National Defence Committee on Dec. 15th, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Before I pass the questioning over to Mr. Opitz, I have to vacate the chair. I have to run over to the House to table a bill. Mr. McKay will take over the chair.

If I don't make it back before the committee adjourns, I just want to wish each and every one of you a very merry Christmas, a joyous time with your families and friends back home, and I look forward to seeing all of you in the new year.

Admiral, thanks for coming in today, and please share our season's greetings with all the families of the Canadian armed forces.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

I will do so. Thank you, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Opitz, you have the floor.

Mr. McKay, I ask that you take the chair.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for coming today, Admiral. It's a delight to see you again.

Sir, you started off your career as a reservist in 1977. I remember what those days were like because I started in 1978. What is your view of the reserves now? We've been very integrated. The reserves have very easily plugged into regular force units, certainly most recently on deployment to Afghanistan, but prior to that on other missions in Bosnia and on the smaller missions, UN missions, and African missions that we've sent people on abroad.

What's your view of making sure that level of training, that level of awareness, and that ability to plug and play, if you want to use that term, between the reserves and the regular force remains at a high state, or as high as it can, given the current circumstances?

As you and I both remember, back in the day—three decades-plus—there were clear divisions. And now everything has changed, and there's a very close level of cooperation. People come back and forth, and there's a lot of component transferring into the regular forces, as you did in the early eighties.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Right, and the other way as well, sir.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Yes.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Thank you for the question.

I've seen the reserves evolve significantly over the course of my career. To my mind, the reserves are in a much stronger place than they were when I joined the Canadian Forces.

We have seen almost a full circle, in that when I joined the reserves, the reserve force was very much a mobilization force: an augmentation force lest the country go to war and need that pool of trained people.

It became clear that we couldn't train people quickly enough in the reserves to fulfill the roles we would expect of the regular force, because the regular force was really quite small and specialized at the time. We evolved the reserves into specialized roles for the reserves in many areas in the army, the navy, and the air force.

When the heightened operational tempo came along, a lot of reservists expressed an interest in folding into a regular force training road to operations, as it were, and deploying with the regular force. I think the reserves really proved that they bring huge capability to the fight, and that the types of skill sets reservists bring are different from the regular force in many respects, but their professional competencies are exactly the same. We've reoriented the preparation of training of reservists to position them to be able to fold into Canadian Forces operations.

We have relied on them heavily to be able to support operations and to backfill at a time when we had a very high operational tempo. We need to shift back to really investing in that part-time reserve that can deploy on operations with the regular force; investing in training and capability for the part-time reserve; capturing the incredible experiences people have brought back from operations and plugging that back into the armoury floor, the naval reserve divisions, and the air reserves to create the enthusiasm, the commitment, and the ongoing expertise that will position us for the future.

Some aspects of the reserves will continue to be an important component of our total force. The army has significant reserve components in some of their ready forces, and they have structured themselves that way for a reason. The air force relies heavily on reserves just to manage surge in their operations, and they've been surging for a while. The navy is looking at a shift in the employment of reserves, from maritime coastal defence vessels being an exclusive domain to how reserve employment could be advantageous across the entire fleet to make the personnel pool more flexible and more agile.

I could talk about reserves for a couple of hours, but I see this as continuing to evolve. As we transition out of this high period of operational tempo, when we have relied so heavily on reserves on a full-time basis, a big priority for us is to invest in reserve capability and training on a part-time basis so they can continue to participate as we go along; it will give us that surge capacity in the future.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Opitz. Your time is finished.

We'll go to Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I would like to join my voice to those of colleagues wishing you and everyone who works in NDHQ and across the Canadian Forces in all branches, even in the most far-flung places well beyond Kabul and parts of Africa and so forth, the very best for the holiday season and a merry Christmas. All of us really do appreciate the tempo you maintain and the sacrifices that have been made particularly in recent years. We hope 2010 was an exceptional year. Certainly it was in terms of our recent history. As the season unfolds we have an enormous amount to be thankful for in terms of the work you and your colleagues have done, so we wish everyone a merry Christmas.

I really want to delve into some of your earlier remarks about readiness. Obviously our readiness is an expression of the priorities that have been set by the government and by circumstances in the world, but by being ready for certain missions, we are, in effect, saying we're not ready for other ones, or we are less ready for other ones.

You said that the mission that actually arises as a new priority is often not the one we could predict. We can't predict earthquakes. We couldn't predict 9/11 and so forth.

We have come to have a lot of confidence in the ability of the Canadian Forces to retool and to become ready for new missions, and we understand that readiness involves equipment. It involves training. We understand it involves human resources. There have been improvements on all of those fronts, but there's an issue we haven't heard about yet, which is really the rate of preparation. Obviously it's better to do a lot of training over a long period, but you don't always have that time.

