National Defence Committee on March 9th, 2009

[BGen G. Champagne]

I can tell you that we are continuing to work on leadership issues and that this is going very well. However, I am not saying that it was especially because of or only because of leadership problems that the Sarposa prison incident occurred. There was also the leadership of the insurgents.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

There is one reality that is being confirmed. Apparently, the Taliban are in control of more and more territory in Afghanistan. There are the insurgents. I would like to quickly hear your point of view on this topic.

In light of the Prime Minister's remarks, his statement that we will never win the war against the insurgents, there is one reality on the ground. In any event, people think that the solution has never been a military one, on Canada's part. In fact, it is thought that the solution would be the result of combining a military effort, development measures and diplomacy. But for our own comprehension, could you tell us, in your opinion, what percentage of the territory do the Taliban control? Do you feel that they control more? When we go in, things go well, but then the situation deteriorates rapidly. In your opinion, what is the situation?

[BGen G. Champagne]

Mr. Coderre, one has to look at the situation in context. When you state that the Taliban control the territory, you have to be careful about the word “control.” In the Kandahar region, the Taliban do not control the territory. Just look at the Taliban presence. If you compare it to their presence during Operation Medusa, when there were between 500 and 600 insurgents, you will see that you will not find that number in the Kandahar region.

Let me go back to the situation at the Sarposa prison last year. We were told then that there could be somewhere between 500 and 600 insurgents. Even the Afghans thought that we were looking for somewhere between 500 and 600 insurgents. Now we are not necessarily looking for such large groups.

On the other hand, if you don't mind, I would like to say that when people are talking about security and the perception of security, it's a very positive sign when an insurgent is unable to bring together a group of this size. He has to do things differently and use small groups of five to ten insurgents, or perhaps just two or three insurgents. He has to resort to assassinations, intimidation and IEDs in order to make the people feel that security has not been achieved. To me that means that he does not control the territory.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Tell me a little bit about the Spin Boldak region. This week we heard that three Taliban leaders, three mullahs, decided to join their forces. At least that was the message they sent to the media. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is porous, particularly because of the tribal zones and so on. Will the additional American troops have a direct impact on the situation? As the election draws near, do you have the feeling that the insurgents are reorganizing and that this could lead to even more difficulties?

[BGen G. Champagne]

Concerning the Spin Boldak region and the area that we call the border region—you realize that the Afghans do not necessarily recognize that border—I can't tell you whether it will be Americans or Canadians in those two zones. The commander of the south region command will decide which force will be assigned to that region.

The arrival of such a large number of Americans will certainly help the deployment of forces in the areas you mentioned with the high Taliban presence, where we will be able to take more direct action, given that we currently do not have sufficient forces to distribute all the way to Spin Boldak.

You have to remember that so far, we have had considerable success in Spin Boldak.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Yes, exactly.

I would like to talk about Kabul because the insurgents are now directly attacking that city. There is corruption in the Afghani government. I remember that Colonel Serge Labbé was in charge of the Strategic Advisory Team, that was precisely meant to help the bureaucracy. There was also a direct link with the ministries to set up a bureaucracy.

Do you have a report for us on that topic? If we realize that there is more and more corruption, does that mean that the group has failed? What is being done to fight corruption? Could the committee no longer be in existence and could they have decided to do something else?

[BGen G. Champagne]

With your permission, I will not speak about corruption, it is not my field. The SAT that you mentioned was replaced by an organization called the GSO, whose full name I forget. It is an organization run by CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, that is in charge of these positions and of appointing people to the right positions, who have the proper expertise that will help them to improve their capacity within the government.

Perhaps I could ask you to put these questions to CIDA, because we no longer have the same elements within that organization that we had previously.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Was your experience conclusive? Do you think that the SAT was a good thing and that, ultimately, perhaps it should not have been done?

[BGen G. Champagne]

Let me remind you that General Hillier and General Natynczyk, the two chiefs of staff that we had, had only praise for that group. When they communicate with representatives of the Afghani government—even now as we are visiting—they remind us that this team has some tremendous accomplishments. Far be it from me to say that they failed; instead, I would say that they had great success.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you, gentlemen.

I now give the floor to Mr. Bachand, from the Bloc Québécois.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Champagne. It's always a pleasure to see you again. The last time we saw each other, you were in Montreal, and you were in charge of the Saint-Jean Military Base. With all due respect, I must say that I completely disagree with each and every point that you made. I entirely disagree with your presentation. Despite having fought tooth and nail with the Minister of National Defence, who was sitting where you are, in order to have this type of briefing, today I want nothing more to do with them.

