National Defence Committee on June 7th, 2012

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Does that suggest that NATO may be missing a certain capacity to implement that doctrine?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

No, sir, I would not say it that way. And “failure” is probably a harsh word. Rather, I would say unintended consequences would be more appropriate, and to me, that's what it was. Something happened, a reaction to it was an unintended consequence, and we should consider that in the future as part of it. But one body cannot legislate or rule over the other body. So it's about coordination then, and communication, and how we synchronize activities.

I will leave it at that.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Norlock.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witness for appearing today.

I'm not going to beat around the bush about which country I'm referring to; I'll just come right out and say that this March, Russia called for an investigation into the Libyan effort.

I'm curious, General, about what your thoughts are on the current relationship between NATO and Russia and on what the future may hold for the relationship between NATO and Russia? If you want to extrapolate or expand that a little further, perhaps there is another nation or entity that may pose a similar challenge.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I'm well aware that Russia may not have shared the same approach or the same belief that I was operating on within minutes, but my order came from my chain of command, which included the North Atlantic Council, which are those NATO nations, including Canada. My directions came from that authority, and I made darned sure I stayed within the guidance I was given.

Let me state right from the start that while I was not confined by it, I was able to work to the maximum extent within the limits of the mandate that was given to me, and to this day I believe I stayed within that mandate because of the feedback I received and the communications we had.

We may have surprised Russia in the way we came about this. They may not have anticipated that course of action. So be it.

As far as Russia's relationship with NATO, it's one that needs to continue. It doesn't have to be an enemy. We have to cohabit. We have to share a part of the globe. How do we do that? NATO is a good balancing act and it can continue to bring them in.

There will always be points of friction. Georgia is a good example of that. Missile defence is another one, as we are well aware, and we have to work through this. A lot of this is bilaterally, but also collectively through our NATO effort. In the 1990s we saw a lot of effort with the Partnership for Peace initiatives and the dialogue that took place. I'm a believer that the more we talk to each other, the less chance we are going to have to revert to other less pleasant courses of action.

I will just close by saying that while Russia may not have appreciated the effort, Russia can help us in finding solutions. I firmly believe that Russia could help us greatly to deal with other issues in the Middle East. We could use their activity. In fact, the solution is through Moscow; it's not through NATO. Therefore, when do we act as NATO and when do we let others act? There is a chance for Russia and President Putin to show some international leadership to bring peace to other parts of the Middle East.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Are there any other entities that NATO may need to or should pay a little bit...or where it might be wise to expand their dialogue?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

Absolutely, and it should be done at various levels.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Are there any specific entities?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

From my perspective, because we worked out of Naples...we worked with the Partnership for Peace with some nations, especially in the Balkans. We worked the Mediterranean dialogue, talking to Egypt. We were talking to Libya in some ways before, and there is the Istanbul initiative, which includes some of the GCC countries.

The biggest point I kept offering to people was that we needed to look beyond those boxes, and let's agree to increase the dialogue with whoever wants to talk to us, and then define a relationship that asks what relationship we want with NATO. Is it one of cooperation? Is it a closer relationship, or is it just some exchange of information?

I certainly believe we should continue. The difficult part is to define that relationship and ask whether it is an acceptable relationship with all 28 nations. We can work through it, through diplomacy and dialogue. Certainly talking to Egypt and Tunisia while all this was going on was an important part of it, and the dialogue we set up to conduct the mission in Libya will serve, in my opinion, the greater good of the movement of illegal weapons, drugs, and migrants in the whole Mediterranean area to begin with. So we have set that in place.

When I left, I said they've created some dialogue with people they didn't talk to before, and they should continue. I certainly hope the wisdom will be to continue this dialogue.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Time has just expired.

M. Brahmi, pour cinq minutes, s'il vous plaît.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank the general for being here.

I would like to go back to a conversation we previously had with Colonel Brian Irwin, who is Director of NATO Policy at the Department of National Defence. We discussed the question of Canada's withdrawal from two NATO programs, the AWACS and the UAVs. Since you were in a very good position to assess the effectiveness of those two programs as a result of your information-gathering and targeting in Libya, I would like you to give us your comments on the consequences that withdrawal could have or has already had. What are your personal observations?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I will start with the AWACS aircraft because I do not believe the allied land surveillance capability or the UAVs or reconnaissance aircraft are in the same category. We can continue that. I will make a few comments for you.

First of all, the AWACSs were very important. We have been there for many years, and their presence is really important. As Canadians, we had a presence in both quantitative and qualitative terms. It was in that respect that we exercised an influence. We could influence decisions by taking part in that program. I believe that was a worthwhile program.

