National Defence Committee on Nov. 17th, 2011

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

Okay.

In essence, the chain of command is the key. You're quite familiar, I think, with the way we maintain the chain of command at unit levels and with the responsibilities you provide as direction to a unit commanding officer.

As a formation commander, I have units, I have commanding officers, I have training opportunities. We will deploy capabilities, measure capabilities and responsiveness, and then essentially ensure and maintain that level of operational capability as required.

To give you an example, Joint Signal Regiment deployed to Petawawa in the last month. They will have established capability to see what their field training standards are, what their level of deployability is. At the same time, they measure back to me and tell me that they have a lot of their people and equipment deployed right now.

So I get a constant feedback measure as an operational commander to ensure that I know what levels and standards of capability we have in place, based on the responsiveness that I need. Again, in some functional areas—and this may not be as self-evident—I need to have contracting expertise that is ready to go and to deploy out the door. I need to rely on Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) and procurement services in addition to military contract expertise to have people ready—and this is more a case of individual readiness—so that if there is a Haiti mission or if we are providing a search and rescue support to Jamaica, I'm able to augment that initial task force and get it out the door.

So I will maintain a certain level of capability, and that is a technical competency in addition to an individual fitness capability for deployments.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

If you see that something went wrong, that, for example, the response was not prompt enough, that something was not satisfactory based on the set standards, what mechanisms do you put in place to ensure that this error or situation is not going to happen again? How do you get back on track?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

We talk about lessons learned and feedback loops. CANOSCOM works in a very dynamic environment. I've been in place for just over two years now. We have been constantly engaged in operations over that two-year period, so I get constant feedback about whether we are providing the right level of support for what we do. I'm not trying to be coy by any means, but very clearly, our ability to deploy and support operations is probably my best litmus test of whether we have the right capabilities and the right measures in place.

Then what I need to do, and you're highlighting that, is be attentive to lessons learned, from a technical perspective specifically, to allow us to ensure that if there are weaknesses in my training or in my competencies I can address those as we move forward.

Much of it ends up being technical. Whether I'm talking about materiel management or accounts structures or some other matter, I have a very knowledgeable team that works in Montreal and I have a supply unit there. They do all the theatre activation of supply accounts. I won't say they're a “one of”, but it's a different type of activity in terms of how they conduct their business of support to deployed operations.

They have never been out of work. They are working day to day. It's almost like a business practice. You essentially take operational activities that are happening and address those, based on whether you see weaknesses, and if you do, you temper them.

But I would say it's incremental pieces. It's not huge things, cases in which I've had to go in and say “not good enough” and we have changed systematically our whole approach. I would say the operational tempo and the environment and responsiveness have allowed me to view capabilities on an ongoing basis and make sure that we are managing it to the best extent possible.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Norlock, you have the floor.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to the witness, thank you for being here this morning.

First of all, I'd like to talk about the Libyan operation and how it differed from other operations such as Afghanistan and the Olympics, in that solely two units or parts of the Canadian Armed Forces were used—air and naval—with no boots on the ground, as it were.

Did CANOSCOM play a part in that, and what part did you play, if any, in that operation?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

Sir, thank you for the question.

You're quite right that in this operation two services primarily did the force generation, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy. What was different from Afghanistan, in simple terms.... The air force, of course, has a very specific characteristic that allows it to do things more rapidly: it's got aircraft. So its ability to get into a theatre, to have effect, to be in place quicker is just self-evident by its capability. Likewise, the navy has always had a readiness capability that allows it to deploy. Again, this is a CEFCOM activity, so it would be best if you talked to the commander of CEFCOM in terms of his views.

