National Defence Committee on Feb. 16th, 2012

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the witness.

We're studying readiness. It's all-encompassing: predictability and unpredictability. I'm going to go with the latter. Based on our ability to predict things like the Arab Spring, or Libya, or disasters like Haiti, etc., how important do you think it is to strategically plan for the future, in acquiring new and modern capabilities, developing contingencies, etc.?

I know you referred to wanting our Canadian Forces to be ready for anything, any time. They have told us they are. And then we're stuck with the reality: in order to do that, we need to maintain some rather expensive infrastructure, with the unforeseeable future.

You talked about F-35s, F-18s, those types of things. I'll just deviate a little bit and say this. I come from a paramilitary organization, where the wages and benefits eat up about 90% of the budget. You referred to General Leslie saying it's 60%, and we heard it could be 50%, so let's say it's somewhere in the middle. Things are expensive. The tools necessary to do the job can't be equated with the police force or even a fire department.

I wonder if you could just talk about predictability, readiness, and then what Canadians expect in a shrinking globe, where anything that happens anywhere does affect you, whether it's a bank going down, a very small country, a small economy going down. That type of thing affects everybody. How does that relate to the military and readiness?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

The best example that we have of what armed forces are ultimately is an insurance policy. Ultimately, then, you choose to evaluate your future risk. As you say, it's very unpredictable. You can have a general sense of what kinds of dangers you face and what you might want to be able to do, but there's no real means of being able to predict exactly what you need to do. I would be very careful when it comes to future analysis and predicting where the world is going to be. Generally speaking, we get it wrong, and we tend to need to then be able to adapt to different circumstances.

But I think you can make certain basic judgments. I will just give you an anecdote. One of the most expensive things that you can get, as many of you may know, in terms of home insurance in Canada, is earthquake insurance. Now, you may choose to get it, you may choose to pay for that, but in all likelihood you may not need it. Therefore, you make a calculation based on what you think you may need and think you may be able to acquire. If you are very risk-averse you will pay for it, and therefore you feel protected to the degree that you can.

It's very similar with the capabilities that you invest in your armed forces. In principle, we could say you never know who might attack Canada with a nuclear weapon, so should we build a nuclear deterrent? But we've made the calculation, looking at our allies and looking at the nuclear umbrella under which we exist, that this is not a capability we require.

Similarly, we may arrive at the conclusion that there are other capabilities that we do not require. That really is an assessment of the international security environment as it exists and what your fundamental priorities are--the defence of Canada and the defence of North America.

But then looking overseas, as much as we are affected by events that happen internationally, we also need to be realistic to what degree we can actually affect those events versus our larger allies. If our larger allies tell us that we would be a much better resource to help them in X, Y, and Z, then why do we also insist on maintaining capabilities to do A, B, and C internationally? So this is what is involved with speaking to your allies about what they need from you, in terms of larger cooperation, instead of taking it for granted that the world is a dangerous place, so we need to be able to do everything.

For a country like Canada, that is really prohibitive and it's not really in keeping with a calculated risk assessment and a calculated assessment of how Canada works internationally--namely, with allies, and much larger allies that have the capacity to affect events much more than we do.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

You have three units to the Canadian armed forces. Are you suggesting that we make a determination whether we want to be good at marine types of engagements, since we have probably one of the longest coastlines on the face of the earth? Should we then look at a concentration on air capability because we have one of the largest land masses in the world? I was even somewhat surprised, but then looked at the map and said yes, the distance between Pelee Island and the North Pole.... So we need an air force. Then we've seen and we've heard from other people who talk about the need for an armed forces, because you need bodies to do something if you want to be engaged in any way, shape, or form. What are you suggesting?

Are you suggesting that we concentrate on one or two areas of the three major areas in the Canadian armed forces, or that we have a more selective, more nimble force, and with that selection and agility comes the need to be able to get to places quickly and to be sort of the initial response--

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Norlock, your time has expired by quite a bit.