I will give you facts that completely contradict what you have just told us. You are trying to show that the insurgents are weakening, because they are no longer able to fight us as a group. That is true, but they have changed their tactics in the field. I am no general, but their current methods, particularly the way they work with IEDs, the intimidation and the guerrilla tactics seem to me to be the only way to defeat the NATO troops. Obviously, soldiers armed with kalachnikovs are not going to form a row in front of a 45-ton tank in order to attack. Everyone knows that the insurgents have changed their tactics and that this has been successful.

Moreover, I do not know whether or not you have read the excellent document on counter-insurgency written by Major-General Leslie. He too is saying that the insurgents are operating very successfully, but that we are not. Major-General Leslie is not alone in stating this, the British generals agree as well. You said that we control the territory. However, we do not control even 20% of this territory. Some British generals are saying that they do not control beyond the 500-metre security perimeter surrounding their advanced bases. That constitutes a major problem.

Pakistan is not helping matters. This has always been the case, but today this is even more true. Just in case you did not know, the Pakistani government agreed to the Taliban request that a certain region alongside the border become an oasis for them. The Pakistani forces do not even venture there. It's got to the point where the Americans are now forced to intervene with their UAVs which are more aggressive than ours, which we use for recon missions. They use attack weapons. Their Predators regularly strike the other side of the Pakistani border, because they are unable to control the region.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Obama are not the only ones to have said that this was not possible. History has taught us so as well. How can you say that things will go better with 100,000 men? The Soviets had 180,000 soldiers and they did not win. We will not be successful. That is not what counter-insurgency is all about. To achieve this, you need to use a whole range of measures that are not military in nature. I know that you are a military man, so you therefore have a military perspective. I, however, will continue to completely challenge what you have said.

We don't even control the highway from Kabul to Kandahar right now. Attacks occur regularly. No one wants to use this road anymore, because everyone is afraid of being killed. I'm sorry to have to say this to you. It's got to the point where the terrorists are even striking Kabul in the green section. How else do you explain the fact that the Department of Education and Justice buildings were attacked by a dozen kamikazis who killed I don't know how many people inside Kabul itself?

The situation has gone off-track. You must give briefings, I agree with that. However, I have always challenged these briefings. Moreover, I have often told the general that we have to be more specific in the types of details we want to get from you. If we let you do as you wished, you would come here with three or four photocopied sheets, but that is not enough for me.

I must confess, I do not have many questions for you. I would imagine that you disagree with what I'm saying, just as I disagree with what you have said.

[BGen G. Champagne]

Mr. Bachand, we agree with one another to a certain extent. During my presentation, I did not use the word “win” nor the words “total control of the situation”. I said that the situation, as it is described this year, remains difficult and that additional efforts are needed. I said that our goal is to make sure that the Afghan army is able to make a greater contribution than in the past, and that we have made advances with respect to IEDs, even if we are still losing people. You also talked about road travel, what we refer to as freedom of circulation. Yes, we are able to travel by vehicle, but we are still using only armoured vehicles. In that sense, I was trying to demonstrate that the situation is not necessarily—if I may use a term that is often used by this committee—rosy. The situation is still very difficult and that is exactly why, through the choice of my words in both French and in English, I am trying to fully demonstrate that the situation is still dangerous.

Members of the whole-of-government team still require armed protection. They are unable to circulate freely to carry out their work. You refer to the manual on counter-insurgency operations. Our soldiers study that manual. I also agree with General Leslie because I applied those principles in Srebrenitza, and that was some time ago. Those same principles were applied in Somalia, and today in Afghanistan. The area remains very difficult. Insurgents still hold the advantage because they can go away and then he join the population, and this makes it very difficult to track their movements. We have indicators of when the Afghans start to support us. This is what we are trying to maximize.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, General Champagne.

I will now hand the floor over to the representative of the New Democratic Party. Mr. Harris, you have seven minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Brigadier-General, to the committee.

First of all, I want to say that we too, in the NDP, are very concerned about the losses our Canadian troops have suffered, in particular in the last few days when four individuals have died in the service of their country. We support their efforts on behalf of the job the government has given them to do. One of the individuals, in fact, was from my own province of Newfoundland and Labrador, which has contributed mightily to this force.

Moving to our questions about your report, I do have to say, though, that we've had the Prime Minister recently indicate that he thought the gains we've made thus far in Afghanistan have been modest and could be lost. I'm looking at the report released at the end of December—which I'm assuming is the quarterly report that we're dealing with here—and I see that in some of the areas, such as increasing the number of Afghan National Army units capable of being involved in their own security, the gains have been extremely modest. In fact, there have been losses in terms of the Afghan National Army's responsibility for security in the six key districts of Kandahar. In June they had responsibility for one of six key districts; as of the end of December there are now no key districts for which the ANA is responsible for security.

