National Defence Committee on May 4th, 2010

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I would propose that even a peacekeeping deployment to certain areas of the Middle East—namely, around Israel or Lebanon or any of these other countries, should that come up—might sow some significant divisions in our society about where our commitments lie, and particularly if we don't maintain strict neutrality, which has been something we've abandoned over a certain number of years. So I have serious misgivings about certain types of peace operations in that region of the world, for instance.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You wanted to share? You still have two minutes.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

You talk about modernizing our forces. Whatever we do, they're going to have to be transformed into a new world of technology. In the American Revolution, the British soldiers marched down the street and guys shot them from the forest and they couldn't cope. It reminds me of what's happening to our troops in Afghanistan, where they're using a new type of warfare against us that has caused most of our deaths.

Do you see that we need to transform in that way to high-technology answers to the new types of tools that are being used against us?

[Col (Retired) Michel Drapeau]

I don't think Afghanistan was new warfare. The use of roadside bombs is about as old as the invention of explosive gunpowder. A roadside bomb is cheap, and it doesn't require a whole lot of skill to construct it, to plant it, and to reap the carnal benefits from it.

How to fight that, against a non-sophisticated enemy who doesn't show up—doesn't wear a uniform, operates in the dark, and doesn't engage in combat—again is as old as warfare and as old as counter-insurgency. I think we need to take and have taken steps, and more particularly in having more armoured vehicles and using some of our tactical deployment to try to learn a lesson from it, and we always do. But in the end, this is not warfare at its best. It's certainly not a classic military operation itself.

The forces, independent of the vast successes we have had and the hard lessons we have learned in Afghanistan, have to go forth from this time onward and not so much re-equip as reconfigure themselves. In some cases, this will require new equipment. It will require garaging some of the equipment. For instance, what are we going to do with the tanks we have acquired, once we're back in Canada? Before going to Afghanistan we went 50 years without having any tanks of any sort in Canada—we had them in Europe, not here. So there will be a restructuring required.

My point is that when we look at the restructuring, I wouldn't even know where to start. That's why I say we need to pause.

One of the issues we desperately need to look at is the great north. What are we going to do, and how are we going to have a military presence? When? What type of presence, and for what purpose in the north? I think it's accepted more and more, and I think the current government is making headway in that direction, that we need to do more.

Second, and I'll stop here, I think our militia has existed as a parallel force, not as a total force. We have used extensively the resources of the militia since our deployment in Afghanistan: somewhere between 15% to 20% of people in Afghanistan are reservists. That's fine; we used them for individual reinforcement. What do we do from this point onwards in order to ensure national security, in order to ensure a military presence across Canada in every province and territory? Is there a better way to use the money allocated to the militia, and is, in fact, the money allocated to them sufficient, and ought they to be equipped and trained the way they are now or the way they ought to be in the future?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Colonel Drapeau.

Mr. Braid, you may go ahead.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much, gentlemen, both of you, for being here today.

If I heard both of you correctly, I think you suggested that our number one priority should be protecting Canada and protecting Canadian territory. To begin, I want to ask you, if you would, to outline what some of the potential threats to Canadian territory are that we need to be prepared for, moving forward.

[Col (Retired) Michel Drapeau]

First and foremost, Canada is a trading nation, and we depend on foreign trade. So to have open sea lanes is absolutely essential, first. Our territorial governance over the sea is important, and we have a vast expanse there; people are coming and fishing in our waters, polluting our waters. It's really essential that we have a presence and an ability to intercept. So I'd say these are first and foremost.

Second, given the ever-present threat of terrorism, our airspace also needs to be protected.

I would start with that. We are sharing a common border with the United States and we have a defence arrangement with the U.S., and our threat on the land base is not quite as severe.

But as I mentioned a moment ago, we will want to have a military presence in the north, if for nothing else, to ensure or to defend or to assert our sovereignty. I think to do so, those measures will be the essence of it.

