What I could say is that if I could not promise that I could meet each of those six, then I would make that clear to government, because that's my job.
It's quite clear: we have those six missions and we must be able to respond to them. But there is a difference between responding to major security support with 1,200 people and with 4,500 people. There is a difference between responding to a natural disaster in Canada with 1,000 people and with 10,000 people. There's a difference between the response to an international humanitarian crisis, for example, with two ships and 2,000 people, or with five ships, eight aircraft, and 15,000 people. So the question is, what types of response packages do you want to have available, and at what level of readiness would you hold them?
We are always conscious that when we commit forces—for example, in the recent operation in Libya—we have to immediately start thinking about who will replace those forces if this mission continues, because we can't keep them there forever, and what other forces are available that remain to respond to the other requirements? In many cases, we will identify forces to come up to a higher level of readiness because we have deployed forces to a mission.
But it gets back, again, to managing readiness in the force. If you are holding forces that can be brought up to a level of readiness in about 30 days, that's very different from forces that will take six months to come up to that level of readiness. So in managing the whole machine, that is what readiness—that portion, that pillar of the Canadian Forces—is all about: managing that whole force within limited resources.
I would say that at the core of this is an understanding that if all six of them happened at once, what is sufficient in each of those areas to respond to the expectations of government...? That's a policy decision of government.