I was wondering if you could discuss how that factor has evolved recently in response to Afghanistan and other missions. How quickly can we become ready for a new mission, and are we doing a better job of that now? Are we doing it faster? Are we able to do it faster than we could in the past? If not, what sacrifices or compromises does this involve?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting question.

Have we improved our rate of preparing forces? We understand the minimum training requirements to put people into harm's way in a modern combat environment, particularly on the ground in Afghanistan now but also in the air and at sea, better than we did 10 or 12 years ago.

What does that mean in terms of the rate of preparation? In some cases it takes more preparation now for people to be ready. We've also confirmed the base skill set that we expect people to have. When we're talking about reserve preparedness, it's very important to me that we have revised the base skill set we expect every reservist to have so that when we start this next echelon of training to prepare for an operation, it's not a question of weapons skills, first aid skills, etc. I would say that we have reaffirmed the basic skill set we expect every soldier, sailor, airman, and airwoman to have. That encompasses fitness as well. It encompasses an awareness of current tactics, techniques, and procedures, but any training for an operation will be specialized.

I would say that we have a better idea of the timeline. I would say that we're investing early, better than we were before, so that we can reduce the amount of mission-specific training that is required. But I would say that we view the first rotation, or “rotation zero”, of an operation as a learning event as much as a doing event.

The other thing we have is a highly developed opportunity to turn lessons learned back into training for the next rotation, almost instantaneously, to the point where in Afghanistan, after we'd had a major incident, if we had learned something from it, that got translated back immediately into the rotation that was planning to come into theatre and was incorporated into their training.

In terms of the agility of preparation and speed of preparation, we have come a long way, but we do invest in making sure the people we put in harm's way are ready to deal with those realities, and there is only so much time you can cut without actually increasing the risk level for people.

Does that—

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Kellway.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Vice-Admiral, I just wanted to reiterate my thanks to you for being here and to all the other chiefs of various part of the forces.

The fact that I have no questions for you today is not to suggest that your comments at the beginning were not helpful or to suggest that any of the other observations and comments from other generals and admirals who have come before us haven't been helpful. It's actually been very educational for me, as a new person on this committee and in this file. I think we've kind of run the course on the issue of readiness, and in fact that we did so quite some time ago.

I appreciate your comments today.

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Kellway.

Minister Baird has now made his announcement, and possibly you'll feel a little less constrained about responding to questions about Syria.

Following on, in effect, Mr. Alexander's question, can you take us through an exercise in preparation for readiness for, in this particular instance, Syria? I'm assuming that the forces have been thinking about this for a fair bit of time at this point. Can you explain to us not only how you go about that, but the lessons you've learned and incorporated from Afghanistan and from Libya, how you think about this, and what stages of preparation you're at, please?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Well, sir, I wouldn't want to give the impression, following on from Minister Baird's announcement, that there would be a contemplation of a military mission in Syria. We are always ready for missions that the Government of Canada may direct us to undertake. We're always ready to provide options for the Government of Canada.

But perhaps it would be more helpful if I were to talk about how we prepared for the mission in Libya and how we advised government on that.

Would that address the same question?

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Well, in politics I'd call that a dodge, but I'll leave it, as that might actually be useful and instructive to the committee.

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

We found the situation in Libya to be quite a surprise, in that six months before or eight months before it was not a part of the world we were really concerned about, and it fairly rapidly turned into a part of the world we were quite concerned about.

The first area of concern in Libya in particular was the safety of Canadians, in fact, the safety of the international community. An initial tranche of planning was aimed at making sure Canadians could be safely evacuated from the country if the situation warranted it, and in fact it did. So the whole of government considered options for doing this and put forward a number of options to government. A decision was made on how to proceed, and then it was revised as the situation developed. Canadian Forces got involved. We had identified a number of aircraft that could be turned to that role, and once it became clear that the Canadian Forces were required, the government directed us to get involved. The aircraft were there within a day to participate in that mission.

We evacuated not just a number of Canadians, but, in cooperation with a number of international partners, in a coordinated operation that was led by the U.K, thousands of people from the areas of conflict to safety.

At the same time—

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

When was it decided to put the ship in?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

At the same time, sir, we were watching the situation as it developed. We were watching the concern in the international community and at the UN.

Looking at the forces that we had ready and the forces that we could make ready, we prepared a series of capability options for the government. We took that forward to offer what capability the Canadian Forces could contribute should the situation worsen, should the international community provide the basis for intervening and the government decide to respond with the Canadian Forces.