The last point is that we need to have a force in being across Canada to be able to respond to natural disasters. I would answer your question by a rhetorical question to you: how are we going to respond tomorrow if there were a catastrophe, say, in B.C., when we have no forces deployed in that particular province? That's a concern to me.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I would reiterate these basic points: natural disasters and consequence management; critical infrastructure protection as well, which needs to be addressed far more effectively; cyber-security; and search and rescue, which is something that keeps getting delayed and delayed. It has now been delayed by two subsequent governments. This is unacceptable. If protecting Canadians is the first priority of the Canadian defence forces, then search and rescue capability should be at the top of our procurement list at this point.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Drapeau, you mentioned the scourge of international terrorism as one of the threats to Canada and to Canadian territory. How do we deal with where terrorism emanates from internationally? How do you respond to that?

[Col (Retired) Michel Drapeau]

The short answer is that I don't know, because I don't know whether there is a “military solution” to it. I say instead that we'll probably have to go back to basics—we, together with our allies—to find whether there is not a better way to structure our national effort and international effort in concert. What I'm alluding to most certainly is that there appears to be some sort of hesitation as to the efficacy of our intelligence apparatus. That's where I would start, first and foremost.

We can spend an extraordinary amount of resources, automated and human resources and so on. Unless we get good, timely, effective intelligence and we can share some—and I'm not so sure that we do yet; I'm not so sure we have found the key, have found the formula for it. That's not a criticism; I'm just saying it's there. They are becoming more sophisticated and more dependent upon technology and better able to go across borders and to seep across sea and air lanes and so on. So intelligence is first and foremost. And not only the cooperation, but the meshing in of intelligence, the constabulary police, and the military may give rise to a new creation, a new formation, a new organization to deal with this. I don't think we're there yet.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Mr. Drapeau, let me continue with you. You mentioned as well in your presentation that looking forward, beyond Afghanistan, you would not recommend a “peacekeeping only” or a pure peacekeeping role, because it would be dangerous. Could you elaborate a little bit on that and on why that is the case?

[Col (Retired) Michel Drapeau]

If I left you with that impression, then I misspoke. I would not support the deployment of a Canadian Forces element rapidly unless there were a real emergency, which I don't see over the horizon. That's first.

Second, what I would not do, because of the lesson we have learned at a very heavy price, is allow ourselves to return to a peacekeeping role or peacekeeping mentality or philosophy within the forces themselves. We have to maintain what we have acquired by way of combat experience and combat knowledge and combat maturity, making sure that we keep it on this particular level. In other words, if they can play in the NHL of combat—Afghanistan—they can meet any peacekeeping mission you can throw at them.

The reverse is not true. If we come down the scale of equipment, training, and expectation of our forces to become “good enough” for peacekeeping, if and when combat comes we are going to find them deficient. That is what we did when we first deployed in Afghanistan: as equipment we had the old Iltis. It was not so much weapons, but in some cases it was equipment that was not sufficiently armoured and so on, and our soldiers were untested in battle. I'm not suggesting we go to battle, but I'm suggesting that we up the level of intensity so that they'll be prepared to respond to the worst case....

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Faille is up next, since she is substituting for Mr. Paillé.

I believe you intend to share your time with Mr. Bachand.

[Meili Faille, Bloc, Vaudreuil—Soulanges, QC]

That is correct.

I have a quick question, further to Colonel Drapeau's comments. I am a member of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts and as such, I examine the Auditor General's reports. In fact, two reports are currently before our committee. One focuses on military acquisitions, while the other pertains to program evaluation.

In your submission, Colonel Drapeau, you stress the issue of governance, that is the need for DND to have some control over its budget and the acquisition of major weapons systems. When we questioned them about these matters, senior DND and PWGSC officials presented us with a list of concerns. We were quite surprised to hear them say that right now there are, unfortunately, no rules in place to determine what effectively constitutes an urgent acquisition. They said they were not in a position to make acquisitions quickly.

Unfortunately, an emergency situation now exists as a result of the following incidents: the deployment of soldiers who are improperly equipped, the mismanagement of the equipment sent to this theatre, inadequate inventories, and Leopard C1 and C2 tanks that are unable to transport needed military equipment to the theatre of operations.

I would like to hear your thoughts on military acquisitions. What role could we play in the process? In terms of control mechanisms, what kind of improvements could be made within the different departments? At present, DND has a special unit that works more closely with PWGSC. We know about the procedure that is being followed. However, in terms of core acquisitions, it is difficult to evaluate programs, to determine what the future holds and to make acquisitions on an urgent basis.

