National Defence Committee on Feb. 16th, 2012

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Professor Lagassé, you've introduced, very helpfully, this concept of smart defence, which is under discussion encouraged by NATO. If I understand it correctly, NATO defines it as allies cooperating in developing and acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new strategic concept, which we are going to look at later.

Our report at the moment is on readiness, but smart defence is potentially an important dimension of readiness, in that it encourages that collaboration that we have long sought with allies.

Given that ten countries are now pursuing the F-35 as a platform and that the U.S. intends to make it the backbone of its combat capability, does the F-35 count as smart defence?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

The F-35 can fit into smart defence if an individual country decides that it's their contribution to an overall NATO effort. Therefore, the idea of smart defence is specifically that not all countries should do the same thing. Quite the contrary: different allies should undertake or invest in different capabilities so that you have an overall multilateral allied capability to undertake various operations. If we decide or if we see in the future that various countries abandon the F-35 and that the U.S. says we need to have this capacity, then maybe it makes sense for Canada to pursue it. On the other hand, if it turns out to be a very prohibitive program that the United States maintains and a few other countries do, then we could ask ourselves if that is the best investment for scarce Canadian dollars.

The idea is, does the F-35 fit in smart defence? It fits into it insofar as the overall alliance should have a fifth-generation fighting capability to be able to undertake these missions. Does that necessarily mean that Canada needs to have it? That is a larger policy discussion we need to have in terms of the overall capabilities we want the forces to have. From a purely objective point of view, you can ask if Canada should have the best possible military equipment. Yes, we can agree. However, the minute you start introducing opportunity costs and budget constraints, then you have to start asking: all else not being equal, is the F-35 the best investment of our defence dollars, versus single-surface combatants, versus new capabilities for the land force? That is the type of discussion I hope we can have.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I agree completely. You have to make choices. However, we can't really rely 100% on allies, as they may not have a doctrine that would allow us to abandon certain missions. Which NATO countries currently follow the so-called smart defence doctrine, and to what extent?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

We are already seeing Great Britain and France slowly beginning to share certain resources, particularly when it comes to naval capacity. Those countries recognize that they can no longer afford, on their own, all the resources they would like. What's more, the U.S. has already suggested that the allies seriously consider this kind of approach.

In fact, we have already adopted it in a number of areas. We have invited the allies to train on Canadian soil, mainly on our various bases, especially out west. So we are already sharing our facilities.

The idea has merit when we look ahead at our future naval resources and we begin to realize that we cannot necessarily afford all the ships we would like to have. We know that other allies will build ships and that we could fulfill other roles.

The discussion has begun slowly, but we are already seeing this new doctrine begin to take root between Great Britain and France, and it already exists in the U.S. Now seems to be the time for that discussion.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

But that is just the start.

Do you think that 1.3% of our gross national product would be adequate to protect Canada and to maintain the appropriate level of readiness, given that NATO recommends allies spend 2% of their GNP?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

It is enough to protect Canada, and only Canada. That would not necessarily be enough to undertake a major overseas operation. So that is where the question comes into play. It all depends on how ambitious we want to be.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

You will recall that the last attack against North America was organized in Afghanistan. Can we really protect the continent if we don't have sufficient capabilities?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

That is an interesting argument, when you consider that the U.S. was spending 4% of its GNP on national defence but was still unable to protect itself from the attack.

So you can't draw a direct link between military spending and a country's ability to deal with all possible threats. Our enemies will adapt their tactics to our military capability. If we invest in a given capability, the enemy will adjust accordingly. We have to be careful when relying on numbers to find a solution.

You are no doubt aware that the reason behind NATO's 2% average is the massive spending of both Greece and Turkey. If you look at those allies that are more comparable to Canada, you see that Canada falls within the average range. It has more to do with figuring out if we have the military capabilities necessary to fulfill our needs and ambitions.

The question I would ask is, “Do we have the equipment we need for the missions we want to undertake?” more so than, “Are we spending enough?” There isn't really a set amount.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

We'll move on to our third and final round.

Go ahead, Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I want to come back to the whole notion of smart defence.

You said that every country should have its own slightly more specialized forces or tools so each can make a different contribution to shared activities.

