National Defence Committee on March 4th, 2013

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I have Mr. Harris and then Madam Moore.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I'm not going to prolong the kind of debate that Mr. Alexander wishes to engage in about what we're doing here.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Gentlemen, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

What we are doing is seeking to improve the legislation by amendment. Having heard what you had to say, it leads me to think you're not prepared to consider improvements to legislation, which is what amendments and subamendments are all about.

The idea of using section 139 of the National Defence Act to determine what is a more severe punishment than the other.... According to the act itself, which is the will of Parliament, a reprimand or reduction in rank, detention, etc., all of these things are more serious than a fine. That's spelled out here in another section of the act itself.

In another subsection of the act, subsection 139(2)(2), it states the following:

Where a punishment for an offence is specified by the Code of Service Discipline and it is further provided in the alternative that on conviction the offender is liable to less punishment, the expression “less punishment” means any one or more of the punishments lower in the scale of punishments than the specified punishment.

I'm not suggesting a severe or large fine is not a punitive consequence or a penal consequence, or as Colonel Gibson says, “true penal consequence”. We're not disputing that at all. What we are suggesting and disputing is that if a reprimand, and a severe reprimand, are, by law, more serious consequences, then the fact of the matter is that the section we're talking about is not appropriate.

I'd be surprised, frankly, if there is a huge fine imposed on someone that would be significantly greater than a month's pay, for example, that's not combined with something more severe than what we're talking about here, whether it's forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank, or something that's deserving of such a significant penal consequence as being suggested by a huge fine. There might not be other consequences.

Any fine, I would submit, is by law lesser than a reprimand, lesser than a severe reprimand, and therefore, by definition, ought to be included in the category that doesn't attract a criminal record.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I would like to point out that it is not because we are trying to improve the amendment that this is a waste of time. We said very clearly at the outset that we were going to support the amendment that was moved by the Conservatives. That does not alter the fact that we believe certain improvements could be made to the amendment to make it more effective. That is what we are discussing. I am truly saddened to see that people believe that wanting to improve matters is a waste of time. In our view, logically, unless I'm mistaken, the fine will not be increased to infinity without other punishments being imposed, which in any case would render clause 75 non-applicable. I could never believe that a fine of $20,000 would be imposed on a private without anyone considering imposing a reduction in rank or detention. If he has committed an offence so serious that he receives a $20,000 fine, I could never believe that he would not be sentenced to detention or be reduced in rank. It was precisely on the basis of that reasoning that we said it would be much easier to use just the word "fine" for the purposes of simplifying the administration of the act.

I wanted to come back to that point and to clarify the fact that we do not want to waste time. We very clearly said that we were going to support the amendment, but the fact that we are going to do so does not prevent us from trying to improve it. We did not say that what it contained was not functional. We said that there were ways to make it more effective and to include more people. The JAG people also acknowledged that it covered 95% of cases. It did not cover 100% of cases. If they had told us that no one would have a criminal record if they did not deserve one in civilian life, we would not need to have this discussion. However, we are having this discussion because they acknowledge that this does not apply to 5% of cases. We want to improve the bill and the amendment.

This attitude on the Conservatives' part is unfortunate because we are trying very sincerely to improve the clauses of the bill.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Let's vote on subamendment 5, moved by Mr. Harris.

(Subamendment negatived)

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

We'll go back to the main amendment. Are there any speakers on amendment G-2?

Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I just want to make a closing statement on G-2. We do recognize that this amendment provides some significant improvement to the scheme of the military justice circumstance. We thought it could be improved, and we still think it can, and we set these amendments forward to demonstrate how it could and should be improved. We think they should have been accepted.

