

As a former soldier, this situation is worrisome. The qualification levels for the Regular Force, which often amount to over-qualification, are not necessary for the militiaman and impact negatively in the longer term on the Militia's own ability to generate replacements.

The present system often encourages dropping out of school and specifically targets the unemployed. This situation could lead to the disappearance of the Militia as an institution, that institution which served as a basis for the participation of more than a million Canadians during the Second World War, whereas before that conflict, the Canadian regular Armed Forces were less than 4,000.

The participation of ambitious and talented people in the militia system has helped our country greatly. Well-known personalities in politics and the public service; people in education; professionals, including lawyers, judges, accountants, and doctors; as well as an untold number of citizens in various trades have made great contributions to their regiments and have received, in return, training that has contributed significantly to their successes and career advancements. But this era is over, and the citizen soldier has become the soldier citizen.

Originally, in the context of a total force, the assigned roles of the land forces militia were to continue as a core resource for national mobilization, to reinforce and support the regular force, to serve as an important bridge and link between the military and civilian communities, and to conduct domestic operations as aid to civil authority/power. Currently the only role being taken seriously from this list is role number two: reinforce and support the regular force.

The perverse effect of this situation is that it will contribute to slowly but surely distancing reservists from their primary role, which is to serve as citizen-soldiers for territorial defence, to maintain a link with the community where they live and, ultimately, to serve as a base in the event of a national call-up for general mobilization.

The problems facing today's militia personnel are numerous and complex. The structure is based on regular force personnel. The roles for the Militia are unclear and the recruiting system is completely ineffective. Enrolment lead times vary from four weeks to eight months.

The Militia is seriously under-strength. The required training levels are unattainable. Reservists are the main target for budget cuts, which is the case today with the deficit we have. Furthermore, they are not provided adequate protection, despite the ombudsman's recommendations.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You have one minute left, General.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

The goal we're aiming for is to have all elements of the total force, regular and reserve, possess the means to fulfill their respective roles well, without either one serving as simply a temporary expedient, or stop-gap, for what is lacking in the other.

In that regard we propose a recommendation to the minister to form a special task force composed of three members from Reserves 2000 (English Canada), three members from Reserves 2000 Quebec, and three members from army/land forces headquarters.

We recommend that this task force make recommendations to the minister on the following matters within 90 days of its formation: that your committee undertake an analysis of the structure and confirmation of the primary roles of the militia and conduct an examination of the recruiting system, selection and enrolment; the level of authorized and paid members within militia units; maximum training requirements that conform to the availability of militia personnel while safeguarding their status as citizen soldiers; safeguards and guarantees for militia personnel serving under different service contracts; and safeguards to stabilize the core structure and leadership at militia units.

Please keep in mind that this situation is not only a Quebec situation; it involves the whole country.

Thank you for your attention. We are at your disposal to answer your questions, if that is your wish.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you for your presentation.

We will now go to Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you. My apology for being a little late.

Sir, I realize you made a recommendation to set up a committee, at the end of your report. In the event that a committee is not set up, or it's set up but takes a very long time, I have one simple question for you. What are the three top things you would want changed, and what resources do you think they would require in terms of dollars?

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

The resources in terms of dollars is part of the bigger issue. But as for the two things we would like, first of all, where we're coming from is that this militia system has existed since the founding of this country. It has evolved over the years, serving well during the First World War and the Second World War, as I mentioned, for mobilization, with one million Canadians serving overseas when the total armed forces were 4,000 people.

This system is based on a regimental system in which people are very close to their community, and it allows the civilians to participate in the armed forces by serving as citizen soldiers. This is in great danger now and it has reached a point where you, as politicians, have to make a decision.

The decision is, do we keep the militia as it should be, with some of the terms of reference, or do we want just the pool of reservists to serve the armed forces when available? If that was the decision of the politicians, we don't need the militia. We don't need the regiment. We don't need the presence of Canada in rural communities across the country. All you need is a big warehouse and you put instructors there and you bring people there and train them and you say, okay, when we need you, we'll call you. We call that, for guys of my age, the Office Overload. When I needed a secretary because mine was sick, I would call Office Overload and ask for a secretary.

So you have to decide that. If you ask me the question, what do we want immediately, it's for you to give direction as politicians to the DND and to the military people and say, just a minute here, we have to protect that institution, or you decide to say no, thank you.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

My reading of what you've said--and I was a bit late--is that you would want the institution protected.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

We recommend that it is protected. That's our strong recommendation, because this institution has done so much for the country. I could give you names of people who have been through that system, people you know. Prime ministers have been through that system, judges of the Supreme Court have been through that system here, business people, lawyers. In Quebec le directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales is a reservist and he was telling me, because I know him personally, “If I didn't have this training from the reserve, I couldn't do the job I'm doing today.”

So we strongly recommend that this institution continues to survive, but it's not up to us to decide. You are the people who have to decide that.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Welcome General, welcome, Colonel.

I had the pleasure of going to a regimental mess dinner with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal. As a matter of fact, I recognized the tie of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal that my father belonged to. I greatly enjoyed your dinner.

