—we expect our troops on the ground to have those skills and to be able to manage and to address issues at the lowest level possible, which could have a particular national strategic impact if they get it wrong.
On the organization and synchronization of campaign planning, that smart defence you talked about as something that can be problematic in terms of what capabilities a country has and whether you can count on it at the time that you need it when you're concentrating force or whatever you happen to be doing at that time—and the greyware, where I think the Canadian Forces.... Sir, I don't know if you would agree with me on this, but throughout the seventies and eighties, of course.... When we were still fighting the Second World War, everything was a left- and right-flanking kind of scenario. We've come a long, long way since then, and I think that having nothing was actually something positive in the later nineties and in recent decades, because it taught our people to be extremely innovative and to deal with things they didn't have.
I would be interested in your thoughts on whether we should revise the principles of war to be a more national strategic principles of war kind of thing. That would include diplomatic skills. That would include the agility and the capability focus that you were talking about earlier, and in fact the exit strategy for someone like a Gadhafi before it gets to horrific consequences such that you can't allow this person to exit.
Could you comment, sir?