However, given that the government is not prepared to go farther than it has, I think we will support this amendment as an improvement to the situation, recognizing that it doesn't even deal with the question that we'll be talking about in the next amendment, and the question that was part of most of the arguments that we made in the House of Commons. It doesn't deal with the issue of mode of trial. It doesn't deal with the issue of whether the constitutional rights of an individual are recognized, the protections of the Charter of Rights, a fair trial, the impartial tribunal, etc. These things are not a part of this, because this says no matter what the mode of trial, whether it's by court martial with all the protections, or whether it's by commanding officer or by a delegate of a commanding officer, no matter what, if it is one of these listed offences, and if the consequence for the individual is one of these four things, then they are not subject to a criminal record. Given that represents a large majority of the number of people who are tried under summary conviction, and some of those who were tried under courts martial, we recognize it as a step forward so we will be supporting it.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Okay.

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

If no one else wishes to speak, I would like us to proceed with a recorded vote.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

We shall have a recorded vote on government amendment G-2.

(Amendment agreed to: yeas 11; nays 0) [See Minutes of Proceedings])

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

We have NDP-20, amendment number 5944548.

Mr. Harris, do you wish to move it onto the floor?

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

I move amendment NDP-20, which provides a subclause after line 7 on page 49, reading as follows:

(1.1) A person who is convicted by summary trial of an offence, or who has been so convicted before the coming into force of this subsection, has not been convicted of a criminal offence.

This amendment would ensure that all people who are subject to a summary conviction trial can be treated as cases of military discipline, and given, in accordance with section 163 of the National Defence Act, specifically subsection 163(3), by a commanding officer, they can receive:

a sentence in which any one or more of the following punishments may be included: (a) detention for a period not exceeding thirty days;

—and we're talking about imprisonment here in the detention centre in Edmonton for a period not exceeding 30 days—

(b) reduction in rank by one rank; (c) severe reprimand, (d) reprimand, (e) a fine not exceeding basic pay for one month, and

—I guess and/or—

(f) minor punishments.

All of these punishments are available to a commanding officer who, after a summary trial, can give any one of these sentences. It involves, as Clayton Ruby mentioned in his testimony, the liberty of the subject.

Detention for 30 days is a serious matter. It involves someone being imprisoned against his or her will. It's a significant punishment in the law and involves a situation where you don't have the benefit of proper procedure—the lack of a public hearing, the lack of constitutional rights, and the lack of respect for what's called natural justice. You don't know the case against you, because you don't have the same kind of disclosure that's available in a criminal trial in a civil system.

We have a very elaborate system of disclosure before our provincial courts, even when someone is charged with a minor offence. Those procedural protections are not available in circumstances where someone is facing a summary trial procedure. You don't have the right to counsel. You don't have a trained judicial officer determining your guilt or innocence. You don't have rules of evidence. You don't have an impartial tribunal in the sense of the meaning of the law for someone who not only is impartial but also is seen to be impartial.

You could have a judge, or someone judging your case, who knows you, knows the witnesses, could be a friend of the witnesses, or in many respects knows the facts before things happen. There is a whole series of matters that aren't available with respect to a summary trial, that are taken for granted, and, in fact, are the basics of an impartial tribunal and a fair procedure.

It's a circumstance that does not find itself in the civil law system outside of the military, and yet it's the mode by which more than 98% of the trials that take place take place in the summary trial system. That's approximately 2,000 a year. In the last year that we have records for, 97% were actually found guilty.

As has been pointed out, 94% of the people who are convicted or found guilty, after the passage of this legislation—again, going by the one year that we have records for—will be exempted from a criminal record. Some 107 Canadian Forces members in the year for which we are examining would have a criminal record, having been tried in a circumstance where you don't have the procedural rights to what's called procedural fairness, which is a constitutional requirement.

There have been some arguments about whether it's charter compliant or not. We've had witnesses come before us. Colonel Drapeau was one, a practising lawyer who practises military law and has written the text from which I've quoted. He has expressed his view about the concerns about the lack of procedural fairness and the legal difficulties from a constitutional point of view.

