First let me provide a little bit of context, and I'll be quick about this.
This is certainly not a new idea. In the United States, prior to 2001, they had something called the Weinberger doctrine, and it later became the Powell doctrine, which was that you had to go in with a certain amount of capability and a certain amount of size and you had to know what your objectives were before going in. I think that's a simple point that we, as the continual joiner and the smaller ally, need to take to heart as well, that unless our allies do go in knowing precisely what it is they are seeking to achieve, unless they're going in with a certain amount of capability and they know precisely what it is they want us to do and we know what we can contribute.... Then we have a recipe for success.
If, on the other hand, our larger allies are not sure of what they're hoping to achieve, if we do not have some clear indication from them that they're committed to the mission they have in mind, and if we are not quite sure where we fit into this equation except simply to take on an arduous task, then that is something we should avoid.
It is certainly not fanciful. We've seen it. We've lived it now for all on five years. One should never accept a mission simply because no other country wants that particular region of an unstable country. That's a bad reason to take on an operation, simply put. Now, we may feel that it's our obligation as an ally to do so. On the other hand, we end up holding the short end of the stick when nobody else really is inclined to replace us when it comes time.