I think where we're going with these conclusions is to an appeal to people who value the interests of Canadians to consider the future a little bit more than the past. If you consider that there's a taxonomy of interest, the first and most immediate being the safety and security of citizens, the second one being their economic livelihood and prosperity, and so on, those two things ought to drive a lot more of our foreign defence policy than I think they have traditionally been doing. So they are more vulnerable in some respects to globalization trends than maybe they have been and maybe they were in the past.
There are two other broader contextual interests, one of which is the value that we place in a stable world order. If it's disruptive and chaotic out there, it's going to wash over into Canada. We have a hard-edged interest in dealing with international conflicts.
The fourth one is that we can try to head off much of the stuff out there if we can get people to understand the value of democracy, human dignity, respect for government, the consent of the government—those kinds of things. The more other people believe in those values out there, the less likely there's going to be trouble out there.
How that translates into policy is the sense that there's probably a new division of labour required. For a very long time, Europe couldn't manage on its own. It needed help. It needed the deterrence factor of North American help. Europe has 500 million people. They are wealthy as hell, notwithstanding their economic problems.