Professor, if you can give us a brief response, we'd appreciate that.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

Very quickly, what I'm advocating is that you maintain a baseline capability for domestic and continental missions. Then, when it comes to selecting what you do internationally alongside your partners, you can be far more selective in the capabilities that you maintain. Yes, you need a navy. The question becomes do you need a navy that has the ability to guard the coasts and is able to engage in conventional naval warfare against the Chinese in the future, or can you say safely that we don't need that capability, we'll maintain the coasts? You need an air force to maintain North American airspace, but do you also need an air force that's able to engage in a first-run bombing campaign against Iran? You can make that decision as well. Similarly with the army, you may say that we want an army that can provide aid to the civil power in Canada, but should that army also have the capability to engage in mechanized warfare against an opponent? You can also make that choice.

You may decide that one of those is absolutely important for Canada in the future and that you're willing to pay for it, or you may decide that all of them are important. Under the current budget envelope, we are by default making the decision that we can't do it all. Therefore, you can say that you want to do all of these different missions and you want to maintain these capabilities, but as it stands, we're not actually paying the money required to do that.

My reaction to that, then, is to say should we not be asking what we actually want the Canadian Forces to do in the future, internationally?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In one of the articles you co-authored with Mr. Dallaire, you promote the idea of striking a parliamentary committee that would have access to information classified as secret. That would help members and parliamentarians do their job better. One aspect of their job consists in being able to follow the developments within National Defence more closely. The idea is to make the government more accountable. For instance, we have never had access to the statement of operational requirements for the F-35 aircraft, or to the full results of the original invitation to tender for R & D. The methodology was also not published.

If we wanted to do a study on operational readiness, which is rather complex, do you think the committee should have access to classified information on those situations in order to understand them better? Of course, members would have to undergo security screening and agree not to disclose information.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I think that is the case, since those are exactly the types of issues on which the committee should be able to obtain all the data it needs to come to a decision.

When the time comes to discuss the future capabilities of the Canadian Forces, it would be nice to have access to risk and threat analyses developed by the government's executive branch. That way, without being able to make this information public, we would at least be able to ask the government questions. We could say, for instance, that its own analyses indicate that the Canadian Forces won't have to participate in a naval war in the Pacific in the future. Therefore, we could ask why the government would spend $40 billion on that capability. That's one question we could ask.

Of course, having that information and being able to discuss threats in camera—studies have been conducted on threats and on the capabilities the Canadian Forces need—would be of value to members and senators.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

A study is currently being conducted on operational readiness. Do you think we now have all the information we need to conduct that study properly, or are we missing certain information classified as secret, meaning that our study will not necessarily be complete?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

Once again, my answer is yes. We have to recognize the fact that, for instance, General Leslie's report was kept secret for a long time. The report was made public only thanks to a few people within the department.

That report certainly gives us a better idea of the department's financial situation. However, other studies and analyses are being and have probably already been conducted on capabilities and equipment. The government is surely making its decisions based on those studies and analyses.

I think it would be preferable for members to also have access to that information so that they can make a decision regarding the Canadian Forces and the capabilities they will need going forward.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I have a question about the F-35s.

Those aircraft are more useful as part of an integrated defence strategy with allies. From a purely Canadian perspective, the F-35 does not seem to necessarily be the best option for defending Arctic sovereignty, especially because it is a bit slower.

If we are talking exclusively about defending Arctic sovereignty—which the government often mentions to justify choosing those airplanes—don't you think using that argument is a bit strange? We know the F-35 is most useful for bombing foreign countries.

The government is compromising on the best option for defending Arctic sovereignty, if I may say so, by choosing a plane that is better equipped for foreign missions. Therefore, we are giving foreign operations priority over Canadian ones.

Could you comment on that?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

If you read the Canadian Forces' statement of operational requirements, which the department has made public, it is very clear that the F-35 could beat out, for instance, the F-18 E/F thanks to three characteristics.

First, the ability to transmit data between 5th generation aircraft is important.

Second, the aircraft survival rate has to be considered. In other words, the plane has to be stealthy.

Finally, interoperability also has to be considered.

Clearly, those three characteristics would make the F-35 the ideal choice for the Canadian Forces only in overseas operations.

That does not mean the F-35 option is not legitimate. It simply means that aircraft has nothing to do with the capability required to defend Canada's airspace. The F-35 is really built for foreign missions with allies. That's obvious, even based on the government's operational requirements analysis.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Merci.

Mr. Chisu, it's your turn.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Professor Lagassé, for your presentation.

