Thank you, sir.
Honourable members, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.
I believe this committee can play its most useful role for this nation by considering Canada's relationship with NATO. Is the alliance still relevant for us? Is Canada still useful to the alliance? If the answers to these questions are not immediately clear—and I do not believe they are—then we might ask if the Canadian commitment to NATO should be increased, sustained as is, reduced, or even ended.
We have not asked such questions since the government of Pierre Trudeau came to power in 1968. It is long past time to ask them once more. Why? Because the alliance's experiences in Afghanistan have been difficult, to understate matters. Nations, including Canada, until the end of 2005, imposed caveats on what their troops were allowed to do. Many members contributed no troops or small numbers of troops and could not be moved to do more. The alliance's command structure was sometimes ineffective, and the United States for a time all but refused to operate within or cooperate with NATO's ISAF structure. These flaws had serious tactical consequences, and I would suggest they led to unnecessary Canadian casualties.
Professor David Bercuson and I discussed some of these questions in a paper we wrote for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.
Some might argue last year's Libyan operation demonstrated that NATO could work effectively. I do not believe this to be the case. First, France all but hustled NATO into the operation, launching its own air strikes. Second, although many member nations did good work, not the least our air force and navy, many members either refused to participate at all or placed severe caveats on their forces' role. Members had too few aircraft available, too little ammunition, and a shortages of pilots. The command structure, ably led by a Canadian general officer, nonetheless had the familiar flaws of uncertain command and control and lines of communication. While successful in toppling Gadhafi, the operation, more than anything, demonstrated the military weaknesses of the European members of the alliance.
Now matters are worsening, and will worsen further, as the global and European Community financial situations force cuts on alliance members' defence budgets. NATO's “smart defence” is intended to promote better and more coordinated use of members' military resources. This is a fine idea, but given more than a half century of history, there's very little to inspire confidence that NATO will be able to make this work. The reality is, if it wished to, Europe would be completely able to defend itself without North America's help. The U.S.S.R. is gone, and Russia, while a potential threat, is not likely to be a serious one for at least a decade. There are no other challengers in sight. A wealthy continent even now, Europe can and should do what it feels necessary to protect its interests.
The United States, like Canada, is turning its gaze towards the Pacific. There are challenges to come there, not least the rise of China as a military, economic, and political power. No one is suggesting war, but there is a need for increased preparation, enhanced readiness. Given the American financial troubles and given our own, we might ask if adequate attention can simultaneously be paid to both Europe and Asia. I think it cannot.
I'm not suggesting that Canada quit NATO. The alliance links us with our friends and it serves our national interest. But perhaps we should downplay our interest in and commitment to NATO, as in fact we have been doing by withdrawing from some alliance military programs. Perhaps we ought to begin looking for new partners to work with us from North America. Britain and France, although perhaps less so in the future under the Hollande government in Paris, appear willing to defend western interests. The Australians and New Zealanders provided excellent troops for Afghanistan and are historic partners in the Commonwealth. In the future, perhaps the Republic of Korea, Japan, India, Singapore, and other nations might be willing to join in what we might call an expanded anglosphere.
I do not see a new formal alliance in the immediate future, but it is not unlikely that there will be new coalitions of the willing—democracies that are capable of operating well together and that share an interest in protecting and advancing their common values.
I'm a historian, not a futurologist. Historians have enough difficulty trying to understand what has already happened, let alone what might happen tomorrow. But it is the task of government and members of Parliament to plan for the future. Your committee, ladies and gentlemen, can contribute to this by thinking ahead.
Thank you very much.