National Defence Committee on Oct. 28th, 2010

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Okay. I'm just trying to keep it focused.

You've talked a lot about what kinds of things the planes might be used for. Is there a paper or a doctrine or a document you could make available to the committee that sets out the kinds of missions you would expect an airplane of this nature to be engaged in, something that says here are the threats we see, or here are the operations we see Canada participating in for which we decide we need equipment? It would be a sort of strategic thing, I suppose.

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

I suppose the document that does have a certain amount of that information would be the Canada First defence strategy. It does talk about the strategic level need for these kinds of technologies.

The air force doctrine manuals--we're revising our own internal documentation--is our view of the world and how the air force needs to operate within it. We have doctrine on fighter operations and future needs that is embedded in our own air force internal thinking process, if you will.

Those would be informative, but they don't drive the statement of requirements; the requirements are based on very specific tasks. It explains how air power should be employed, how it's integrated, and how it's leveraged.

The theology of air power is found in our air doctrine, which is web-based. We can certainly give you the web address, should you be interested.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That's public.

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

It is available to the public, yes, sir.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

But that's not a strategic analysis in terms of what Canada would want to do.

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

It's not a classified intelligence analysis, no. It's our doctrinal view of how air power needs to evolve in the future.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

I will give the floor to Mr. Hawn for five minutes.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Through you to Colonel Burt, we've obviously talked a lot about stealth capability, the F-35, and fifth generation. There have been people suggesting that older airplanes are just as good, or whatever.

Can you talk about the difference in the stealth capability between the F-35 and the Super Hornet, which is obviously the airplane that is most on people's minds?

[Col Dave Burt]

Mr. Chairman, with your approval, I will use another couple of slides that I will be able to leave with you.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

That's convenient.

[An hon. member]

He comes prepared.

[Col Dave Burt]

There's been a lot of discussion about the nature of the differences between the F-35 and other options we were considering. We use slides in a briefing, obviously, and I've brought hard copies to show the nature of the difference.

These aircraft are all in their combat-ready state, and there's clearly a difference between the one on the right and the ones on the left. That is what comprises stealth. People often ask how you tell whether an aircraft is stealthy. Well, when you first look at it, you can see when it is in its combat-ready state.

What is good about the F-35 is that after you advance beyond the high threat environment where stealth is no longer required, you can take more ordnance on the outside--external--and you start to look similar to the other aircraft. But that's in an environment where you don't need to have the stealth capabilities. This type of flexibility gives the Government of Canada a range of options that does not exist with any other option.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

And speaking of slides, I've seen these slides before. They're well illustrated.

I'm obviously familiar with the program, and these are the kinds of questions I would expect Colonel Burt to be able to answer.

I can't remember, so I won't state the number, but I recall seeing a slide where it had a relative range, a detection kill range between an F-18 and an F-35. The difference was substantial. I don't want to say the number in case it's classified, but can you give us an indication of the distance...how far away the F-35 might be to kill a Hornet before the Hornet even knew it was there?

[Col Dave Burt]

Indeed the numbers are classified, but we can say that the objective with a stealth aircraft is to be able, if necessary, to destroy the adversary aircraft before the adversary aircraft even knows you are there.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

We talked a bit about cost analysis of the in-service support with the F-18. Of course, we started flying the airplane in 1982, and we didn't sign a contract for the in-service support until 1986.

I would suggest that the kind of process we're going through now with the F-35 is not much different from what we've gone through with previous programs that have turned out rather well. It's part of the learning as you go process. Is that a fair statement?

[Col Dave Burt]

Indeed we are miles ahead of where we were at the same time in our new fighter aircraft project in terms of the understanding of the sustainment costs. We have a concept we intend to pursue. We understand we intend to pursue this collectively, which will give us the best value option for sustaining the aircraft for the long term, and we understand from the initial cost estimates that this will be affordable.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Through you, Mr. Chair, to Colonel Burt, we pay you, Mr. Ross, and all folks like you a fair amount of money to give us the best advice on whatever it is, based on your experience and knowledge.

This is a rhetorical question, but do you find it a bit odd that large groups of people don't seem to want to believe you? You can answer that in any way you like.

[Col Dave Burt]

I don't know if I would describe it as “odd”; it's perhaps a bit frustrating. It's the discussion that went on today.

We are a privileged nation among the other partners in the JSF program to have what's on offer. I often describe what's on offer as very impressive. I wish I could tell all of you the details of what's on offer. I'm not able to do that.

Indeed, as Mr. Hawn has suggested, it is a little disconcerting, perhaps frustrating, to the small group of people who have had the privilege of dealing with this level of information, understanding clearly that with these kinds of capabilities the best value option, the option that provides the best capability for the longest life at the least cost to Canada, is the F-35. It's a little disconcerting that we have to continuously reconfirm our convictions.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

As a professional officer and a very experienced person—and, again, this is a pretty rhetorical question—how devastating would it be to you and people you know and people who are counting on you if, while we're improving the process, as processes always need improving, we killed this program for the sake of improving a process that has already been approved well along? What would be the impact of killing this program?

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

A point of order, Mr. Chairman.

We're happy to have the generals here, and asking questions is part of the democratic process. That is what our armed forces fight for: democracy. This is part of democracy. To suggest that asking questions of people who are highly intelligent, who are serving our country, and that we have an obligation to test that.... There's nothing wrong with that. To ask the generals and Colonel Burt to comment on this process I think is out of order for this committee. This is not what we're here for.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Chairman, it's a legitimate question to ask a professional military officer, who has lived with these kinds of programs throughout his career and is being followed by other younger people who are going to live with whatever decisions government makes, what the impact on the air force would be of killing this program.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Yes. Okay.

Can you answer this question briefly?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think the reaction is frustration, because we know the value of this program, and it would be very disappointing to see Canada lose an opportunity to get what it needs at best cost. It would be disappointing to miss a very significant opportunity as a nation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chair, I understand that it can be frustrating to hold information that cannot be disclosed and then get an earful from a committee. However, I support what Mr. Harris has just said.

I sense another kind of discomfort. In fact, there is a direct relationship between the Conservative Party and these witnesses. I do not appreciate the fact that they are here with their files and are ready to support the parliamentary secretary.

I would like to remind you of one thing regarding the parliamentary secretary. In previous legislatures, when the Conservatives were in the opposition, they demanded that the Liberal parliamentary secretary be excluded. Their argument at the time was that the parliamentary secretary could not do impartial work because he was under the orders of the minister.

I do not appreciate that—and I think that everyone noticed this—they already have their charts ready to support him whenever the parliamentary secretary asks a question. I have nothing against them, because they must obey orders. However, I do object to what the parliamentary secretary and the government are doing.

I find such behaviour reprehensible, and we should not tolerate that here. The parliamentary secretary should come out and say that he will no longer use that type of approach with the Canadian Armed Forces.