I would like to take the issue that you raised about the general-purpose forces. We are the second-largest country in the world by territory, and we have a population of 33 million, 34 million people. We share a continent with the largest military power in the world. So in your opinion, is it a good idea to maintain this general-purpose force, or do you see something else happening in this scenario?

I want to avoid issues like the DEW line, for example. We didn't have much input on establishing the North American defence, but if there had been a general-purpose force, not necessarily a super big one, we could have had a different approach to these issues and we would have avoided environmental disasters and all that.

When you are speaking about cooperation with our allies on an international operation, it is a well-known and well-publicized idea that the other allies didn't step up to the plate in Afghanistan. In my opinion, that is not true, because we withdrew in 2003 from Afghanistan, and when we came back to Afghanistan, only the province of Kandahar was left for us. Other forces, like those of Italy or Germany, had 4,000 people deployed in different areas of operation. So when you are speaking about cooperation with other allies, we have all the junior NATO members, such as Romania, Hungary, Poland, and I don't think we cooperated according to our difference to the other nations. The U.K. used the Estonians, the U.K. worked with the Poles, and all the other allies tried to capitalize on these new NATO members as a force multiplier.

So we had 2,500 people deployed first in the province of Kandahar. We were not able to cover it and that was the birthplace of the Taliban.

If you recall, in 2010 we handed over command of the province of Kandahar to the U.S. force and we maintained command of two districts, Panjwai and Zhari, and we were able to make significant changes in that area; we also lost fewer personnel than when we covered the entire province of Kandahar. If you go to one place and then withdraw, it's reoccupied by the forces.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

In terms of the first question, there's no doubt in my mind that we need to maintain those capabilities that are sufficient to deal with the defence of Canadian waters, Canadian airspace, and Canadian territory. The question then becomes, given the threat environment we're in, which is fairly benign, at least in terms of conventional threats, do we also need to maintain the ability to fight wars at the high end internationally across all three services? That's what interests me. In terms of war-fighting capability at the higher end of the spectrum, does Canada either have the means or the willingness or the interest in maintaining high-end war-fighting capability across all three services?

What the numbers tell me now is although rhetorically we say we do, in practice we don't have that willingness. So to my mind it's time to start making those choices.

In terms of cooperation with the allies, I agree with you. Most NATO allies were in theatre. The issue is the number of caveats that were attached to the use of their forces. And while other countries were able to leverage certain smaller countries, we faced a great deal of frustration in trying to convince some of these other allies to let go of the caveats that were attached to the use of their forces, which would have enabled them to help us in a more significant fashion.

I also take your point that certainly starting in 2010, when we did have another country come in and provide significant assistance, that changed the dynamic quite significantly for the Canadian Forces, and rightly so. But that begs the question, then: Should that not have been how Canada approached the problem to begin with? And I worry that sometimes, in our enthusiasm to do good and take on very significant missions, we overestimate what our armed forces can do or what we're asking of them. As admirable as that may be, and as willing as the CF are to say they can do this, we sometimes need to be a little more critical about whether they have the capacity to do what we're asking them to do.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Do I have another question?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

No, your time is up.

Monsieur Brahmi.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have a question for Professor Lagassé about Canada's role within NATO.

Last time the NATO unit was needed, about half the countries, or 13 out of 28, refused to intervene. That was the case in the Libyan intervention. Out of those 13 countries, two of the largest ones have a population of 80 million. I am talking about Germany and Turkey.

Could you tell me what you think about NATO's viability and about how Canada should behave in future interventions?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

First, we have to recognize that NATO is a military alliance, but, even more importantly, it's a political alliance. Some countries want to become members, but do not necessarily want to participate in all the alliance's military missions. We recognize that fact. That is the reality. NATO mostly operates based on a consensus. The question we should ask ourselves is whether the countries who did not want to participate in that mission threw a spanner in the works of the alliance during the Libyan operation. The answer is no. Even though they did not at all contribute to the mission, they did not prevent the alliance from taking action. Canada must always recognize that reality. In the past, we were often the ones who did not participate fully. Even now, in Afghanistan, some members of the alliance are wondering why we withdrew our military strength from Kandahar and why we decided to go to Kabul.

