Evidence of meeting #28 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was nato.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Prof. David Bercuson
If the committee has the requisite security clearance, I don't see any reason why not. But then the problem would be to keep the information you receive in closed session, separate from the information that you receive at open session.
NDP
Christine Moore NDP Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC
My last question focuses more on the strategic aspect of readiness.
Currently, with the F-35 project, we tend to group the purchases of all allies together. However, many of them will have exactly the same type of aircraft. If a number of allies intervene in a country using the same aircraft, doesn't that represent a security risk? The enemy need only find a single strategy to shoot them down. That was not previously the case as there were two or three different models of fighter aircraft. The enemy then had to find the strategy and weaknesses for each of them.
Prof. Stéphane Roussel
The answer is no. On the contrary, standardized equipment affords many benefits. You can save time dealing with spare parts, know-how, expertise and so on. That makes it much easier to collaborate. The problems start when the equipment is highly diversified.
I don't know of any weapons system that has been systematically undone by a strategy. In fact, when that does happen, the situation is corrected quite quickly.
Lastly, in view of the cost to develop and maintain these aircraft, you absolutely have to have economies of scale. For the industry, that is the only way to succeed. As Canada does not have a national weapons or defence industry that would generate immediate dividends if the government bought a Canadian product, for example, there is ultimately little interest in breaking away from that group. I see far more advantages than disadvantages in that.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Thank you, Chair.
I agree with Chris that this has been an absolutely excellent panel, and I appreciate everyone's contribution.
General Bouchard, in a very humorous presentation last week at lunch, talked about the three strategic rules for NATO coalitions and how they get along. Rule one, he said, is that the children have to play nicely with each other. Rule two is that the children have to share their toys, and rule three is that they should take a nap in the afternoon.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
He was using that to illustrate the point about the sharing of intelligence—which speaks to the points that both of you were making—and in particular the silos in which countries operate within the coalition with respect to their intelligence. Americans generally don't share a lot of it.
It got to be actually quite serious at the beginning of the mission, when they were literally using Google maps to figure out where they were going to do their bombing runs. It also got to be quite serious in the sense that if certain countries were included in the briefing, they could see the briefing on Al Jazeera that afternoon.
I'd be interested in your thoughts with respect to how NATO will get over that problem, because if it doesn't get over that problem, that will be.... Well, it may not be the end of NATO, but it certainly won't help.
Lecturer, Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy, Université du Québec à Montréal
I have been very interested in that subject for some time now. It is true that information sharing within NATO is a reflection of what goes on between the states.
A country will choose to share certain information with one country, but not with another, even though it is an ally. There are also little clubs within NATO in all fields, including intelligence sharing, because intelligence is a very rare commodity. It is also the product of know-how. Very often, by revealing information, you may simultaneously reveal the know-how.
So there are national habits that very often re-emerge within coalitions. It is an extremely difficult thing to combat. It requires time and genuine trust between the individuals in the structures, not at the political level. It is really within the structures. It is a little like an exchange: I give you this, you lend me that. I know that's often done at a tactical level, without telling leaders. It is still a problem as old as intelligence.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
It does hold up to the candle the operating rule that coalitions are going to be the way of the future, almost regardless. It's probably an area that bears a lot of thought, because intelligence, if it has been important in the past, will be even more important in the future.
For my final minute, I'd like to do a pivot here and change the subject completely to the search and rescue capabilities of this country. That's not been touched on a lot, and some members of my caucus are extremely concerned about what they see as the declining ability of the military to, in effect, do a cost-benefit analysis on search and rescue.
A suggestion was made to me, by a lobbyist, for privatization of some search and rescue functions. I'd just be interested in your gut reactions to that thought.
Prof. David Bercuson
I don't have any personal problems with privatization—it has been done in other places in the world—but it has to be under an overall government authority, in the sense that doctors work for themselves, but they're also part of a medicare system in this country.
I think the problem is that the cost-benefit analyses that have been done about SAR have left out the political part of the equation. I think you're going to see more and more Canadians in outlying areas insisting that the political part of the equation be factored back in.
I mean, it's okay to say that it costs us too much to put a helicopter permanently at point X, but then when a kid goes missing for three days and could have been found alive if he'd been found within 12 hours, that cost-benefit analysis goes right out the window.
That's why we have a problem. And we do have a problem in search and rescue, there's no question in my mind.
February 28th, 2012 / 12:55 p.m.
Conservative
Conservative
Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I will return briefly to the Arctic. Of the Arctic nations, I think that we are the only one that has the Northwest Passage, and that there is a difference in sovereignty if somebody claims that the Northwest Passage is in international waters. How can you relate this to the readiness of the Canadian Forces, which you said would be the first government organization there?
Do you think that more Arctic readiness for our armed forces would be an asset?
Prof. Stéphane Roussel
The short answer is yes. My advice for the government is to act as if you're 100% sure that this is not an international strait, that it's purely Canadian waters. If you act this way, you're reinforcing your position on the international level.
Yes, there is a strong incentive to do it.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative James Bezan
Thank you.
Your time has expired.
We're out of time. I want to thank each of you for appearing as witnesses. Dr. Bercuson, Admiral Garnett, Professor Roussel, and Professor Battiss, thank you so much for your input. It's going to help us with our deliberations as we move forward. Hopefully, what we come up with will be valuable to Canadians and to the Department of National Defence, and of course to our fellow parliamentarians.
With that, I'll take a motion to adjourn.