National Defence Committee on Dec. 13th, 2011

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and through you, thank you, General, for coming today.

Like Mr. Strahl, I have ancestors from the RCAF. My father joined the RCAF in 1942, and ended up as a navigator in a Lancaster bomber until the end of the war.

I want to come back to the issue of F-35s. This is no surprise, I'm sure, to those opposite. Mr. Strahl has already anticipated this. On our side of the House, we stand up and ask questions fairly frequently about the F-35, and it usually ends up with our asking government when they're going to put this contract out to tender. It is our hope that at some point in time, given all the news that's coming out of the United States with respect to the F-35, that's what this government will do.

In the meantime, the question for you, General, is why did this particular contract never go out to tender in the first place?

[LGen André Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

I can't really speak to the process with tenders and competition. That's really not my domain. Mr. Ross would be better placed to explain the rationale and process. All I can say is that in 2010 we completed the statement of requirements and the option analysis, and made recommendation to government that the F-35, from our point of view, was the best platform for Canada, both from a cost point but also, more importantly, from an operational effectiveness point in the decades to come.

The process of acquisition was then passed over to outside the air force, and the decisions that were made were based on the best judgment from government.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

The 2016 date that you used in your comments this morning with respect to the purchase of the F-35s doesn't seem to have changed at all. Yet we keep hearing news out of the United States that there are significant delays in the production of the F-35. Even last week there was news of the discovery of hotspots and that sort of stuff. As best I can figure from all the news I read on this matter, we have a delay period of three to five years.

I'm wondering how the year 2016 in your comments enters into the equation. On what basis, in light of all the news, can you still reasonably anticipate 2016 as the delivery date?

[LGen André Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

The year 2016 remains one of our planning figures as far as a goal to negotiate towards and start from is concerned. As I pointed out previously, Canada has flexibility as to when we actually launch into full-rate production and acquisition. The year 2016 was more of our start point in that process. There was only going to be one airframe procured that year. The big numbers for us come at the end of the decade. Really, 2016 is that first check mark to validate whether that's the year we're going to start. It's still, as part of our planning process, what we are driving at. Whether, when we get to the contract negotiations, that's the year we acquire the first airplane is yet to be determined. That's why we're still aiming at late 2016 as that first decision-point for looking for that sweet spot of acquisition.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

If 2016 is still just a planning concept and we add in the delays, most of the acquisition is intended to follow that by about three years. If we have a delay of three to five years, we'd be well into the 2020s for the purchase of what I think you referred to as the block III purchase. They are presumably, or at least theoretically, the lower-cost airplanes. That is well beyond the lifetime of the CF-18 that you've described today.

In terms of readiness, these planning concepts are great, but when we're talking about having planes in the air and national defence, the timing seems well out of whack by five years at least. What are you doing to account for those very real possibilities?

[LGen André Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

Again, Mr. Ross would probably be in the best position to answer questions about timelines for procurement. My understanding right now is that although you're hearing all kinds of different numbers in regard to project delays, we are not concerned at this point. You're using three to five years. I don't think that's what we're understanding as the issue. There's probably a pessimistic view out there.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

You're out of time, Mr. Kellway.

[LGen André Deschamps]

The point is that we understand the challenge of any production delays, and we're watching that very closely. We have flexibility in our program. The year 2016 was a start point for us, but it's not a fail point, if you know what I mean. We can actually increase production in certain years to make up for a slightly later start. At this point in time, we're not concerned that this will become problematic for us. But we are watching it closely, as all of our allies are, to ensure that we are able to adjust our production timelines to our needs, as far as the transition goes.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, General.

Mr. Daniel, you have the floor.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you, General, for being here.

My questions will be all over the place, as it were, but let's start with the CF-18.

I understand that the airframe for the CF-18 has a limited life, and that a number of the airframes are therefore no longer available for flying. In terms of upgrading and keeping them up, it doesn't seem to make sense, since they're already about 28 years old.

Can you comment on that?

[LGen André Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

We initially bought 138 CF-18s. That was in the early 1980s. We still had a fairly large footprint in NATO bases in Europe and so on. With the consolidation in early 2000, when we brought those assets back from Europe, there was a decision made that only 80 aircraft would remain in our operational fleet and be modernized. In other words, the reinvestment was based on our current defence needs and not on the ones from the early 1980s. We have modernized those 80 airplanes, although we've lost three since then. The 77 aircraft remaining are good until, I'd say, the end of life of the F-18. The numbers will remain firm all the way to the end of the decade. As we get into the next decade, obviously, we'll have to start retiring the airplanes as they run out of those operational hours. But right now, our transition plan allows for that transition between the operational fleet as it ages out and the new fleet as it comes online.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

So you clearly will be able to maintain your operational readiness through to the period when you pick up the F-35s.

