National Defence Committee on June 7th, 2012

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

These are such interesting matters to me. First, the issue of boots on the ground...you're quite right. There were flip-flops and running shoes, and they belonged to many, but no NATO forces under my command. So that was the one point. There's an interesting strategy to that. Every day that went by, I would have liked to have had boots on the ground because I could have acted in one way, but not having boots on the ground made the exit strategy so much easier for us. At midnight, I said “stop”, and the ships turned around, the airplanes turned around, and we were done. We were disconnected.

The second part, more importantly, is a strategy that I think we need to look at. If the people on the ground can handle it, should we put our troops on the ground, or force the ownership on these people? If you put 150,000 troops in Libya, I suspect the Libyans would have stood back and said they would wait until NATO was done, and then they'd start doing it. As it was, we didn't give them that. The essence for us was, without telling them what to do, how did we make sure we enabled success, which for us was the protection of civilians. It stayed there. I was not the private air force or navy of the NTC, but essentially by stopping the violence it shaped the environment for them to continue. Again, the end state and the end game were the will of Gadhafi to start talking and stop hurting his people, which he opted to do differently.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You raised the interesting point of an exit ramp for Gadhafi. I can argue this in several different ways and arrive at mutually contradictory answers.

In a conflict like that, I don't know what is the appropriate relationship between NATO and the person who is the cause of the conflict. Once the writ was dropped, if you will, Gadhafi was cooked. He was trapped. What is the mechanism for that conversation in terms of what the World Court in The Hague needs to do and what NATO needs to do?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I just want to make sure: I was not trying to be critical of the International Court of Justice—

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You're very careful. I'm not quite so careful.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

But an action has a reaction. The reaction in this case was no exit strategy for the dictator who we were trying to convince to stop doing what he was doing. It took continued kinetic activities and non-kinetic activities to make him stop what he was doing.

The point is, how do we create an environment? I remember saying in the early days that our job was to create an environment where we could have dialogue and diplomacy take over, because that's the part that saves a lot of lives. That belongs in the political realm of the North Atlantic Council and the participating nations.

In my opinion, though, at the end of the day, it's about justice taking place and justice being seen to take place, but justice also taking place at the right time, with the prioritization of stopping violence against civilians—stopping people from dying—and then we'll sort out the legitimacy and then the judiciary thereafter. We could spend many hours and many beers on this one.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I wish we could. The beer is on.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Thank you, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

That's just at eight minutes. Moving on to Mr. Opitz, we are at five-minute rounds now.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Once again, General, thank you for everything you've done. You've brought great honour to this country, sir, through your actions in Libya, and we thank you for it.

Sir, I've been listening to all the things you've been talking about—fitting the war environment, the environment of what we're fighting and where. Obviously, in the things you're talking about and in what our soldiers have done in Libya, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and other theatres of war, diplomatic skills are clearly important. Even devolving down to the corporal and master corporal level—

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I agree.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

—we expect our troops on the ground to have those skills and to be able to manage and to address issues at the lowest level possible, which could have a particular national strategic impact if they get it wrong.

On the organization and synchronization of campaign planning, that smart defence you talked about as something that can be problematic in terms of what capabilities a country has and whether you can count on it at the time that you need it when you're concentrating force or whatever you happen to be doing at that time—and the greyware, where I think the Canadian Forces.... Sir, I don't know if you would agree with me on this, but throughout the seventies and eighties, of course.... When we were still fighting the Second World War, everything was a left- and right-flanking kind of scenario. We've come a long, long way since then, and I think that having nothing was actually something positive in the later nineties and in recent decades, because it taught our people to be extremely innovative and to deal with things they didn't have.

I would be interested in your thoughts on whether we should revise the principles of war to be a more national strategic principles of war kind of thing. That would include diplomatic skills. That would include the agility and the capability focus that you were talking about earlier, and in fact the exit strategy for someone like a Gadhafi before it gets to horrific consequences such that you can't allow this person to exit.

Could you comment, sir?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Thank you very much, sir. That is most appropriate.

I think the point, first of all, is that the Canadian Forces is very good at training its people towards that, but I also believe we need a clear understanding of what “comprehensive approach” means, to the broadest level.

I've seen a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Bosnia and the Balkans, and in Libya for sure. As a military theatre commander I had my lanes, but what's the linkage with the political entities? We worked that part, as I said before, from political, military, economic, social, cultural, infrastructure, and the like.

We need to continue to train, but also we need to advise—and this is a failure of the military sometimes—our political leaders who give us those directions on how to work it together.

