You're wise to be very concerned and cautious.
This effort that we're talking about is really, as you have identified, an effort to short-circuit what took a very long time to develop in our own countries. It's an effort at social engineering, let's be blunt.
My argument is that if we're going to do it, we have to bring our best game to the table. That means that we really have to be sure that we, on every side, in NATO, at the UN, are capturing the lessons on what works and what doesn't. Even then there aren't any guarantees, but there's a better chance to maybe make it work, and also to be realistic about how much you can achieve over what period of time.
Afghanistan never got into full stabilization, so it was never able to get on to the next phase. President Karzai had to spend most of his time shoring up alliances, covering his back, because of the ongoing, in effect, civil war. It was the worst case for doing what everyone has to agree is an extraordinarily difficult task.