My point wasn't that all conflicts can be negotiated; it's that all conflicts are. That's the way conflicts end. That doesn't mean the military process hasn't influenced enormously how the negotiations go and all that sort of thing. That's one point. That's what happens.
Secondly, it is also part of the pattern that the adversary is viewed as being the unique one that can't be negotiated with, that in other places it may be possible, but in this case it's not possible.
I used the example of Mozambique. That was an extreme case. It's the same with the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. These are people of no redeeming virtue, who don't want to deal but who we sit down at the table with.
In Afghanistan, that may be a perception, but I have met with people in Afghanistan who, though not identifying themselves as Taliban, are highly sympathetic to the Taliban, who think they can negotiate strongly but who also realize that riding into Kabul and taking over the government is not something that's going to happen. So they realize that there's going to have to be some negotiating there.
I think the pattern in Afghanistan isn't so totally different from everywhere else. Ultimately it's going to come to that process.