I just want to put my view on the record, having listened to Colonel Gleeson. I think it is important to understand that there is a principle of law, an interpretation, that if you give expression to one general power, it can exclude other powers, so if you say you can make general instructions, that could be interpreted to include that you're not allowed to make specific instructions. I think the Latin is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. I think that's what Colonel Gleeson was referring to when he talked about the fact that if you write one down, it means you've got to deal with the other one. so I accept that, even if clause 1 says the provost marshal acts under the general supervision of the vice-chief of defence staff in respect to responsibilities.
I think that if you start giving these general powers, you have to give the specific ones as well. I'm satisfied with the transparency contained in proposed subsections 18.5(2) and 18.5(4) in terms of satisfying the public interest.
The only quibble or reservation I may have is with proposed subsection 18.5(5), which allows the provost marshal to keep the instructions to himself. That isn't only in relation to the specific instructions, as I understand it. Perhaps, Colonel Gleeson, you can tell us some examples of when the best interests of justice would motivate the provost marshal not to make these instructions available.