In my view, from a sustainment perspective, just back to what we did to assist, the reality—not challenges—of operating in Libya was that a lot of the air force basing was in Italy. There was goodness in that because it was a NATO nation. In fact, I had previously signed with Italy what we call a mutual logistic support arrangement, which means in essence that with NATO nations we can use—not barter—services and on a cost-recovery basis pay for those services. In fact, I ended up augmenting the task force going in, very much air-force-centric, based on the Italy piece, and just added capability to them as they put in place such things as the fuel agreements, contract agreements, and then the basing agreements and housing agreements and such. So that was probably primarily where I would have provided assistance at the front end.

And then, very clearly, there is the sustainment piece. So once the operation is up and running, for the most part, again focused more on the air force—ships tend to be very self-sufficient, except when they come alongside to refuel and replenish—it was the sustainment piece of the air force elements that became the focal point for that operation.

Again, it was very dynamic. One of the things I have learned is that the pre-existing agreement structure is—I won't say essential—very beneficial for being able to stand up and operate in a very complex and demanding environment. So even though it was a NATO nation, even though it was in Europe where we have worked on occasion, I'm sure it was very challenging for those on the ground.

But, again, I would suggest comments from the commander of CEFCOM would be more appropriate, in terms of views.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

In answering a previous question, I think you alluded to part of the answer you're going to give me in the next question. We're dealing with readiness, and we sometimes get the impression.... My background is in policing. You're out doing your general patrol and at any second you could be bang in the middle of something pretty large. Would I be correct in assuming that the Canadian Forces is in a constant mode of training, etc., and capable or ready to address any kind of mission that may be required?

We've heard that you plan at any time for six different types of mission. You did allude to Haiti being one of those that really complicated things, but you were able to sustain that operation—by the way, very well in Canadians' eyes, especially those in my area. Northumberland—Quinte West has CFB Trenton, and of course a lot of the operation came out of there.

Does CANOSCOM have any forces in a high-readiness posture, ready to support a rapid response should a call come? In other words, are you ready to turn the key and get out there?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

Again, I alluded to it in answer to another question. The short answer is yes. So for known types of operations, I cited two—non-combatant evacuation operations and disaster assistance and relief—and we have another one, major air disasters. Those are essentially plans that sit on the shelf and indicate a level of readiness and response. I couch that as high response, because the timelines for those are “move now”. In that sense, yes, CANOSCOM does maintain capabilities in certain functional areas that we would need to augment a task force moving out the door, so that we can be very responsive, in terms of time and space, to be able to act on that.

The other piece you alluded to, in terms of readiness—of course, you are going to have an opportunity with the service chiefs, and specifically the Royal Canadian Air Force, to talk about their force generation, because they are the force generation commands, and quite rightly so. Yes, one thing we do all the time, and need to, is to have a culture of training and education. That is just the reality for the Canadian Forces. I always like to say logistics is a little bit different. We train every day because we are executing every day.

Again, the high readiness piece in CANOSCOM I talked to, but I would suggest that the bulk of the rest of the operational support command units, formations, and technical capabilities maintain a level of response and readiness to be able to respond to the timelines of other types not as time-sensitive, perhaps, as the three I gave as examples.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Brahmi, you have five minutes.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chair, I am going to yield my time to Ms. Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you.

In your opening remarks, you said that roughly 300 civilians worked at the Kandahar airfield. Those civilians, though used to working with military members, are still civilians. Could you tell me how you train and help them to adjust to a military role? What guidance do you give them so that they do not compromise the operations or operational readiness and so that they can function in a military environment that might be dangerous?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

Madam, thank you for the question.

The CANCAP is a contract, and it essentially puts in terms and conditions in terms of the readiness and the requirements of the individuals. So in terms of the training and the requirements for those employees who would be deployed, it is up to the contractor to maintain a level of training that we will stipulate in that contract.

One thing I need to articulate is that we are very pragmatic in terms of when we would use that contract, and the environment under which.... Yes, Afghanistan is a dangerous place, but you note I stated that those contractors were used at Kandahar airfield. What we don't do is we do not put, in this case, contracted civilians in what we would consider adverse risk considerations. This is because--as you suggested in your initial comments--the training requirement would be high and the risk would be extreme. So that's the idea in general terms.

