If you examine the pattern of defence expenditure growth during the period of the Canada First defence strategy, we've seen some very substantial increases that were made through the supplementary estimates rather than through the main estimates. So they were not immediately as apparent as main estimates figures. As a consequence of that extra flow of funding, we were able to move to the recapitalization of a number of significant platforms and to have new ones. I would say, for example, that the C-17 has had an enormous impact on the logistics capabilities of the forces, as have the other aircraft that have been bought over that period.
Our feeling is that were that pattern of capitalization continued, we would have a good chance of staying in sight of what's going on in technology. But if that is stopped, or even worse, reversed, we will be in a position that some major platforms are going to be very expensive to replace. This, then, drives the question of what we do now.
I would cite, for example, the F-35, whose numbers have been all over the map and are looking more frightening, depending on who is the latest person to comment. Even greater than that is going to be the problem of dealing with the replacement of the destroyers and frigates. There we are seeing some extremely large numbers. For example, the last Canadian patrol frigate built came in at a price of about $850 million. Now, the figure the accounting office cites for equivalent American destroyers, at this point, is over $2 billion per copy. We are looking at sticker shock problems that are going to be pretty horrendous.