Given our northern geography, would Canada do well to specialize in operations on hostile terrain such as the Arctic, to acquire the vehicles, equipment, aircraft and submarines that would truly be capable of operating in very cold climates and be tailored to those conditions? Might that be a worthwhile contribution, if Canada were to specialize further in this kind of capability?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

That might indeed be the case, but it's a discussion that we must have with our allies. We could learn that they would be in favour of making the Arctic our area of concern and having us protect the region on their behalf. If we work alongside the Danish, the Americans and others, they could say it makes sense to have Canada specialize in Arctic protection and surveillance. Then, it might be something the Canadian Forces could work on.

Conversely, if we learn that the military threat does not warrant investing in that capability and that the preference is for Canada to invest in the coast guard, for instance, that could change the dynamic and perhaps our investment priorities.

As I see it, there is no way around sitting down with our allies to discuss what kind of capability NATO wants to have in the Arctic. The discussion would also have to focus on what Canada would like its Arctic defence capability to be. It would also be necessary to figure out the best government agency to contribute to that mission.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Canada, like many other countries, is in the process of restructuring its defence budget and asking itself some serious questions. Is that not reason enough to have these kinds of discussions immediately, be it domestically or externally, before making any large acquisitions that are not compatible with the smart defence strategy?

Before we go ahead and spend money and saddle ourselves with equipment that does not suit our future operational needs, should we not ask the government to come together to swiftly figure out its defence vision for the future?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

You are absolutely right. That is what concerns me. The time to talk about smart defence is now. As you said, procurement contracts are just getting under way. We have not yet signed any major contracts for the fleet or the F-35s. Right now, we are thinking about acquiring new army equipment, but the real investment has not started flowing yet. Things are still at the program stage and have not yet progressed to actual procurement.

If ever there was a time to have this discussion, it is now. As you said, we must do it before we start signing contracts that entail cancellation penalties. Now and over the next few years is when these discussions need to take place, while our allies are talking, while NATO is examining what exactly it wants to do and while the U.S. is considering a reduction in defence spending, as are Great Britain and our other allies.

We think of ourselves as a multilateral country with global reach. Should we not, therefore, talk to our allies and partners about our defence policy?

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Do you know if other countries are in the same boat? If they are not yet overcommitted financially, isn't this the right time for them to have these discussions as well?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

That is precisely the reason why NATO's Secretary General is telling us what an urgent priority this is. He recognizes that NATO's defence budgets are going to shrink. He knows that, and as the secretary general, he is concerned. NATO's operational capability in the decades ahead will depend on how willing states are to cooperate.

It is a fact that defence spending, particularly in Europe, will in all likelihood shrink or, at the very least, procurement budgets will. We are already seeing it in the U.S. Now, then, is the time to find a way to maintain the operational capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as we enter a period of cutbacks and fiscal restraint.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

You'll be pleased to know how prescient you actually are, since while you've been sitting here there's apparently been a report of an earthquake in Vancouver, or off Vancouver Island—somewhere around there. Why you buy earthquake insurance is another interesting question.

You wrote, along with Senator Dallaire, a very eloquent article about R2P, willingness to intervene, all that sort of stuff, and I was thinking about it in terms of this whole approach to smart military interventions. It seems to me that the thought process with respect to not only personnel, but procurement, etc., has to be cast, particularly with our expeditionary capabilities, in terms of R2P, R2I, that sort of stuff.

As NATO says, and you quote here, “As the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept rightly notes: 'The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening.'” Given the expanding interconnectedness of our globe, that's probably quite true.

So casting your comments to date, which have largely been within traditional military thinking, and given this article you've authored with Senator Dallaire, what would you offer as to how you think about the personnel mix and the equipment mix, and I would say almost a cultural attitudinal mix?

My sense of some of the senior personnel, particularly on some of these UN missions, is that they're not really worthy warriors, shall we say. And it does play itself out. I think the request to intervene in the Congo was something this government passed on, arguably for maybe not such good reasons.

I'd be interested in your thoughts in that respect.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

The first point to make is that capability is not simply equipment, it's also people.

One capability we're honing now is the ability to train local allies, as we're doing in Afghanistan. When we speak about conflict prevention, as we look to the future one thing that seems clear in a time of cuts and a time of complexity is that we're going to increasingly depend on regional allies to do a good deal of the work with respect to maintaining security in their part of the world.

