Peacekeeping is on a continuum that goes from being a basic constabulary type of mission--and Cyprus would be a good case in point for most of the 40 years that we were there--to Somalia, a robust peace-enforcing, peacemaking type of mission. You could say that the early stage of our deployment in Afghanistan also had some colour of peacekeeping.
A well-trained, well-armed, well-led command and control force, a combat-capable force, can do the whole range of peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peacemaking missions. The aim of it, I think, stemmed from our national character. We've never had territorial ambitions, and we want, as a middle power, to try to use our forces as an extension of our diplomacy and of our internal policy to try to make peace whenever we can help.
Our missions and the deployment of forces that we ought to have, save and except for one general failure--I'm alluding to Rwanda--have been pretty well tempered. We deploy in sufficient numbers with a sufficient mission and within a respected mandate. I'm alluding to Bosnia. Nevertheless, we did make a significant difference in bringing peace and stability to these particular countries.
Did we have enough? Could we do enough? The answer to that is, “Never enough”, but prior to Afghanistan, we inherited almost a peacekeeping constabulary force in terms of our equipment, our training, and our philosophy. We had an entire generation, or two generations, of officers who did nothing else. That became even more accentuated after we withdrew from Germany in 1992.
I think that was wrong, because ultimately the type of soldier we are looking for to deploy and to enforce peace has to be combat-trained and combat-led as the first thing; otherwise, he's going to fail in his task.