Evidence of meeting #15 for National Defence in the 40th Parliament, 3rd session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was war.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
I will.
In Canadian foreign policy history, Wilfrid Laurier, in 1910, talked about Canadian defence policy. What he said, in essence, was that there was no threat, and if there were one, the Americans would save us, so we didn't need any armed forces.
That was changed by Paul Martin, Sr., at the end of the Second World War. He said that Canada had an appetite to play a strong role in the world and that we had the teeth to go with it. And we did.
That has all withered away, so that we're now in the position of, “There is no threat, and maybe the Americans will save us”; and the same for Europe.
Liberal
The Vice-Chair Liberal Bryon Wilfert
Thank you very much.
Hans Morgenthau, in his book Politics Among Nations, argues that the international system is structured still under the guise of the nation-state, yet we have all these non-state actors who are emerging and are much more difficult for nation-states to respond to.
In terms of these non-state actors, are you able to comment on whether we as a nation have, in terms of both our military and our intelligence background, the capabilities and the understanding to respond effectively to those non-state actors?
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
Can we say no?
Liberal
The Vice-Chair Liberal Bryon Wilfert
That's the shortest answer you've given. I wanted a little more than that.
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
That was my question, Chair; sorry.
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
Yes, Monsieur Coulon.
Director, Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations
Mr. Chair, I believe that we have, nonetheless, tools to respond to these non-state players.
First, unlike what some may believe, the fight against terrorism is working. It is not because there was a scare in New York or a passenger gets on a plane—one out of three billion passengers per year—that we are failing in our fight against terrorism. I believe that we are successful. I believe that the messages being sent to terrorists and to the states that support them show that we have gone on the offensive and that we will no longer be intimidated.
At the same time, we live in an open society. As a result, openness is necessarily one of our weaknesses. However that is what makes our liberal societies so great: our openness and our democracy. So that is the point with regard to terrorism.
With regard to other areas, for example, during these debates we have talked about the problems facing some African countries in controlling their territory. I am thinking in particular of the Sahel, from Mauritania to Somalia. The Americans have a strong presence there, but there are other countries too, such as France and Great Britain, conducting exercises, etc.
We are not obligated to occupy the territory in order to neutralize or destabilize such groups, because they will always be there. Sometimes I would like us to stop trying to make everyone believe that our enemies are eight feet tall and that we are only five feet tall: that they are giants and we are dwarfs. Western countries are well equipped to deal with such threats. That said, there will never be 100% security, Mr. Chair.
Liberal
The Vice-Chair Liberal Bryon Wilfert
I appreciate your response to my question. Thank you.
We have a few questioners left. I'm going to shake it up a little bit.
We have Mr. Allen, followed by Mr. Payne.
NDP
Malcolm Allen NDP Welland, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Through you to Mr. Coulon, we'd spoken earlier, and Mr. Bland had answered the question around how we equip folks and make sure they go with, as I term it, the “right tools”.
Notwithstanding the fact that they do that...and let's presuppose that we got it right and we did send the tools as we thought.... We went through the things that Professor Bland talked about, the checklist of why we're there and all that sort of stuff. But when we get there, we see that the place isn't quite as we thought; in fact, it's less so. As Mr. Bland said, you stop planning; you can sort of park the stuff.
How do we balance that with the folks on the ground who are there to help, who are looking at that material that comes in to actually engage in an operation that we're not going to engage in? How do we balance the needs of that population, which is looking and thinking that we want to escalate up, when the reality is that we're looking to escalate down? How do we make sure that we don't get into a situation of having a conflict unnecessarily escalate simply because we came over-prepared because of whatever intelligence we got?
You know, there's no fault, and I'm certainly not finger-pointing that somehow we went with too much. We thought that's what we should do.
So how do we balance that need of those folks on the ground versus what we've done as we enter that theatre?
Director, Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations
I think, sir, that you are pinpointing one of the most fundamental questions when it comes to peacekeeping operations.
Actions in peacekeeping operations seek most of all to maintain peace, to bring peace rather than wage war. So the military's position and the objective of the operation have to be peaceful. This does not mean that we do not bring some weapons in order to be heard or even to defend ourselves when incidents happen—such as in Cyprus in 1974.
Consider that peace operations are different from war operations such as in Iraq, for example, where you have to bring all your materiel to face the enemy and the situation on the ground. This is why it will always be difficult for international organizations to adequately assess the options that they have in terms of military deployment on the ground.
Now, do not believe that we engage in peace operations with our eyes closed. There are preparatory missions in which we inspect the territory and measure the dangerousness of the actions of the parties on the ground. Then, they advise the United Nations or other organizations about the modalities of the military deployment on the ground. Usually, and I'm talking about the 120 peace operations launched over the past 20 years, peace operation missions arrive with the right materiel for the mission that they have.
Only exceptionally are there unforeseen shifts. Indeed, no one foresaw that the Turks would invade Cyprus in 1974 because there had been a coup in Athens that just toppled an administration that had itself toppled the government in Cyprus. You can see that this was an exceptional situation, and Turkish paratroopers arrived within a few days. Action was needed. Peace operations do not constantly unfold in situations like that.