Mr. Clayton Ruby, one of the leading criminal lawyers in Canada, and one who has a sterling reputation, his text on sentencing in Canada is one that is most often used across the country. He is also, as he pointed out, the constitutional litigator and editor of the Canadian Rights Reporter, which is a law journal dealing with constitutional cases. He makes it clear that one of the reasons.... I believe Mr. Opitz asked him why there has been no challenge. I think he explained it quite well, the fact that individuals had to mount the case, to actually bring that case.

The suggestion again has been made that Justice Lamer and Justice LeSage said that the military justice system was constitutional. I think that argument was dealt with by several of our witnesses.

I guess Mr. Ruby said that we've never seen the legislation being challenged in that particular...that when you're dealing with constitutional challenges, you actually have to look at the challenge in a particular section of the code.

He said in his testimony:

There's been reference to the military justice system being constitutional; it is constitutional, in my view, in the sense that having a separate and different justice system for the military is constitutional. That's all that anyone is saying. No one has ever examined these provisions one at a time for constitutional compliance.

When he's saying “no one” he means no court. He added:

It's right to say that it's expeditious. It works well for the guys in charge, but it really is beyond any rational thought to call this fair. The judge....

And I guess we're talking here about judge in the service tribunal, which could be a commanding officer, or could be a delegate.

...may not be impartial; he could be friends with the witnesses. No transcript is kept, and there is no right of appeal or to full disclosure of the case against you. You're made to stand like a child in front of the tribunal for its entirety. This is demeaning and unfair. We should not hesitate to acknowledge that and change it.

That's his very strong opinion about this.

We've had this argument before at this committee. The last time we talked about it, it was suggested that, well, you know, you can't have people not getting a criminal record for some things that ought to attract public opinion, that the public should know about it.

That may be, but what is the solution? I think the solution was stated by Clayton Ruby in his testimony. He said that if you want someone to attract a criminal record, you must provide the proper procedures, or have them charged in criminal court.

One of the things that was raised the last time was sexual assaults. Right now the military deals with them under section 129, Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Discipline. That's a rather general section for something as specific and significant as sexual assault. But it's only been in the last 15 years that the military has actually tried sexual assaults. Since 1998 the changes to the act provide for that type of charge, as I understand it.

So if there is a sexual assault, it obviously needs to be dealt with and be taken seriously. The method should then be to bring in the civilian authorities to carry out such a prosecution. Otherwise, before someone can have a criminal record, you must ensure that the procedures and protections are in place.

We heard some suggestion in a general way that when you sign up for the military you sign away your rights. I don't think that when someone takes the oath of office in the military they are asked to give up the legal protections of the Charter of Rights and due process with respect to their liberty. They are the people who are fighting on our behalf to protect the Constitution and offering to sacrifice themselves to pursue that. Yes, there are specific issues with respect to the Charter of Rights. One of them is actually contained in the charter, but there is no suggestion that people waive their constitutional rights.

Mr. Ruby said:

It has been said that when you enlist in the military, you waive your constitutional rights. This is nonsense. It is legal nonsense because the charter has its own provisions for exempting certain laws, and each one must be justified on an individual, focused basis. You can't have a blanket exemption for the military about anything as general as that. The look at the legislation the particular practise is fact-specific, and it can't be based on general concepts like the need for discipline in the armed forces, because that attracts every aspect of armed forces life.

That, I would suggest, is a proper answer to this notion that when you join the military you don't have the protection of the Charter of Rights when it comes to being treated as an offender, being sentenced to a fine and imprisonment and ending up with a criminal record.

I think we've talked about this quite a lot in our debate and argument. I think our side has clearly accepted and advanced the argument that military justice is different from civilian justice. That is constitutional in the sense that it's appropriate to have a separate system of military justice, and there are reasons why that justice system would be harsher than the civilian justice system. All of those things are accepted. The consequence might be that you might end up in a military prison for things you would not be incarcerated for in civilian society. As long as the system is fair and properly administered, that's appropriate.