The extent to which we can mobilize and help these regional allies develop their capacity to act, so that we don't have to.... They are actually closer to the situation. They understand the dynamics far more than we do, and that's a very important point to keep in mind. Often when we intervene, we have no idea who we're getting involved with, what the situation is, and what kinds of power structures underlie the situations we're interfering with.

Therefore, the extent to which we can help regional allies throughout the world build their capacity, as we are doing, let's say, in Jamaica, just recently.... It's a good example of the types of specialized forces or the types of specialized capabilities that we might seriously consider in terms of being able to go out and help regional partners build their own capacity to act in their region so that we are not always asking NATO to do that particular mission.

This is something we really tried to emphasize in the article I wrote with Senator Dallaire. The extent to which you can avoid having to be reactive to conflicts, and you can try to intervene at the outset before they become as violent as they usually end up being, the extent to which you can develop regional partners that are able to intervene and have a far greater regional legitimacy than we do--and it's far less costly for them to intervene than it is for us--that is something we need to seriously look at.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You also make an interesting point in the article about amendments to the National Defence Act, that in the event the government chooses to go into a conflict that it table before Parliament its missions, its goals, measurement of success, that sort of stuff. You also argue that members of Parliament, select members of Parliament presumably, should be sworn in to the Privy Council so that they can participate in decisions as decisions are made, given that secrecy is a pretty important concept here.

I'd be interested in your thoughts on this.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I am very strongly of the view that we should preserve the crown's prerogative to deploy the military without necessarily having the approval of the House of Commons.

That being said, there is the question of what role the House of Commons does have in debating these missions and obliging the government to, at the very least, outline what it intends to do, what it intends to spend. And if it needs incremental funding from the House it should be able to secure that.

Again, the reason I'm so adamant about this is that to my mind, accountability in our system is preserved when the executive is fully responsible for the decisions it makes and doesn't have the capacity to launder its decisions through the House, as I believe this government has done on a number of occasions. I find that really muddies accountability for national defence.

That being said, there should still be a debate in the House, motions in the House, where members of Parliament have the opportunity to debate these missions. That should be required. The government should also be required to divulge the full information in terms of costs, in terms of what it's deploying and what it foresees as the end game.

Similarly, on your second point, there should be a parliamentary committee with security clearance that's able to look at operational secrets and operational details so that members of Parliament have a much better sense of exactly what is happening on the ground and whether the mission is operating as successfully as what they're being told.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

The last question of the day goes to Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you.

To go back to this issue of smart defence, my figures show that there are only five countries in the alliance that spend less on defence as a percentage of GDP than Canada does, and that we're on a par with Denmark and Germany, with every other ally at a higher level. That's just on this question of percentage of GDP.

At a time of austerity and deep cuts potentially in the United States and definitely in many parts of Europe, do you think Canada should stick with, increase, or reduce the defence commitment it has to remain ready for the challenges we now have identified?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

I'll begin the comment by noting the following. One of the reasons Canada has weathered this economic crisis better than other countries is because in the 1990s severe cuts were brought to federal government spending. One of the results of that was that the amount of money spent on defence in Canada was reduced significantly, which allowed the government to reduce its overall debt-to-budget ratio.

That only happened because we made significant cuts in military spending. It is easy to look at other countries and the amount they spend on their military, but then you have to look at that in the context of what the effect has been on their overall budgetary situation, the fact that they didn't actually cut where necessary at the time.

In a sense, the fact that Canada chose to get its fiscal house in order in the 1990s has been a good thing. It has been a good thing for our ability to invest in the military now. We have to always keep this in context.

Similarly, I would also note that in real dollars, which is really a measure of the overall capacity that you have, Canada ranks sixth in the NATO alliance. More to the point, percentage of GDP as a measure of spending measures your relative effort compared to other allies, but an equally good measure of relative effort is how you use the forces that you have. In that respect, I think Canada has been an exemplary member of the alliance, as compared to many other members that spend far more as a percentage of GDP.

The question overall is should Canada spend more? It should, if it believes that it is necessary to meet its ambitions and to meet its security requirements. We shouldn't necessarily allow those decisions to be made based on a number that needs to be put into a much larger context.

I'm hesitant to say that we need to meet a certain percentage of GDP, and I would look much more closely at how we use those forces, and why it is that we spend the amount that we spend.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

You're undecided?

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé]

No. To my mind, it's a policy question. If the government chooses to have a more ambitious defence policy—