In some places, there can be surprises but throughout the majority of peacekeeping operations, things in general happen the way they were supposed to be when the mission was planned.
NDP
Malcolm Allen NDP Welland, ON
This question speaks to the experience. Professor Bland talked about what General Hillier and General Natynczyk finally learned coming out of the Balkans as we headed forward. If we're not engaged in peace missions--or whatever terminology we like to use--how will our folks gain the experiences so that when we actually do go back to those, as we'll no doubt be requested to do...and how will we make that balance fit?
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
Partly to answer your first question, you need to have, and we always do have in fact, continuous planning for military missions. Every morning the commanding officers get up and have a meeting, an orders group, on what went on last night, how it's going, and how to adjust. That's all warfare stuff. They're always adjusting to the mission. If they say nothing happened last night, well, we'll stand down a few patrols.
It's important, and I think modern commanders understand that they have to play a part in the game of not escalating or unnecessarily de-escalating the impression of a threat.
What do you do when you're not in operations? The armed forces train. You simulate, you do exercises, you learn as much as you can.
Ladies and gentlemen, you have a very highly educated armed forces these days, and a very sophisticated training system.
The other thing you do, and what I would encourage, and I think most officers and others would agree, is you send as many people as you possibly can to all kinds of operations all over the place so that they can watch, see what's going on, learn something, and talk to their colleagues. That's the normal way of doing things.
Liberal
The Vice-Chair Liberal Bryon Wilfert
Thank you very much.
We have three questioners left. We have Mr. Payne, then Monsieur Bachand, then Madame Gallant.
Then I've informed Mr. Hawn--he has no difficulty--that we have some very short committee business to do with a press conference on Tuesday dealing with the Arctic study.
Go ahead, Mr. Payne.
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions and comments, through you, are to the gentlemen here today.
I want to welcome you. Thank you for your attendance here.
I was actually quite interested in your comments, Mr. Coulon, on what we need to do in terms of telling the public about the missions. I found that quite enlightening. I guess in some ways there have been some failures in that in the past, and I'm sure there will be in the future.
One of the concerns I have, of course, is with respect to some of the things that we are doing in Afghanistan, in particular around helping to rebuild the country. I don't think that message is getting out. I think we're trying to tell that message, but I'm almost positive that the media isn't carrying that kind of message.
I just wonder if you had a short comment on that.
Director, Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations
It is true that in any military intervention, there is the development aspect, the population assistance aspects, that are all part of everyday reporting. Very often you don't see this: why is that? That's because what you and I retain is what is going wrong. If a soldier gets killed, that will be in the news. But the fact that we just built the 168th school in the district of Kandahar will not be in the news.
It's very difficult to attract the attention of the public. Take yourself for example. When you read about medicine, road construction, all of those events that take place in today's society, do you want to know about the good news, for example, the fact that the trains are arriving on time at the Ottawa station? No. You wouldn't want to know why the trains are on time, you would rather want to know why they're late. Reporting work, public relations work, often raises problems in operations.
That being said, I still think that the role of politicians is extremely important. They play a leadership role. That's why politicians must be at the vanguard: always ready to explain to the public what is going on on a daily basis, in Afghanistan or elsewhere, with the right words, even if those words hurt. I know that it's difficult to do this because public opinion is a fickle thing: just look at polls, by-election results, etc.
I think that you have to be very honest in those situations, because after all, human lives are at stake.
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Bland, you talked a little bit about ungoverned spaces. I'm wondering, in your opinion, what would be required before we would send troops into ungoverned situations and ungoverned spaces. You talked about a number of them around the world. Could I just get a better understanding of what your thought process is on how we might be able to manage those kinds of situations?
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
I would piggyback on what Jocelyn has just said.
The first thing is that the nation's political leaders would decide that going there would be something that was in Canada's national interest. Then they would provide the resources commensurate with the mission, as decided by them and their advisers. Then they would get out on the street and convince Canadians that this was in Canada's national interest. It might be hard; it might be not hard. We're not doing it because we're all boy scouts, as one Prime Minister called the boys in Bosnia: boy scouts with guns. We're there because it's in Canada's national interest. It might be hard, it might be soft, but we're going to go.
Then, as the mission unfolded in its various phases and conditions and situations, the politicians, not the military, would stand up and say that we're in control, we're doing this, we're supporting it, and we're not backing down now.
I think it goes back to the House of Commons, and the Senate to some extent, setting the mission for Canada and paying a lot of attention to it before launching anybody off on any kind of mission.
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Thank you for that.
My impression from both you gentlemen is that in fact what we need to do for our Canadian Forces is to, for lack of a better term, “train them for war”--we've heard that before--and that will allow them to do peacekeeping missions.
Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual
Or fight floods in my hometown of Winnipeg, or find lost kids, or fight forest fires; they could serve the national interest in all sorts of ways. You can hire civil servants to do all of those things--to fill sandbags--but when push comes to shove, you need an armed forces whose duty is, whose only purpose is, to apply force, deadly force if necessary, to enforce the policies of the government of the day--lawfully, of course.