Where we are seeking to draw the line is to prevent this process, which doesn't meet the constitutional standard in terms of procedural fairness and the rights of an accused person. We want to ensure that it would not leave you with a criminal record that would follow you for the rest of their life or until you are able to obtain, I would say, some kind of pardon. However, our law has now been changed to take away even the notion of a pardon, which, again, we opposed vehemently, but which the government nevertheless, with its majority in the House, passed.

This is a very important principle, one that we think is at a very high level of significance. It has to do with the constitutional rights of the people who join our Canadian Forces who we ask to give unlimited liability with their own lives in the service of their country. As we know from the past 10 years, we've seen quite a number of individuals lose their lives in the service of their country in Vietnam and elsewhere as a result of their being willing, in a voluntary army and air force and navy, choosing to join the Canadian Forces and serve their country. They deserve our consideration, our respect, with respect to ensuring that while military justice may be different, it's not going to stick them with a criminal record contrary to their having the constitutional protections, in the absence of the constitutional protections that they are in fact fighting for and willing to sacrifice for and joined the Canadian Forces in the service of.

That's the most succinct way I can put it, Mr. Chair. This is an extremely important amendment. It's very different from the amendment we just passed. The amendment we just passed has to do with excluding certain particular sections in a circumstance where the penalty is not high, not beyond the item set out. This is a different category. This is based on the mode of trial. If we have a summary trial resulting in a conviction, that ought not to attract a criminal record. If there are circumstances or offences or charges that need to be laid based on what happened, and it's deemed to be important enough that a conviction ought to result in a criminal record, and a public record, so that other employers and others who come into contact with that individual have means to know what they've done, then the system ought to be changed, or they ought to be tried in a civilian court.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

I have Mr. Alexander, Mr. Toone, and Madam Moore.

Mr. Alexander, you have the floor.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

We'll be opposing the amendment for the simple reason that it runs contrary to fundamental principles of this bill and the military justice system. Mr. Harris says that the NDP accepts that the military justice system is different from the civilian system. Then he goes on to suggest that it is harsher. The effect of this amendment would be to make it more lenient, in a dramatic way.

If this amendment went through, and I, as a serving member of the Canadian Forces, were to commit an assault or an assault causing bodily harm and elect to be tried at summary trial rather than by court martial, my criminal record would not pass into the civilian system. Those are offences under the Criminal Code of Canada. There are eight such offences. If they are tried at summary trial in the military system, they should show up in the civilian system. That, to our mind, is common sense.

I think the real grievance, or hesitation, that Mr. Harris has, that the NDP have, is about the summary trial system itself. He raised the question of its procedural fairness, which indeed was attacked by Clayton Ruby, but by no one else among the witnesses that I remember, certainly not by those charged with reviewing the system, who think not just the military justice system but the summary trial system would stand a charter challenge, a constitutional challenge. And those are very eminent jurists indeed.

Even while proposing this more lenient approach to Criminal Code offences that if tried at summary trial would not generate a criminal record, Mr. Harris doesn't want to revise the summary trial system. There have been no amendments to that effect. They would be dramatic, far-reaching. We would oppose them, almost certainly. But he has not proposed that.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That's out of order.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I think it is absolutely in order to mention that, because it's the context without which this amendment becomes even less coherent. We will oppose it.

I'd like to point out for the record that the summary trial system has widespread and deep support among the witnesses that we've heard, and to take the position of a Clayton Ruby, someone who is a self-described amateur on military justice issues—he said explicitly that he wasn't very familiar with the system—as the new gold standard for what should constitute a criminal record strikes us as a weak argument for this amendment. So we'll be opposing it.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Toone.