The feedback I gave to SACEUR rarely was based on what my military activities were as much as what I required inside these constructive comprehensive approaches, because it's a mutual approach, and I often asked what, for example, was—and I'm leading to your last question, the last point—the strategy to deal with Gaddafi, because we were the strong arm of NATO, doing kinetic activities and non-kinetic influence activities. What were the diplomatic activities? Who was talking to him? I know President Zuma and the African Union tried their best. The Arab League was doing some work. But was this coordinated, and who was coordinating it at that level? Much of it was done bilaterally, whether it was the U.S. directly, or France, or the U.K., or even Canada. I know everybody was doing some work on that.

My perspective is that we continue to train. You've said it. We train strategic corporals. It's just amazing the way we've done it. Sir, my experience is that not all countries are doing that because not all cultures are doing that. This is what I will go back to: what we can bring to NATO in many ways is the skill, capabilities, and knowledge we have, and therefore it's important to remain because we bring value-added.

I will close my point, sir, by saying that during the operation I told the admiral, “You probably notice there are quite a few more Canadian uniforms floating around your headquarters.” In fact the Canadian flag was floating beside my headquarters, and it was at MOBILE. I had it set up next door. His answer was, “I'd like to see more of those a lot more often and a lot more in a permanent manner.”

We made a difference as Canadians, sir, we make a difference to NATO today, and we can make a difference to NATO in the future by continuing to do what we're doing and what we're good at.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. The time has expired.

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bouchard, it is a great pleasure to speak with you.

I have two questions. The first concerns an article concerning the mission in Libya. That article is entitled, "NATO Sees Flaws in Air Campaign Against Qaddafi". The author writes as follows:

“Nations did not effectively and efficiently share national intelligence and targeting information among allies and with partners,” the report said. “The inability to share information presented a major hindrance to nations deciding if a target could be engaged” based on information from another country.

I would like to know your opinion. What caused that lack of intelligence sharing, what are the consequences of these problems, and how can they be corrected during future operations?

You also said in your introductory remarks that, if you break things, you have to rebuild them. I would like to discuss that point a little.

I would like to draw a parallel with what I have seen, although it does not concern Canada. I am talking about what happened in Iraq. I was a military member at the time and that enormously affected me. When Hussein fell, we saw—at least in the media, because it may not have happened exactly like that on the ground—military members protecting the oil ministry while hospitals and schools were pillaged. Some people stole x-ray equipment. Ultimately, the country had to rebuild things that it could perhaps have protected.

I would like to know whether there was a specific action plan to provide rapid protection for civilian institutions in operations such as the one conducted in Libya. Did you have a plan? Did you know, as Gadhafi fell, how many military personnel you had to send to such and such a hospital, for example? Was there a specific plan of that kind? Did you know the civilian institutions that had to be protected? Is that something that is generally integrated, if I can put it that way, in missions in which several countries are involved? Do commanders have that vision, and do they immediately think of institutions that must be protected, to prevent them from being destroyed and so they are able to be operational as soon as possible?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Thank you, madam. Those are very good questions.

First, with regard to information sharing, the challenge is that NATO has no source of information as such. Information sharing within NATO is done this way: each of the nations provides information, as little or as much as it wishes.

There is information in the various countries, whether it be at the "NOFORN" level in the United States or the "confidential-defence" level in France; that may be the "reserved for" level, or another level. Imagine as well that this is a mission in which Arab countries are working with us for the first time and with other countries that are not members of NATO. This is a challenge because we have no existing architecture.

Information transmission is not just a technological issue, but especially a national policy and procedural issue. When we start an operation by saying that we are working together to find a solution, you have to share information.

I would say to you, madam, that my perspective is twofold. First, as a Canadian, I had the opportunity to serve in NATO and with the United States. Very early on in the conflict, I was pleased to earn the confidence of the other countries that gave me information. The problem was sharing that information. So I became the fusion centre. We created our own architecture, which was based on a principle that guided me in all circumstances. I said to myself that my centre of gravity was NATO and that, if I lost one of my forces, a single individual, a ship or an aircraft, because someone in that group knew something that he had not shared, it would be a major failure. We then established that as our basic principle: it was at that point that we shared the information, and we learned. It was at that point as well that I put a lot of pressure on the countries.

In future, we should create a policy in advance establishing that, if those countries got together to do that, information would have to be made available and shared as soon as possible. So there is a policy aspect and a procedural aspect. At the operational level, there has to be a good understanding and the emphasis has to be on the mission in order to carry it out. That was my first point, madam.