However, because I was well aware of all considerations, I also understand why Canada made the choice it made. I can see both sides of the issue, but I emphasize that it is easier to influence a system from the inside than from the outside.

The second item concerns those common products and capabilities. That also requires common approval for their uses. How can we evaluate domestic needs and those of NATO? Imagine a small European country that does not have a lot of resources and can share certain things as a result of its geographical position. Let's take Albania and Croatia, for example. Do those countries need all that? Can they create a capability and share the capabilities of the other countries? That would be very sensible.

Our geography and distance, of course, give us a different aspect. That is why, in the case of reconnaissance aircraft, we wonder which is the best one. I am not convinced even today that the proposed choice is necessarily the best choice for Canada. Canada's decision was to say no. It asserts that it will develop its own capability and offer it when others need it. It must also take into account its capability to meet its needs in the far north and above its three oceans. There has to be a balance between the two, and that gets difficult. We have to make wise decisions, I am well aware of that.

On the one hand, we have to be present and to find the right level of presence if we want to have an influence. On the other hand, what do we do about the rest of our domestic needs? In the case of allied land surveillance capabilities, I lean more to the side of domestic needs that cannot necessarily be met by what meets communities' needs. With regard to the AWACS, my pendulum may perhaps swing to the other side, perhaps for a historic reason and because the systems are already in place.

I am giving you both sides because the problems are different. Is there something that needs to be found, a complementary arrangement that could help us? Medical care could be made a common component, if necessary. We could develop protocols, but that also requires a guarantee. I mentioned medical care, but it can be something else, information sharing, for example.

I think the most important thing is to create a political will and architecture. Once that architecture is created, we can develop it and move forward without too many problems. We can meet a community need or develop a community capability or national capability, adding it to the component, as necessary, at the appropriate time.

I hope that answers your question.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

That's good.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Merci beaucoup.

Mr. Strahl.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, thank you for being here. Certainly one of the most memorable experiences of my so-far short career here was the celebration honouring your efforts and those of the sailors, air personnel, and soldiers who participated in Libya. It was an honour to be there in the Senate with you and your family for that ceremony.

But I hope you'll forgive me if I get away from Libya a bit. In your opening remarks, you talked a bit about smart defence. Everyone who has come before us on this study of NATO's strategic concept has had something to say about smart defence. I think it's like our previous study on readiness; everyone has a different definition of what smart defence is. But I was interested in your comment, if I'm paraphrasing it correctly, that smart defence is theoretically sound but very difficult to operationalize.

I'm hoping you can expand on that and give us your definition of smart defence and how that applies to NATO—perhaps Libya is a good example of where smart defence took place—and, perhaps more importantly, how it applies to the Canadian context.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

It's a good question.

If you will allow me, I was in Sweden this past weekend for an air power conference. The Chief of Defence of Sweden put forth an interesting perspective.

He told me this: we share a weapons system—or a system, it's not important—between Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. We all have the same system. We have four training centres on the same level, and we're small countries. My recommendation would be to have one training centre, and everybody applauds that, because now we're removing duplication. We're pooling and sharing resources. The problem is that if I say anywhere but Stockholm as far as location, there'll be some issue on the national level as well.

So I'm not trying to be flippant, sir, but that's really the balance that we need to look at. When do national requirements and objectives trump smart defence? It works in Europe, especially with the smaller countries. I think probably a phased approach to that would be wise.

When I look at the smaller nations—Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, and to some extent some of these others—why not say that we don't need all of you to do the same thing? We need some specialists in the cyber world. We need some specialists in the social media. Without prejudicing your sovereign defence requirements, what is it you'd be better at than some of the other nations?

As to how we apply that to Canada, it's interesting. First of all, there's geography itself, our own geography, our distance from Europe. We have different requirements. We have the Arctic, which requires a different approach. We therefore have national requirements that we cannot jeopardize.

But then what is it we can bring to NATO, to the commonality of NATO? I think we can bring certain capabilities. Much of it is through the human aspect of it and the capabilities we have, but also continuing to share the burden in many ways.

So smart defence I think will be seen by small NATO nations differently from how we as Canadians will see it. It's normal, and it's applicable; the trick to all of this is to figure out how everybody else sees it, to understand why they're seeing it the way they're seeing it, and then to say, okay, fine; now that I know what your national interests are, how can we resolve that, and what can be then put towards smart defence? And I think that will be the art of bringing it and operationalizing it.

I know that what I'm saying is very hard to put in numbers and perspective, but I think the first step toward understanding the problem is to define it clearly, to figure out how the others do that, and then, after that, to find a solution. I think that's an important part.