In terms of support for the police services in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police, it now seems that only one out of 17 police units is capable of conducting basic law and order operations, which is only 6% of the total. And the suggestion is that the support for the police is riddled by changes in staffing, high desertion, and casualty rates.

It seems that if one of the goals of this mission is to have the Afghan National Army and Police capable of looking after their own defence, not only are we seeing a deterioration in security and humanitarian ability, but we are also seeing very little or no progress—in fact, deterioration—in our ability to assist the Afghan National Police and Army in looking after their own defence and policing.

[BGen G. Champagne]

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

If you don't mind, I'll tackle the army issue, because this is the one we're responsible for. The police issue is more for DFAIT and the RCMP, and I think they can speak to that.

In terms of the Afghan National Army, it's important to understand that.... When I referred to the level of expertise or the level of proficiency, I mentioned level one and level two, which are critical for us because it means those organizations can operate on their own.

In the case of the kandak that was reported last year as being responsible for the region of Zhari, the reason they were moved out of Zhari is very simple: in terms of the cycle, like any unit you will find in the Canadian Forces, in Afghanistan, with the U.S., there comes a point when that unit has to rotate in order to retrain their people, get new recruits. Then they go through three levels of preparedness, and I'll use colours to illustrate my point. Red is when they start from basic, then they go to yellow, and then they go to green.

The organization that was in the Zhari area had finished the full cycle. So during the green cycle, which is the highest, they were responsible for Zhari and they did the operation they had to do. In the meantime, there's another kandak following behind, and a third one, and all at different levels. At that point, when that kandak had to retrain, we had to pull it out of Zhari so that it could retrain and then get back.

The beauty with the kandak was that instead of going back to a level red, in a very short period it was able to go back to a level yellow of preparedness. That's why we should not look at the fact that we pulled them out as a lack of success. The fact is the unit had to come out in order to retrain and get new recruits so that it could go back. Each of those kandaks, when in operation, loses a lot of people, either wounded in action or killed in action, just like we do. So they need to retrain.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I'm going to ask you about the numbers now. Your document suggests that the troop strength of the Afghan National Army units is in some cases around 70%, but in most cases it's lower than that. How many Afghan National Army troops are in the field in the Kandahar region?

[BGen G. Champagne]

I'll be cautious on this one, if you don't mind.

What we have is a brigade a quarter and three kandaks. Each of those kandaks is about 650 strong. But again, the strength goes up and down. I will not tell you the exact number of each of those kandaks. That would be within the realm of operational security; otherwise, the Taliban would know exactly the size of the force it's facing.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That being said--and I appreciate there may be some need for security around these numbers--it certainly appears that there's a great degree of fluctuation in the troop strength. Using the numbers you've used here in your report, they suggest that we're talking about less than 70% effective strength, which indicates either a lot of casualties or an inability to in fact recruit people for this work...or desertion, which is mentioned, in the police force. Reading the report, I don't see the kind of optimism you're expressing today in terms of progress being made here. Can you counter that with any information that we haven't heard?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Mr. Champagne, you have 15 seconds to reply.

[BGen G. Champagne]

As I explained to you, a lot of them are back up to 70%. This is a snapshot in time. The recruiting and the reinforcements are coming in, and even today some of those units that might have shown at 60% are now at 70%.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Well, 70% doesn't seem very high to me.

[BGen G. Champagne]

For us, it is a level of effectiveness that we're looking for in a battalion.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, for seven minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to General Champagne.

First of all, congratulations on the operation with the Chinooks. I know the soldiers are very excited about their successes there. And congratulations for the increasing percentage of IEDs you're neutralizing, both through the use of choppers and UAVs.

Prior to the situation that happened last week with our casualties, there was an issue that was percolating up from the boots on the ground, so to speak, with respect to different things that could be used to detect IEDs. One of the questions was, why is it that our military, for example, does not use dogs to detect IEDs? Maybe it does use them, but not to the extent that other countries do. I understand there's a disproportionate number of Canadian soldiers who have suffered casualties as a consequence of IEDs as compared with the Brits and the Americans, so I would like you to comment on that.

In your introductory comments, you talked about your experiences with the insurgency in Srebrenica , and I'd like you to compare, first of all, what you saw there with what you're experiencing now, and what are the lessons you learned there that you are now applying to the situation in Afghanistan?

Also, with respect to borders, I understand that Canadian Forces officers in Kandahar organized a border flag meeting with ISAF and the Afghan and Pakistani officers to discuss border security matters, the first such meeting in eight years. I'd like you to tell us a little bit more about that meeting, its outcomes and what effect it might have on the progress made with respect to the insurgency. Our area of operation is in Kandahar, so we're adjacent to Pakistan. For the countries that have areas of operations adjacent to Iran, are they experiencing the same sorts of insurgency?

Thank you.