I also had all the information I needed for targeting purposes. That was a matter of information sharing.

What do you do in cases where information cannot be shared? In that case, you decide who will carry out the mission. That is how it was at the start, but, toward the end, everyone had the information since we had established an atmosphere conducive to information sharing. However, I never felt I lacked the information that I needed to perform tasks. I do not agree with the allegations, even though we could have done much better.

Second, with regard to construction and reconstruction, two-thirds of the targets in Libya were not attacked for that reason. Going back to targeting, it was done by teams, which perhaps was not easy for certain colleagues from another military culture. I had political, cultural and public affairs advisors for kinetic and non-kinetic options, for legal affairs, in addition to operations, but I was the person responsible. I ultimately made the decisions, but we all came together to discuss the issues.

In the case of many issues, I wondered what the impact of selecting a given target would be on civilian life, for example, if that target were a hospital, a communication centre or a refinery. I wondered how much time it would take to rebuild, hence the importance of showing good judgment. If I was not sure that an action would stop the violence against the population, we did not do it. We asked ourselves how much time it would take to rebuild. That is why you may have noticed that no refineries or hospitals were hit by NATO. Of course, some buildings that were used for wrongful purposes against civilians were affected, but we always asked ourselves whether we would be doing good or bad for the population.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chisu, it's your turn.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, General Bouchard.

General Bouchard, the Libyan operation, Operation MOBILE, was unique in the way the air force was in the lead and there were no boots on the ground. Also, it was the first operation where the U.S. was in the background, and the U.K., France, and Canada—with some other countries—were in the lead.

Can you elaborate on the contribution of the 18 countries you mentioned, and the flexibility? How quick was the integration of these nations?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Thank you, sir.

There were no boots on the ground. Therefore, projection of power from air and sea became critical. A lot of people focused on the air participation because it's probably the most visible and the most dramatic. But I want to mention my colleagues from the navy, who spent a lot of time and did a lot of work, and, more importantly, kept the Port of Misrata open through mining and shelling. To be mindful, the last ship that was fired upon was during the Korean War. They showed great courage, sir, so if you'll allow me not to forget our naval capability and effort.... It was truly important.

The second part, though, is the team effort. I was in total disagreement with the term used by the U.S., which was “lead from the rear”, because it was not. My boss was U.S. His boss was U.S. There was a lot of activity on the international scene by the U.S. as well. They opted perhaps to even out the burden sharing from the military perspective. The U.S. provided capacity and capabilities that did not exist.

On an average day, I had over 30 air-refueler aircraft that were airborne. One of them was Canadian, and some British, but most of them came in from the U.S. They provided that air bridge, and we couldn't get there without it. That's the critical capacity and capability.

In terms of capability, there was also intelligence support, and I'll stop there. They provided a lot, but again the trick was not only to take what they could, but actually pull it all together and work it. In fact, that's what pool and share really is; it's NATO's future. It's not only about equipment, but intelligence and everything else. They played a key role.

From my perspective, on a weekly basis I spoke to my colleagues in Paris, in the U.K., and obviously I was talking to my colleagues through the U.S. and Canada as well. For me, there was continued dialogue on that. They didn't tell me what to do; I informed them of what I was doing. I wanted to make sure I was catching the national concerns that were going on to see how it affected the campaign, or whether the campaign should be affected by it. It was not because I was under orders from these countries, but more to make sure I didn't have a national action that would break the alliance.

The U.S. played a critical role. In the future I sense the message from the U.S. will be, “We won't go, but how much of this can the rest of Europe handle that we don't have to provide?” That's the rebalancing of the burden of sharing.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much.

Can you elaborate on the cyber-security and the space security, which continues to be a focal point for NATO? Probably somebody else was listening, and this is how the conflict in Libya was developed. I'm not saying who was listening, but everybody knows who was listening and who was following the operation, whether they were successful or not.

How will we be able to secure the eventual concerns around cyber-security and space security and that it will not be compromised?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I agree with you. A lot of people were listening to everything we did and everything we worked on. It's okay, because it's a double-edged sword. You can actually work this to your advantage if need be. We have to be mindful of that.

More importantly, also in the case of Libya, is that everything was done using iPhones, iPads, YouTube, Skype, e-mail, and Facebook. Your reconnaissance party would go with their iPhones and take pictures, and then report to their boss in Benghazi on Skype and post the video on YouTube. Facebook could provide directions to what the intent of the NTC was.

We need to get into this business as well. I had three people looking at this, Arabic speakers, and it was not enough because of the pool of information.