[LGen André Deschamps]

That is correct. The intention is to overlap between the two.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

There has been a lot of talk about the price of the F-35s. Could you share with us the actual cost or cost ratio of the maintenance of it? Clearly, this aircraft is very sophisticated. There are a lot of sophisticated electronics. You will need a lot of automated test equipment and software support systems. Can you tell us a bit about that?

[LGen André Deschamps]

I'm probably not in the best position to talk about the details of in-service support and long-term maintenance. Mr. Ross would probably have more details. My understanding is that the cost of long-term in-service support will be in the range of $250 million to $300 million per year. It's a fairly solid understanding of the costs, which are going to be the same as what we would pay for the maintenance of a generation 4.5 fighter. I think we're confident that the costs will be in that range, and therefore affordable in our current budgeting.

The technology will require less maintenance, but I think as everybody understands, the components are probably more expensive. In the end, that's what the cost drivers will be, that is, the overall cost of the work on the airplane and the cost of the components that need to be replaced.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

The aircraft contains a lot of software. Are you going to work with the partners on the software upgrades so that we don't have a uniquely Canadian aircraft that requires special maintenance?

[LGen André Deschamps]

That's one of the powerful incentives of this program. There are a couple things that the F-35 does differently from previous fighter fleets. One is that the airplane never becomes obsolete. Nine nations in the partnership have invested in long-term software upgrades. It's a jointly led program funded through the partnership, and is part of the in-service support costs. Every two years, the aircraft softwares will be upgraded and retrofitted to all the fleets. You're never more than two years out from the latest software upgrades for the airplane, and this is something that we've never had with any of our fleets.

With the F-18, we had to spend a significant amount of money on software upgrades and hardware improvements to bring the airplane, after 20 years, back up to international standards. The F-35, throughout the life of the aircraft, will always be within two years of the latest aircraft coming off the factory floor, which is something we've never had before. That's leading-edge technology for the life of the program.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

It will help to maintain the fleet and reduces the overall cost for the F-35 in the long term.

[LGen André Deschamps]

It would give us a combat-ready airplane from the day we acquire it to the day we retire it.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, Mr. Daniel.

Who is next on our list?

Mr. Brahmi, you have the floor.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to ask the general a question.

As part of the F-35 decision-making process, Boeing proposed the Super Hornet to the Royal Canadian Air Force. One of Boeing's criticisms at the time was that the Canadian Forces did not consider the stealthiness of the Super Hornet.

I'd like to hear your comments on the matter. I'd like to know how the Super Hornet's stealthiness is not as good as that of the F-35.

[LGen André Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

As I mentioned previously, we started to really look at this in detail around 2003 to 2005. We saw that we had to replace the CF-18s with an aircraft that had to be manned. The study done in 2003 determined that the only thing that could replace a fighter jet was another fighter jet.

Since then, and even today, we are looking at the options available on the market. We took part in an analysis. We talked to our partners, particularly our main partners, the ones we do a lot of business with. And the working group that was set up conducted analyses. Each nation did its own analysis, but the information on the intelligence and capacity of the aircraft was shared. So we have a fairly in-depth understanding of the capacity of the fleets available on the market. We are very confident: we have the information required to make decisions.

As for the stealthiness, the Super Hornet CF-18 is a very good aircraft. It's a very reliable aircraft, and we really like it. But, although it's a very good aircraft, it isn't the aircraft that Canada needs for the coming decades, 2030, 2040 and 2050. Its stealthiness is not as good as that of the F-35.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Boeing was complaining about the fact that the actual stealth of the Super Hornet was not even studied in the analysis that the Canadian Forces did.

Do you refute that? Was stealth taken into account, or was Boeing right in saying that this parameter had not been studied?

[LGen André Deschamps]

You can rest assured that the parameter was studied in depth. As I said, we have dealt with allied governments that use those planes. So we have quite a thorough understanding of the capabilities of the planes, although the company might have not provided us with all the information it had, as you pointed out. After discussing it with our allies, we have gained a significant understanding of the plane's capabilities.