A lot of the people you have to negotiate with—and there's a long history, as I alluded to, of negotiated outcomes—are people who have blood on their hands. That's just the reality. They're often not very nice people, and sometimes those people, if there is a negotiated resolution, form the next government. We've seen that in Central America and we've seen that in sub-Saharan Africa in some of the negotiated conflicts. So we shouldn't be shy of negotiation.
The real question is, why do parties come to the table? They come to the table when the costs of a political settlement appear to be lower than the costs of continued fighting. I would submit that the challenge with the Taliban—which is a very amorphous entity and there are many factions and interests, and there's low-hanging fruit that, yes, can be co-opted by President Karzai and others, but there are others who can't—for those who are really intent on waging the struggle, the real question is, what's in it for them if they see NATO heading for the exit, if they see countries like Canada heading for the exit, if they think if they just hang on for long enough they'll be able to pursue their goals through military means and through insurgency because Karzai is weak? What's the incentive structure there for them to change that fundamental political calculus?