National Defence Committee on March 1st, 2012

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

And thank you, Professor Fergusson.

I want to bring us down from 35,000 feet to maybe only 10,000 and talk about your ideas in the context of the F-35. You wrote a pretty thoughtful article here in the fall about the F-35s. I just thought I'd reflect on your article, but also reflect on the testimony that we've had here over the last few months.

I don't think there's much argument around the table that we need to replace our jet capability. I don't think we're walking away from that. Once you lose it, it's gone forever. We agree with that. I don't know whether you're plagiarizing Dyer, who says it's going to be a “come as you are” war, but it is. That's likely true: whatever you have on the shelf is going to be what you have, and that's it, and there are no replacement possibilities.

Putting aside all of the technology delays and difficulties that Lockheed Martin is having, and all of this stuff about who's in, who's out, and how much this thing is going to cost, and trying to do it from a military and strategic analysis—again, I don't think there's much argument the jets need to be replaced. Given the overall proposition that whatever conflict we're going to be in, whether it's a continental conflict or an international conflict, we're likely going to be part of a coalition; that's just going to be a given. Certainly in an air conflict, the likely lead is going to be the United States. That's just going to be a given. So then the question becomes, if that's true, what does stealth bring to the dance?

We had a witness here who said stealth kills non-stealth each and every time, and produced statistics to that effect. On the other hand, other witnesses have said, well, yes, but we're never first in anyway; we are part of the follow-up. The government has basically staked itself to this F-35—and in some respects, I'd say, even hoisted itself on its own petard—where the strategic value of stealth, putting aside the concept of whether it's F-35 or something else, is challengeable, shall we say.

I'd be interested in your thoughts about what stealth brings to the dance that nothing else can possibly bring. Are there other alternatives that, as one British general has put it, will make do for the purposes of future conflict?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

That gets into the highly technical issues. The point you're making we can take specifically from the Libyan experience, where, by and large, before the NATO forces moved in, the U.S., from what's in the public domain, apparently had done most of the initial work to degrade enemy air defence systems. The United States have certain capabilities which none of the other allies have, not just in terms of stealth platforms, but in supporting technologies and systems, which have enabled them in repeated conflicts to take out and destroy relatively advanced—not that the Libyan one was—air defence systems.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Did they use any stealth capability? I thought they parked their F-22s for that conflict.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

They don't need to use the F-22.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I know.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

They have a variety of attributes to use.

What does stealth bring to the table? I guess the question is for the defence of air crews and very expensive platforms as lesser states acquire more and more sophisticated air defences. They're not going to stand still. The Irans of the world aren't standing still to see what will happen to them militarily if something goes wrong. Russia and China are certainly moving to try to deal with and develop more sophisticated air defence systems, which will enable them to defeat American systems and not give up air superiority so quickly.

Stealth provides a basic technology or hedge against the unknown future. It's a mature technology now, at least for the United States and for the F-35. I would turn the question back to you. Why wouldn't we want the next generation of fighters, which is going to last 30, 40 years, to have the best technology we can put on them right now, notwithstanding the question of what other fighters are out there?

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

The argument has been that if you don't buy stealth, you're in effect creating flying coffins.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Potentially.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Yes, and it's a bit of a dramatic way to say it, but on the other hand, you don't know the stealth is going to be that much further ahead. By the time these planes are delivered, there may be an antidote to stealth, which makes the additional cost quite useless.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

That's possible. One of the dangers, one of the big problems that all armed forces, including the United States, face today is the pace of technological development. How do you make decisions? We gambled in the past that the technological developments' span was 10, 20, 30 years. If you look back at the history of the evolution of fighter platforms since World War II, you've watched it shrink from 20 years of new platforms to technology shrinking and the ability then to add on a modular plug in new technologies.

There's no safe answer to this. There is no clear answer, but there are other reasons besides the stealth issue involved here as to why the F-35 is the only option for Canada.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I understand the argument. I'm not sure I agree with it, but I understand it.