[Col (Retired) Michel Drapeau]

I'm not sure where to start, Ms. Faille, but let me just say this. When I was a logistics officers with the Canadian Forces, I gained some experience in the field of public acquisitions. Since then, I've noticed that the problem stems from the fact that there are too many controls and too many parties in control. We have two departments and each one has a responsibility and a strong desire to acquire the very best for our military. I have no doubts whatsoever about that. However, instead of working together, they operate in a more linear manner.

DND has a public acquisitions unit that is a very bureaucratic organization. Once it has done its work in minute detail, everything gets passed along to PWGSC which is an even more bureaucratic organization. Therefore, it can take 20 years to purchase a vessel and the cost can be prohibitive. When a new danger looms on the horizon and our military must respond to it, the Chief of Defence, the Prime Minister or the officials responsible for supplying our military in combat operations must take extraordinary measures. They say: we want it, and we want it now. The reality is that when it comes to public acquisitions processes, DND and PWGSC are incapable of responding.

What should we make of all of this? The process is likely far more costly. Over the years, we have probably added some layers to make the system run more smoothly and to prevent abuse, fraud or error. And what has that accomplished? We're in a fine mess.

I would recommend, quite simply, that we revert to the arrangement that we once had, that is that we give the Minister of National Defence, who is ultimately responsible for defending our country's security and for motivating our military to engage in combat, the needed tools—in this case, a public acquisitions agency or, as I call it, a supply agency. We already had that in the past. When I served in the Canadian Forces in 1960, we had an agency just like that. PWGSC could then oversee the purchase of office equipment and supplies that are not specifically military in nature.

I don't think I'm alone in calling for such an agency. In terms of configuring and reconfiguring our military, I would start with this step, that is with deciding what we are going to do.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you. You are out of time.

Mr. Boughen, for five minutes.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thanks, Chair. I don't have a question. I'll pass to my colleague.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Mr. Payne.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Boughen.

Welcome, gentlemen.

I was listening intently, Professor Lagassé, in terms of your third bullet about the expeditionary missions and capabilities and that Canada must avoid these kinds of situations, which certainly would be less likely to be successful. I believe that's an important point. I'm wondering if you could expand a little more on that, particularly around the issue of working with our allies, whether it be the UN, NATO....

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

First let me provide a little bit of context, and I'll be quick about this.

This is certainly not a new idea. In the United States, prior to 2001, they had something called the Weinberger doctrine, and it later became the Powell doctrine, which was that you had to go in with a certain amount of capability and a certain amount of size and you had to know what your objectives were before going in. I think that's a simple point that we, as the continual joiner and the smaller ally, need to take to heart as well, that unless our allies do go in knowing precisely what it is they are seeking to achieve, unless they're going in with a certain amount of capability and they know precisely what it is they want us to do and we know what we can contribute.... Then we have a recipe for success.

If, on the other hand, our larger allies are not sure of what they're hoping to achieve, if we do not have some clear indication from them that they're committed to the mission they have in mind, and if we are not quite sure where we fit into this equation except simply to take on an arduous task, then that is something we should avoid.

It is certainly not fanciful. We've seen it. We've lived it now for all on five years. One should never accept a mission simply because no other country wants that particular region of an unstable country. That's a bad reason to take on an operation, simply put. Now, we may feel that it's our obligation as an ally to do so. On the other hand, we end up holding the short end of the stick when nobody else really is inclined to replace us when it comes time.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you.

Just in those terms, we've obviously read a lot regarding NATO and the lack of wanting to put other countries' military troops in harm's way. In your mind, is there some way we could encourage NATO as well as the other countries to pull their fair share, so to speak?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I'm not enthusiastic about that. Simply put, unless we know going into an operation that our ABCA allies--Americans, British, or Australians--are willing to put in a significant amount of force, then I think it's a mission that Canada should look at with a great deal of hesitation. I don't believe our German and French allies have demonstrated that they are willing to take risks and costs for arduous tasks. I would be loath to say that in the future the Canadian Forces should engage in operations alongside countries that have not demonstrated their willingness to take casualties or major risks in Afghanistan.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Okay.

How much time do I have left?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

One minute.