However, the situation you have outlined worries me. I did not think that the situation had deteriorated to that extent. If I understand you correctly, the only role that is presently envisaged for the Militia is that of a reserve for the Regular Force. That is virtually all that the department wishes to use it for.

I understand that throughout history, the Militia, in Quebec as elsewhere, was something else. Its specificity was its proximity to civilian authorities. In a disaster situation, an extremely rapidly deployable response team can intervene. As a matter of fact, I can bear witness to this myself, since I found myself inside the “dark triangle“ during the ice storm that hit Saint-Jean, Granby and Saint-Hyacinthe. As soon as things took a turn for the worse, we began to see the reservists arrive.

You are therefore telling us that there is a change of philosophy in the department. This change would result from the document entitled Strategic Corporations and Resource Plan, that was delivered by the Chief of the Land Staff. You are therefore talking about General Leslie, if I am not mistaken.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

I would simply like to provide a correction. I have not read the document in its entirety. The article written by the journalists was entitled “The Canadian Forces, a “phantom army““. General Leslie was saying that he did not have the necessary manpower to be able to carry out all of the operations and all of the missions he was charged with. Of course, because the Regular Force is under strength, General Leslie managed, saying that he was going to use reservists.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

He did this to the detriment of the other functions which normally...

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

He considers the immediate needs, the reinforcement needs for his missions. I understand General Leslie and I imagine that he has no other choice. What we are saying is that with these policies and the whole training, recruitment and promotion system that is in place within the Reserve, he acts in accordance with his needs. That did not begin with the mission to Afghanistan, but with Bosnia, in 1995. It is therefore something that has carried on.

The Militia has become what we call a “farm talent club“ for the Regular Force. In so doing, this has had a very perverse impact on the regiments and on those citizens able to take part in the system.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Could that go even further by, for example, changing the structure of command?

Previously, it was under the direction of militiamen in sectors and districts. I am told that today it is a brigadier-general from the Regular Force who is in command and that it is divided up into brigades. This goes to prove all the more that we are moving away from the citizen-soldier concept.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

The structure of command has been changed. At the time we set up what we called the “total force“ concept, there were two elements. The Militia was led by the Militia and fell under the command of the army. In the beginning, these two elements were supposed to complement each other and work jointly.

Today, you know how the system operates within the Armed Forces. The commander is a member of the Regular Force and the militiamen are placed under his authority. He is the boss, and he decides and does what he wants. There is less and less of a contribution by the Reserve and by the Militia with regard to the decisions to be made.

There is a whole ripple effect on recruitment, training and strength level. Everything is interrelated and the system is suffering from this because it is more and more focussed on the needs and the way to manage the regular force. You cannot manage a citizen-soldier system using the system applied by the Regular Force with regard to training, course duration and programming of courses during the year. You must know your clientele and know how to accommodate it. We are doing the reverse. For example, we are telling our clientele that the courses will be given on such and such a date. The reservist tries to free himself up in order to be able to attend. Then, the course is cancelled for all sorts of reasons. Holidays have been planned based on a given date, but the course does not go ahead. It is delayed for a year or two, etc. There is a whole ripple effect.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

This is an issue with employers, who, normally, make an effort to free up their people. If the employer makes an effort and the employee comes back and says that he must do something else because of events beyond his control, that makes things more difficult with employers.

It seems to me that we are making things even more unbearable. We have correspondence indicating that full-time reservists will lose their salary and benefits between January 1 and April 1, in rotation. Do you discuss that within your ranks?

This seems unbearable to me because, in addition, this will not be applied to the Regular Force but to people who were giving of their time and were paid. We are taking advantage of the opportunity to tell them that it is quite unfortunate but that, during a month, there will be no benefits nor pay.

What has full-time reservists' reaction been?

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

There have been several. When the order to make cuts is given, the first institution affected is the Reserve. Over the years, given the needs of the army, 50 to 60% of the leaders, the Militia officers and NCOs, were assigned to what we call “classes of reserve service“. Someone is needed to fill such and such a position, an offer of class B service paid at 85% of regular salary is made, and the person fills such and such a staff position or else is told that he or she is needed as an instructor. We are not talking about Afghanistan, but of local service. That is class B.

Among militiamen, there are people who have been there for 10 years and whose contract is renewed every year. There are others who have been members for one, two or three years. These are people who, for the most part, were unemployed or who, despite very commendable professional skills, were better off joining the system, the pay being much higher. Today, whenever budget cuts are made, those positions are the first to be abolished. That is one of the problems.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Could you finish up within about 30 seconds.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

These individuals who, in good faith, signed a contract one or two years ago, for example, now get told that they unfortunately no longer have a job and must leave. That is stressful for them and their family.

There are other cuts as well. Within the units, the “class A“ days for which reservists are paid to train over one or two weekends, in the evening, etc. are also being cut. Over the course of a fiscal year, these days are reduced by three and a half or four. Take for instance the case of a student who enters the Militia, who decided to join in order to pay for his education. He planned everything, he calculated that he was going to work X number of days, that this would pay him so much and that he would be able to afford this and that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

General, you have 15 seconds left.

[MGen Frédéric Mariage]

All of a sudden, we are in the month of December and this individual can no longer count on his four days, and he too is therefore penalized.