We had put options together that we took to the government. As the situation evolved, the government made decisions about the type of Canadian Forces involvement and in fact the type of Government of Canada involvement that would be a follow-on to the developing situation.

One of the things about a warship, sir, is that it takes a while for a warship to get into theatre. Quite often, if you wait until you need it, it's too late. The advantage of a warship, though, is that you can send it anywhere you like, and it's not an expression of anything other than national interest and sovereignty.

So the decision was made earlier to have a warship in the region because of the flexibility it gave for any requirement for further evacuations of people that came to light, and also because of the flexibility it offered in a developing multinational situation or in fact as an expression of independent Canadian interest. Following that, the government made a decision, after the United Nations Security Council took a position on the matter, to join the coalition operation. Shortly after that, the aircraft that we had put on a heightened level of notice to move were ready to go, moved immediately into theatre, and commenced operations the next day.

That's how it all came together. There were a number of options that were put on the table. After options were selected, we continued to advise the government on further Canadian Forces options that would be available should the conditions worsen and should the government wish to have a more robust response. That's our business: it's to be ready to respond in that way. We identified and held the level of readiness of other forces, should things have gotten worse and should the international community and the government have decided to intervene in different ways, so that we could respond to that quickly to meet the need.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you. I'd like to follow that up, but I'm out of time.

For the Conservatives, Chris.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thanks.

We're going to ask two questions, one by me and one by Mr. Chisu, but I'll start.

Admiral, about the environment that is space, we understand that it belongs to you in the chain of command, for lack of—

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

I just rent it, sir.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

You rent it.

We do understand that Canada doesn't have forces in space. We rely on it for communications, etc. But perhaps you could comment on our readiness to do what needs to be done to support missions from space. In making that comment, and given the importance of imagery and communications that rely on satellites in orbit or geostationary satellites, perhaps you could also comment on what Canada's current assessment is of the military risks that we face in space.

For decades there has been concern about some militarization of space, a weaponization of space. To what extent are our capabilities in the communications realm vulnerable there? How do we assess that and its relationship to readiness?

[VAdm Bruce Donaldson]

Thank you. Another great and complex question.

I'm conscious that I'm probably taking too long to answer some of these questions, and I apologize, but clearly it's a subject that interests me and I want to make sure that I can be as clear as possible.

Let me talk about four domains of space: the way it supports operations in terms of communications, the way it supports operations in terms of awareness, the way it gives us awareness of a threat, and the threats that are posed in space.

Let me start by saying that we are very conscious of the Canadian interest in preventing the weaponization of space, and we continue to work very carefully to support that policy of the Government of Canada. As well, the Government of Canada has an interest in space that goes beyond the Canadian Forces, and we work very closely with the Canadian Space Agency and other government departments to manage the government interest in that domain.

From a Canadian Forces perspective, one of our principal uses of space, historically, is to provide communications. Using satellite communications is in fact an excellent way of getting the high-speed, high data rate communications that we need for our modern command and control systems. We invest where we can in that. Historically, we've rented satellites in order to do that for us, and it tends to be quite expensive and you tend to pay by the volume of information. We partner where we can with allied communications systems, but it has historically been insufficient to meet all of our needs. We continue to look for ways to invest in secure, guaranteed, high data rate communications, and spend less money on it because it tends to be quite expensive. There are a couple of initiatives we're pursuing that you may have heard about, which represent cost avoidance in the future, at a fraction of the cost today, by making investments today in that type of capability.

In terms of awareness, we use RADARSAT quite a lot, we use weather satellites, and we use other types of satellites available through allies to increase our awareness of what's going on. That's a very important component of our use of space, because in terms of intelligence surveillance and response and in terms of just being able to understand the domains we're going into, we rely heavily on space instruments to do that for us. We have a number of different programs and a number of different mechanisms for doing that.

In terms of the threat in space, we need a degree of awareness of what is going on in space because quite often space can be used as a domain within which weapons travel that can be a threat to Canada. So an awareness of what's going on in space is very important. As well, space debris has posed problems for us historically, and we're enhancing our ability to understand what type of space debris may be posing a threat to Canada and to predict as best we can—although it is a hugely inexact science—the threat that it may pose to us, so that we can respond to it appropriately.

Finally, there is a threat in space, and we have seen it develop. We have seen weapons testing, and it would be, I think, self-evident that countries would wish to deny potential adversaries the use of space in a conflict. There is work going on in that domain, and we track it carefully. We have to understand the vulnerability of our own space sensors and certainly of allied space sensors, and we work to try make them as robust as we can. But a satellite is a pretty vulnerable piece of kit up in space.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Is there time for a second question?