Let me pivot onto another question, which has also come up here, and that is again in the context of coalitions, in the context of literally the pivoting of the United States toward the Pacific away from the Atlantic and necessarily our pivot with them. I don't think they phoned us up and asked us what we think. This is what they're doing and we're coming along. So there's going to be a division of tasks. What would your advice be to the Canadian navy in particular, which will be the main force with respect to this pivot, with respect to tasks that it should assume in the overall participation in the Pacific pivot?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

To continue what they're doing right now, which is fundamentally being able to integrate effectively into U.S. carrier task forces. That is where we should continue our emphasis.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Are there strategic points where you think they should pick up—say the Arctic or something of that nature—because they're not going to do anything in the Strait of Malacca or whatever?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

We lack the capacity. If you're talking about taking the lead in the Arctic, or releasing U.S. forces from the Atlantic—we'll take over the Atlantic while you concentrate naval forces in the Pacific—we don't have the capacity to do that, period. This gets to a bigger issue, which is about the potential of the Canadian Forces to be leaders. Sorry, we're not.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Yes, we're going to be part of a coalition, regardless.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Right.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

We're now going to start our five-minute rounds.

Mr. Chisu, you can kick us off, please.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your presentation. I liked it very much. You speak about the experiences from Afghanistan and the lessons learned from Afghanistan and from other areas of conflict.

If you are speaking about Afghanistan, you know that we have had a precedent in Afghanistan with a counter-insurgency operation. We were not directly involved, but our neighbour to the south was involved in the Vietnam War. That was 30 or so years ago. There were a lot of lessons learned from that kind of conflict that also apply in this.

But I am going to be concentrating on the threats. What threats do you see Canada facing, especially in the Arctic?

Of the Arctic nations, we are the only nation that owns the Northwest Passage. There is a tendency for the Northwest Passage to be an international freeway through our own territory, and I see this as a very realistic threat. If we are speaking about an Atlantic fleet or a Pacific fleet.... But this is in our own territory, and if it is.... We have seen nations such as Panama, with the Panama Canal, and Egypt, with the Suez Canal, and all the other stuff in international territories, and I don't want to see Canada divided by an international free waterway.

What do you think we should do to avoid these things? There is a tendency toward that, and, personally, I perceive this as a threat to Canada.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Well, my simple view on the Arctic is that it's not a military threat to Canada whatsoever. The thinking that we need to build up armed combat forces to be able to prosecute some sort of naval campaign in the Arctic, with supporting land forces, has a probability of near zero.

For reasons related to my understanding of the climate changes that are going on, it still will be a very harsh environment. You have to look at what the strategic issues there are really going to be about.

There is a security question up there for Canada, one of controlling and maintaining pollution standards and our territorial integrity relative to shipping transportation. We need to do something, and the Canadian Forces can play a role in that, but in terms of devoting specific military resources and developing capabilities to deal with the Arctic, I think that's a very grave mistake that we're making.

As to the threats to Canada, the military threats to Canada, those threats to Canada are almost exclusively in the aerospace world. My view has always been that this is where the emphasis needs to be. If you're looking very narrowly at the threats to the nation per se, in military terms, it's aerospace.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

How are you looking at this, at having an international waterway in your own territory? That was already an explanation.... It is a fact that American submarines and American icebreakers went through the Northwest Passage. So I think this is an important issue, and not only for security; it is our national integrity.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

There are a lot of nations around the world that live beside international straits and have been able to manage their straits issues. Canada has certain sets of rights that stem from it being an international strait transiting through, roughly, internal waters: legal rights to enforce certain elements of its jurisdiction or sovereignty up there.

I do not see that this is going to be an area where you're going to have significant transit of armed vessels. At least, the right of innocent passage is not a problem for us, and it's not a problem for any states in this area. On the issue of submarines, we're really talking about the question of the extent to which the Russians or the Chinese might replicate the Soviet strategic nuclear policy of trying to “bastion” their SSBNs, their ballistic missile submarines, in the Arctic, and where they would put them.

If the ice is shrinking, and if the reports are correct, probably that strategy for the Russians or the Chinese will become very problematic for them. I'm not sure why we should spent a lot of money, beyond perhaps the surveillance systems that are being developed just to know what's going on. But to invest significant amounts of money to try to counter a potential submarine problem up there...? To what end? What are we going to do with it? What are the scenarios we're trying to think of? I think that's a very misplaced investment.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

So you don't think we should have a presence in our Arctic...?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

We have a presence—

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Because if you are not there, somebody else will be.