In terms of the first question, there's no doubt in my mind that we need to maintain those capabilities that are sufficient to deal with the defence of Canadian waters, Canadian airspace, and Canadian territory. The question then becomes, given the threat environment we're in, which is fairly benign, at least in terms of conventional threats, do we also need to maintain the ability to fight wars at the high end internationally across all three services? That's what interests me. In terms of war-fighting capability at the higher end of the spectrum, does Canada either have the means or the willingness or the interest in maintaining high-end war-fighting capability across all three services?
What the numbers tell me now is although rhetorically we say we do, in practice we don't have that willingness. So to my mind it's time to start making those choices.
In terms of cooperation with the allies, I agree with you. Most NATO allies were in theatre. The issue is the number of caveats that were attached to the use of their forces. And while other countries were able to leverage certain smaller countries, we faced a great deal of frustration in trying to convince some of these other allies to let go of the caveats that were attached to the use of their forces, which would have enabled them to help us in a more significant fashion.
I also take your point that certainly starting in 2010, when we did have another country come in and provide significant assistance, that changed the dynamic quite significantly for the Canadian Forces, and rightly so. But that begs the question, then: Should that not have been how Canada approached the problem to begin with? And I worry that sometimes, in our enthusiasm to do good and take on very significant missions, we overestimate what our armed forces can do or what we're asking of them. As admirable as that may be, and as willing as the CF are to say they can do this, we sometimes need to be a little more critical about whether they have the capacity to do what we're asking them to do.