The reason I say this is that my experience in Libya was to understand every nation around the table, to understand their culture, to understand why a Muslim nation was behaving the way they were during Ramadan. Once I understood that, I could understand. I could respect it, I could gain their confidence, and then, after that, achieve my objectives. I'm extrapolating that to the relationship in NATO and defining the problem; I think that's going to be an important part, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Your time is up.

The last questioner is Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thanks very much, Chair.

General Bouchard, I'd just like to reiterate what so many others have said, that for this government, for the Parliament of Canada, and for this committee, it was a matter of great pride for us to see you, a Canadian, commanding this mission so capably.

In light of everything you've said today, having heard this very stimulating discussion cover a lot of ground, I think we all understand much better now why it was a success: it was because of the approach you took and the painstaking efforts you made to knit together a lot of players into a team and to ensure the due diligence that is the sine qua non of any effort to protect civilians by using force. Our hats are very much off to you.

You mentioned that the idea would have been for the regime to stop killing its own people in May and for diplomacy to take over. We all agree with that. You also are very clear that Gadhafi's own decisions, his regime's behaviour, dictated otherwise. So it was not until October 20, I believe, that he was apprehended and killed shortly thereafter, through no fault of NATO's but certainly as a result of the dynamic on the ground.

You mentioned the question of exit strategies, how important that was, and the importance of political will. One of the successes of this mission is that the will to continue the mission held up on all sides throughout, to the end.

Could you give us your thought, because I think it will be instructive for the committee, on what would have happened if the NATO mission had stopped earlier? Say you had lost political will in late September—September 26, for example.

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

The 26th, yes—

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Let's say the ships had gone home and the air power was no longer at your disposal. What would have happened in Libya?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

I clearly understand your question, sir, and I will try to answer it even without speculating what would have happened if.... The reason it took the time it took is that.... Because I remember discussions sometime in May and June when the term “stalemate” kept being used, and I can you assure you, sir, there was no stalemate.

But what we had to understand is that the regime used this 90-day mandate as a campaign against NATO by saying, “Hey, guys, they may be gone in 90 days, and we're going to get back to you.” I'm putting it to a very low level, but to put it in a better way, it's that these 90-day mandates created doubts in the minds of the Libyans. Therefore, the Libyans would not rise up until they were guaranteed that they could succeed. The guarantee of success required NATO's presence—to stop and to make sure that the regime could not inflict violence against them—and therefore that's why it took so long.

If you look at the history of how it developed, it was in one village after the other. It was not a massive uprising in many places. It started in the west and worked its way from Misrata towards Al-Khums and Zliten and the like. So it took a lot of time, but it built on that, obviously, and the momentum culminated in the fall of Tripoli. It took a while.

My point to you, sir, considering the other campaigns that have been taking place, is that I understand the fear and the concern of nations about being seen as getting themselves into a place where they won't be able to get out, where they will be for years.... On the other side, especially with no boots on the ground, where it's a matter of the confidence of the people that we won't walk on them, how do we balance the two to make sure we're not going to walk out on those guys, that we'll stay around?

Now, by September at a certain point, I had reached the point where I knew the regime forces were no longer capable of inflicting a massive offensive operation. That I knew, but the next level was, at which point? It became my own criteria to recommend cessation, to say that we had achieved the mission, which was, at which point is the regime no longer capable of inflicting...? But more importantly, at which point are the people on the ground capable of assuming responsibility for their own security? We've seen this in Afghanistan as well, sir. Mine was a less complex problem, but no less present, and that was to define these two points. I had defined one much earlier in the conflict, but the second was to wait and see when those guys could handle it.

Again, to go back to your point, it's to give them the confidence that we're not going to walk out on them halfway through, sir.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

So what if we had walked out and the mandate had not been renewed in its final phase?

[LGen Charles Bouchard]

You're asking me to speculate, and that's very difficult for me.

I don't think it would have been the right thing. If we're going to commit to something, we've got to commit to it, sir, and we commit until the end or to an agreed point at which we stop, and that has to be well understood, and with 10 states that are clear.... I believe that's how it should be done. It's to clearly enunciate that. Other than that, it's difficult for me to answer, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

With that, we've run out of time.

General Bouchard, thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to appear before our committee and help us with our study on NATO's strategic concept and our role in the world in international military cooperation.

Again, I want to reflect some of the great comments and the praise from around the table today. You served us with honour. You've brought pride to this country. Canada is proud of everything you have accomplished and of the way you led our young men and women in uniform.

Thank you so much. I want to wish you the best in your retirement. I know you'll probably have many different opportunities ahead of you. Make sure you find some time to spend with your family. I know as well that you probably want to get back to Chicoutimi in Quebec.

With that, I'll entertain a motion to adjourn.

[An hon. member]

So moved.