That's a difficult question.
I would suggest to you that we would not be well served—this is the kind of question that military historians tackle regularly—by preparing for a last mission. That's not really what this discipline is about.
But we can find examples of...and let's take the case study of Afghanistan as an example.
There is nothing in the Canadian mission in Kandahar that had not been experienced in some form by the Canadian Forces at some time in the past, and therefore new institutions and capabilities and ideas had to be created when in fact they previously existed.
I'll just give you the quick example, from a project we're working on right now, of the Allied invasion of Sicily. The armed forces are trying to effect or influence a diplomatic negotiation against an opposing force, the Italian government, and therefore military operations must be waged with an eye to influencing a diplomatic process. The landscape must be reconstructed in order to pacify the population and bring them onside to the Allied cause, and therefore reconstruction forces are part of the fighting forces and integrated fully into them...as well as fighting a high-intensity war against an army that was attempting to use improvised explosive devices to stop you from moving in the mountains that looked strangely like Afghanistan.
You can find whatever you need in history to serve as a training tool, but you should not use the example of Afghanistan to suggest that whatever happens next will look exactly like that. If there's a lesson from both—the Second World War experience in Sicily and Afghanistan—it's that there's a common set of principles you can train for that by and large the Canadian Forces are in agreement with alongside our NATO partners.
If you train for the worst-case scenario, you are capable of fulfilling any mission required of you lesser than war.