I clearly understand your question, sir, and I will try to answer it even without speculating what would have happened if.... The reason it took the time it took is that.... Because I remember discussions sometime in May and June when the term “stalemate” kept being used, and I can you assure you, sir, there was no stalemate.
But what we had to understand is that the regime used this 90-day mandate as a campaign against NATO by saying, “Hey, guys, they may be gone in 90 days, and we're going to get back to you.” I'm putting it to a very low level, but to put it in a better way, it's that these 90-day mandates created doubts in the minds of the Libyans. Therefore, the Libyans would not rise up until they were guaranteed that they could succeed. The guarantee of success required NATO's presence—to stop and to make sure that the regime could not inflict violence against them—and therefore that's why it took so long.
If you look at the history of how it developed, it was in one village after the other. It was not a massive uprising in many places. It started in the west and worked its way from Misrata towards Al-Khums and Zliten and the like. So it took a lot of time, but it built on that, obviously, and the momentum culminated in the fall of Tripoli. It took a while.
My point to you, sir, considering the other campaigns that have been taking place, is that I understand the fear and the concern of nations about being seen as getting themselves into a place where they won't be able to get out, where they will be for years.... On the other side, especially with no boots on the ground, where it's a matter of the confidence of the people that we won't walk on them, how do we balance the two to make sure we're not going to walk out on those guys, that we'll stay around?
Now, by September at a certain point, I had reached the point where I knew the regime forces were no longer capable of inflicting a massive offensive operation. That I knew, but the next level was, at which point? It became my own criteria to recommend cessation, to say that we had achieved the mission, which was, at which point is the regime no longer capable of inflicting...? But more importantly, at which point are the people on the ground capable of assuming responsibility for their own security? We've seen this in Afghanistan as well, sir. Mine was a less complex problem, but no less present, and that was to define these two points. I had defined one much earlier in the conflict, but the second was to wait and see when those guys could handle it.
Again, to go back to your point, it's to give them the confidence that we're not going to walk out on them halfway through, sir.