Thank you, Chair, and I want to thank you both for coming to join us today.
Of course, because you didn't read your paper, we had to read it while you were making your presentation, and I want to thank you for it because it does outline some of the things you said. Of course, I've also had a look at some of the other papers that your organization has worked on, and you, Mr. Chapin, in collaboration with a number of other people in the last couple of years.
To what you're presenting to us today I have to say a big “wow”, because in listening to everything you had to say, it seems that Canada has a role in the world that I never thought we would have in terms of military interests, particularly from a defence point of view. I want to say there's a difference between being interested and having an interest. Obviously, we care about what happens in all parts of the world and support working toward international peace and security and our partnerships with NATO and with the United Nations. Forgive me if I focus a little bit on NATO, because that's really the purpose of our study here today. What you're saying and what some people say is that you're not arguing against involvement in NATO, but there are other areas that Canada should take an interest in. Certainly, that's the case.
To get back to NATO for a moment, I do want to clarify some of the things your organization has said, and some things that you, Mr. Chapin, have said concerning NATO and the UN. Of course, the Washington Treaty is very much engaged itself as a party to the Charter of the United Nations, and NATO is integral to that, as reinforced by the strategic concept itself and reinforced by the UN-NATO declaration of 2008, which I'm looking at here. It's very much a vehicle for international action.
I wonder if you could clarify what you mean in your most recent strategic paper, “The Strategic Outlook for Canada”, in which one of your recommendations, recommendation 7, suggests that Canada should begin discussions with the U.S. and other democratic allies on a new international architecture better suited to the security environment of the 21st century.
Then you go on to say that the doctrine, laws, and institutions on which we have relied for our collective security over the decades are all well past their prime. Well, they may be traditional, as you point out in your paper today, but certainly the whole basis of NATO is article 5, and the whole purpose of it—there are other purposes, obviously, but the notion of collective security and how that adds to the stability, at least of the NATO areas, and the notion of including others, including relations with Russia and the other European nations, seems to me to be still a very important goal.
Why would you say—I think it was interpreted by the Library of Parliament analysts—that they were irrelevant, and were no longer valid? Could you clarify that for me?