It goes without saying that the members of the alliance will always play different roles and will always want to recognize their own prevalent political reality. I would not agree that the alliance is broken or that it cannot work. In my opinion, the alliance is still working. It's a political alliance, and that dynamic must be recognized. The main allies—the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark—all nevertheless still recognize, on some level, the importance of the alliance and its ability to act. I think we must also recognize that, even if we were to focus solely on UN operations, we would still depend on the U.S. and other allies when it comes to deployment. We cannot sever our relations with those allies and then undertake independent missions.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

It is not at all a matter of breaking off our alliances. You pinpointed the problem in your presentation. You talked about the choice we must make between an army limited to domestic operations and an army with expectations in terms of expeditionary operations. If we want to have the required expeditionary operational capability, NATO must be involved. Yet, how can that be viable if most of our allies don't support us or support us verbally, but do not actually provide the alliance with resources? That's especially true when two of the largest countries, Turkey and Germany, do not provide support.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

It is important to recognize that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries. We always maintain our sovereignty. That is a vital principle for the member countries. That does not, however, prevent the alliance from supporting us or those countries that choose to intervene or undertake operations. Clearly, not all NATO members will provide the necessary troops for a given operation, and as Canadians, we have to recognize that. At some point in the future, we too may decide not to take part in certain missions, but that does not detract from the alliance's relevance; nor does it mean that Canada should question the alliance's value. It still provides the foundation necessary to undertake these missions abroad.

By no means is it perfect, I admit. But the alternative is to rely strictly on other Anglo-Saxon countries. Do we really want to be in a position where the only members of the alliance are Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada? We have the NATO option of working with 28 member countries, or we could opt for just a four-member alliance. In light of the Canadian dynamic, I believe it is preferable to remain in NATO, rather than limiting ourselves to four very specific allies.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Van Kesteren, it's your turn.

[Dave Van Kesteren, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Essex, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Lagassé, for being here.

I'm not a member of this committee, though I find this conversation fascinating. You talked about coalitions, and you talked about NATO in particular and the importance of that group involvement. But let's face it, the Americans really are NATO. They have 11 Nimitz class carriers and I don't know how many submarines. I think the British have two carriers, and the French maybe two. Let's face it: that's the real power of NATO. That's the power of the western world.

But I read recently, just maybe a few months back, that the Chinese had bought one of the carriers that the Soviets were preparing to build and were refitting it. I understand they have to learn how to land planes on these things and everything else, but the Chinese are moving in that direction. I also recently read that they are developing an underground submarine station. We don't know too much about that, because that's all underground.

When you look at the history of the world, there have always been alliances, and the powerful nations have always risen and always fallen out. In your estimation, where is the United States as far as maintaining their sovereignty in the sea, in the air, and on the land goes? And where is China in comparison?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

There's no question that the United States will remain the world's dominant military power for the foreseeable future, if not into the next century. It has a capacity that extends far beyond that of any other country in the world. The U.S. is a global military power; that needs to be recognized. China is developing into a stronger regional military power. We need to recognize that difference.

The Chinese are interested in boosting their defence expenditures in order to protect and pursue their interests in the Asia Pacific. They have neither the capacity nor, it would seem, the intent to become a global military power of that level of reach. Therefore, of course the United States is preoccupied with that, as it would be with any peer competitor, but we need to be very clear that China represents a peer competitor to the United States in the Asia Pacific and not globally at this point. That does not seem to be its intention. I remain confident, as you pointed out, that the true, sheer size of the United States military power at this moment is not threatened by China.

The question becomes more in the specific area of the Asia Pacific whether the United States should be concerned about the rise of China's power. I would be very careful in trying to attribute any clear intention to the Chinese government at this point as to why they're building these forces and what they hope to do with them. I hope sincerely that we do not re-create a situation, as the one we saw leading up to the First World War, in which Great Britain was unable to accommodate the aspirations and intentions of Germany, and therefore we found ourselves in a greater confrontation, which we could have avoided if we had taken the time to allow diplomacy to run its course and had been more accommodating of the other power. I really hope that through economic relations and the building of large diplomatic relations we can avoid this type of confrontation.

We should, to the extent we can, try to recognize that it's entirely legitimate for China to build up its forces in that region, given the threat it faces from India, Japan, and others. So this isn't just about the U.S. and China. This is also about China having to recognize its own regional realities.