When they operate, they operate within the command and control structure of a support element that operates in the task force, and the terms and conditions of how they operate are laid out in the contractual arrangements, but discipline-wise, again, they are subject to the code of discipline of the military. They have to follow our rules, regulations, and operating procedures while employed.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Are those civilians really used as a temporary solution to military staff shortages, while waiting to recruit and train more forces in this line of work? Or is this the direction the Canadian Forces want to take?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

The key, I would say, is flexibility. What you want to have in a support continuum...you have military people with functional capabilities, you have contracted solution space, and an option in contracted solution space--what we have--is what we call the CANCAP, the civilians. Will we continue to use it? We will continue to maintain that contract. So in fact that contract presently, if I'm correct, takes us out to December 2012, and we're in the process right now of re-competing the framework of that contract. How we use that contract is essentially if we have a deployed operation, and--back to an earlier question--capacity, how much, when, and where. It allows us to maintain a level of capability that is essentially on the shelf, so that if we were in a scenario where the government had asked us to deploy to a number of missions at the same time, and we needed additional flexibility to augment existing support relationships, then this contract is a venue, or a tool, that we could use.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Do you intend at the moment to have other contracts like that, where civilians are used in other areas?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

I will give you some context in terms of how we use it. The types of services that CANCAP actually provide right now are administration, supply, transportation, health, environment, equipment, food, communication, waste management, water supply. So we have put a range of functions into that contract. Again, what we essentially allow ourselves to do is...our first response, of course, is military. Our first response is environment dependent. What we would not do is use the contract if the environment was seen as so hostile that it was risk adverse for that contract to be used. Then what we do have is that range.

So there is a range of services, and we compete that contract with a range of services, with the view that if we need it, those are the traditional types of functions by which we could complement existing military capability.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much.

Moving on, I have Madam Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General McQuillan, would you compare and contrast the former system prior to CANOSCOM standing up in 2006? How did it work before?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

Prior to the dot-com establishment, we had the deputy chief of staff organization. I did not work in it, so I can't comment on how it conducted its business at that time. But when we stood up the transformation, or when transformation and the dot-coms were established, the first thing we were doing was separating strategic from the operational capability. We were focusing based on the span and scope of operations. It allowed CDS to focus operations on international, domestic, support, and special, all in one context. So that was the advantage of it.

Previously, you would have had some of those, what I call joint enablers in the army, navy, and air force. At the same time, within the DCDS, you would have had a matrix solution that would have brought together those functional aspects and then tried to bring together whatever that force component structure needed to be. What you did not have was a person or organization that spent most of the time focused on operational support to operations. You ended up with, as an example, ADM (Mat). You have a military capability there. In fact, the depots came from ADM (Mat) when CANOSCOM was formed. You would have had from the ADM, Infrastructure and Environment, military engineering advice and support. Those pieces now reside within my purview. I'm able to maintain an operational support process that allows me to apply military support resources more quickly and directly on an ongoing basis. So it's focused, and it is just the concentrated effort of capability.

I still have reach-back, so the policy authority with the ADM (Mat) still exists. I still need direction, support, and advice when we're doing certain things such as disposal, or working with contract authorities. But there's very much an enforcing function with CANOSCOM. We have the requisite expertise around the table to formulate a plan and put it together.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

So previously there were redundancies, because they were being done by the different arms of the Canadian Forces?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

I wouldn't say redundancies. I would say that we're now more concentrated on bringing those joint enablers together.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

There was reference made in your testimony to cost savings. Do you have any idea of the amount of money saved on behalf of Canadians through the setting up of CANOSCOM?

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

I would not have an idea on that, sorry.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

You just know that there have been cost savings.

[MGen Mark McQuillan]

There have been efficiencies and economies in how we do business, yes.