The problem is that we get into legal action as well, because you can disseminate information and share it. The problem in the cyber-world is that there are no borders, or, as we know, it's very difficult to have them. The server that may be providing you the service may well be outside that geographical area. From a military perspective, lines on the map matter. The problem, and you're an engineer, is that when you go in the cyber-world, there are no lines on the map; there's only the globe. How do we connect that part? We can act militarily, or in a cyber way, both offensively and defensively. But how do you control that to make sure that you don't spread the mission outside the realm in which you're supposed to operate without bringing somebody you don't want into the realm?

The last point is that I did not have the legal authority to conduct any of this stuff, and therefore we did not. We gathered the information we could. You gather it from everybody. But action we could not do, because I was not cleared to do this.

Yet I will opine, sir, that we need to look into that. You may be able to stop an action in cyberspace without any kinetic action. It makes the reconstruction Madame mentioned earlier much faster. We can make the influence much faster, and we can do it without putting anybody in jeopardy. It's an area we need to continue. But we also need time to understand how we deal with that part, sir. It's a very good question for which I can only offer some thoughts but no solution at this time.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Time has expired. We'll go to Mr. Kellway.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and through you to General Bouchard, it's wonderful to have you with us today. It's been a very interesting conversation so far.

One of the pleasures of having you with us today is the fact that you are probably uniquely situated to comment on the doctrine of the right to protect. I don't imagine that there are too many other people who have had to take that doctrine and apply it in the context of military intervention.

I understand that the doctrine is largely one that talks about the prevention of genocide and governments failing to meet their commitment to protect their citizens.

My question to you is maybe more of a philosophical question, but it is one that, with you, would be informed by practical experiences. Is there value to the doctrine in the context of military intervention? Is it a sensible doctrine to hold on to?

There's a quote I found kind of amusing but very much to the point. I quote Simon Adams. He's the executive director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. His point is that although it's largely a preventive doctrine, “R2P is not regime change with mood lighting”. He's saying there is kind of a difference here.

There seems to be a kind of internal contradiction, or sort of a logical slipperiness, that takes you from R2P to regime change. I'm wondering whether you could comment for us today on how sensible this is in the context of military intervention.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Thank you, sir.

It's difficult to answer, but I will try to provide you with my views on it. There isn't a day that goes by without this conflict being in my mind at one point. In fact, I will take it to the ethical level as well.

If the mission is to protect the population from those who inflict violence, and I have to neutralize that, and it may involve endangering the population at the same time, how do I deal with that? Do I accept a smaller amount, five casualties, to protect a hospital with 2,000 people in it, and how do I come to grips with that? That's what commanders do. Those are the ethical and moral aspects.

I've given you a tactical or an operational example that we can extrapolate, if you wish, to the strategic level, as to the responsibility to protect vis-à-vis recognizing the national sovereignty of a nation and at what point does the international community say that's enough of that and we need to get involved. Hence, the need for legitimacy at the international level as a foundation to act.

I think that's the first part, because if we act from the military perspective, Libya is not a model for anywhere else. Libya was a model for Libya and that's it. The next time someone's going to have to look at the next point, the next problem, and figure out all those aspects that I hope I've offered to you for consideration, be it regional support, geography, who are the actors, and put it all together and say, what kind of strategy am I going to use in this problem?

But at one point we're going to have to have good people get involved when bad people cannot get the message. The weapon of choice should be diplomacy, it should be dialogue, and it should be creating an environment. Where that fails, to me, R2P, from my military perspective—and I'm talking only about myself—is about stopping the violence and then creating an environment where dialogue can take place.

My solution, which, by the way, would have been the most complex solution, would have been to stop sometime in May. If the regime had said, we're stopped, we're done, we're going to sit down and talk, that would have been a very political and interesting situation, because then my mission was ended. I would have been done. So it's a complex series.... Then what do we do after that? What would have been the next step? We went through and we discussed this a fair bit.

I think the responsibility to protect, to me, is just a term. From a military perspective, when your mission is to protect the population, how do you go about that? How do you connect your kinetic activity and your non-kinetic activity and your strategic political activities to mesh them together? I believe it becomes more important to have military and civilian consultation and coordination, because much of it will be done at that level.

I suspect I'm not being so naive as to say this is not happening with Afghanistan and others, but it certainly applies a great deal, because the aim is to stop the violence and to move on.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

You commented on the failure to offer an exit ramp to the regime. Does that then suggest, and given your view of what R2P means—

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Very quickly. The time has expired.