Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.
I first wrote on peacekeeping 50 years ago, when I was a fourth-year cadet at the Royal Military College. I did a long undergraduate thesis on the subject. I was then a true believer in the virtues of peacekeeping, but within half a dozen years I had become a skeptic. Fifty years later, I'm afraid I remain a skeptic.
Why is that? The reasons are pretty clear: the political paralysis and continuing administrative inefficiencies of the UN; the overwhelming lack of political will in New York to resolve crises that have led to peacekeeping operations that never end; the Canadian public's belief that peacekeeping is cost-free, when in fact it has resulted in the deaths of more than 120 Canadian servicemen; the Canadian public's belief that all that is required for peacekeeping is a blue beret, a belief that has greatly impacted the Canadian Forces for decades as governments have eagerly seized on this myth to cut the defence budget; and finally, the public attitude that persists that all the Canadian Forces should do is benign blue-beret peacekeeping, rather than robust operations of any kind.
Nonetheless, Canada did do peacekeeping, and the Canadian Forces were very good at it. It was never a major priority of the government and the military, however, no matter what white papers may have said or what Canadians believed. UN and other peace operations never absorbed more than 10% of budgets and personnel.
Moreover, we did peace operations not out of altruism, but because they served western interests, as at Suez in 1956, the Congo in 1960, and Cyprus in 1964. We did them because we had an expeditionary military geared to operating with NATO, a force that had good logistics and communication skills while not many other smaller states did. And we did them because the public liked peacekeeping. It did not divide Canadians the way the world wars or Korea had, for instance.
It's a cliché to say that the world has changed since the end of the Cold War, but like most clichés, it's true. It has changed, and so have peace operations, which are now much more robust and much more difficult. The United Nations record in dealing with peace enforcement is, if anything, worse even than its spotty record in handling the more benign forms of peacekeeping. That is, of course, why the UN has increasingly subcontracted its operations to organizations such as NATO or the Organization for African Unity. Generally, these organizations have fared better. NATO more or less resolved the situation in former Yugoslavia and is trying to do so in Afghanistan. The OAU, its members' militaries much less effective than NATO's, has had no success in Darfur. I see no sign that the UN will be able to mount effective, robust operations at any time. Certainly the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo offers little reason for optimism.
My pessimism is not meant to suggest that Canada should opt out of all peace operations. There are two things that should determine whether we participate: the country's national interests and the capabilities of the Canadian Forces.
Our national interests are pretty clear. Canada must defend its territory, its people, and its unity. It must work to strengthen the economic welfare of its citizens. And as a liberal democracy, Canada must cooperate with its friends in advancing democracy and freedom. These interests require that we focus first on our own territory, then on North America and the western hemisphere, and then on areas of the world like the Middle East or southwest Asia, where conflicts are likely to expand and threaten us all.
As an aside, the Afghan mission, not a peace operation, is justified, in my view, because the region is so volatile, and there are nuclear weapons in the neighbouring states.
As another example, nearer to us, Haiti cannot be allowed to slip further into chaos. We have national interests at play there. Alongside these national interests, we have humanitarian values that must be considered, as is true in both Afghanistan and Haiti.
But we can do nothing without a capable military. At the beginning of the 1990s, for example, the Canadian Forces was in a state of rust-out, its strength sapped by overuse and a failure to invest in equipment. The budget cuts after 1995 made matters worse, and it has taken Herculean and expensive efforts to rebuild capacity.
We now have a small, very capable army, navy, and air force, but the operative word for all three is small. The CF has been strained to the breaking point by the efforts involved in sustaining a 2,800-person force in Afghanistan. Twenty years ago, Canadians talked optimistically of deploying a brigade overseas. Today we struggle to sustain the commitment of a force half the size.
This is not good enough for a nation of Canada’s standing, and if we want to be able to play a role in peace operations or in coalition operations of any kind or in the defence of Canada and North America, we are far from finished the rebuilding of the Canadian Forces. The situation is better than it was in 2005, but until numbers are increased, and ships, aircraft, and armoured vehicles are contracted and acquired, the process of rebuilding will not be complete.
What is clear to me is that it is important that we carefully consider national interests and capabilities in every deployment we wish to make. Not every UN operation is good. Not every non-UN operation is bad. Some people have suggested that only the UN is good and that everything touched by the United States must be bad. This is flatly wrong. The proper test to determine Canadian participation is an assessment of national interest and Canadian Forces capability. Will it serve our interests, broadly speaking, to participate? Can we do the job? Those are the key questions to ask.
In the Congo and Darfur I believe that the answer was and is no, notwithstanding the humanitarian needs. White troops that are dependent on a long logistical chain and troops that require special training and equipment are what we have, and they are not necessarily useful there. Better to make a cash contribution or to offer aid than to deploy the CF on the wrong mission.
We should, however, be willing to offer military assistance to peace operations if there is strong political will at the UN or among our allies. We should be willing if the funds are committed. We should be willing if the host nation or nations agree to accept foreign soldiers on their soil and demonstrably want to resolve the crisis. We should be willing if the exit strategy is clear or if a withdrawal date is stated in advance by the UN or by our Parliament. We should be willing if the Canadian Forces can do the job and if the mission serves Canada’s interests. And it must be taken as a given that we should be willing if the troops we deploy will have the right equipment and training and the requisite numbers to achieve the operation’s purposes.
Only if these principles are in place should the Government of Canada send its men and women abroad. In other words, let us not any longer rely on platitudes and myths. Let us be honest and modest. We are not a moral superpower. We are not divinely gifted peacekeepers. We are not neutral. We ought never to make virtually automatic commitments to the United Nations or other peace operations. Again, from 1956 to 1967, we did. We need, instead, hard-headed, realistic assessments of our situation and interests, and Parliament should be required to approve all deployments. Public support is essential, and the House of Commons must be involved in such decisions.
If Canada wishes to play a role in future peace operations, some of which will certainly involve combat and casualties, then the government must provide the requisite funding to ensure success. So a peace operation, yes, but only if it is something we can do and something that is right for us.
The task of the Canadian government, any Canadian government, is to properly assess the factors involved and to provide what is needed to make successful operations a certainty.
Thank you very much.