[Philip Toone, NDP, Gaspésie—Îles-de-la-Madeleine, QC]

I think there's been testimony that supports Mr. Harris's position. I will quote from Colonel Michel Drapeau, a retired colonel from the Canadian Forces, who was before the defence committee on February 28, 2011. He said that he strongly believed that the issue of summary trials must be addressed because there was currently nothing more important—nothing more important—than for Parliament to focus on fixing a broken system “that affects the legal rights of a significant number of Canadian citizens every year. Why? Because unless and until you, the legislators, address this issue, it is almost impossible for the court to address any challenge, since no appeal of a summary trial verdict or sentence is permitted. As well, it is almost impossible for any other form of legal challenge to take place, since there are no trial transcripts and no right to counsel at summary trial.”

On the face of it, I think it's fairly clear, and I don't think anybody here is going to disagree, that if you have a summary conviction, the appeal possibilities are significantly reduced. There's no transcript; there's no trial record. This is a significantly different process, and the weight of the consequence of that process has to be consequent. The proposal that we have before us right now would, I think, lead to a much more balanced approach to summary conviction.

It does not make sense to me that somebody who is risking their lives to defend the Canadian state would be subject to so significantly fewer constitutional rights than any other Canadian citizen. The person who would be facing the summary trial has made grave sacrifices and should benefit from what we're proposing here, seeing as it has been proposed by a number of experts. It has been supported even by the Supreme Court of Canada, which has said that when it comes to summary conviction we have to be very careful about the procedural protections that are going to be afforded to them.

I don't agree that the bill before us goes far enough. I think it really would benefit from this particular amendment.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I want to repeat that there is no subsequent written record in the case of summary trials. It is therefore very difficult to determine whether that has been done properly. It must also be understood that the accused in a summary proceeding is tried by someone who knows him. When it is the commanding officer, he knows him. In all other justice systems, the judge refuses to try someone whom he knows personally. That is even the case for a military judge. There is a legal problem in this case.

We may have to reconsider whether we are prepared to adopt the amendment moved by my colleague from St. John's East, acknowledging that the rights of our Canadian military members must be respected. Perhaps we will have to review the list of offences that may be tried by summary trial and the list of those that could not. Perhaps we will choose to exclude certain offences that may currently be tried by summary trial and that may attract a criminal record.

It is really important to respect military members here. It must be understood that, despite all good will, the fact remains that very little is known about the consequences, particularly by our military members who may have been in the system for a shorter period of time, especially the privates. Members often choose a summary trial because they think it will be simpler and will resolve the matter quickly. They may have the wrong impression. They feel they will undergo a summary proceeding, pay their fine and serve their punishment and that the matter will be resolved and put behind them. However, when they realize, years later, that they will have a criminal record as a result, they will not be able to turn back the clock. What has happened is recorded nowhere. If they realize the actual consequences 5 or 10 years later, it will be very difficult to go back to the situation and to be tried again.

Furthermore, as nothing is written, every time we adopted a retroactivity clause, now or later, we would be unable to consult the written record to determine whether the retroactivity clause might apply in a criminal case. That complicates administration.

I really believe this must be adopted. We must help our military members avoid attracting a criminal record.

If the government party is prepared to adopt this amendment, we may subsequently have to consider determining whether we should exclude certain offences that may currently be tried by summary trial. We can think about that. Whatever the case may be, we owe it to our military members, particularly considering everything that might be retroactive. Even now, some provisions of the bill could apply retroactively. However, as there is no written record, it is very difficult to determine whether this could apply in this specific case. It thus becomes difficult for a military member to argue.

The idea here is really to prevent negative consequences for our military members. If the government party is open to this idea, some other steps may subsequently be taken to ensure that we exclude certain offences from these provisions and ensure that they can no longer be tried by summary trial. My colleague Mr. Alexander referred to offences such as assault, for example. I believe we really owe it to our military members. They do not necessarily understand the consequences. As there is no written record, it is very difficult for them to mount subsequent challenges.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

I just want to respond to some of Mr. Alexander's comments.

Clayton Ruby is not the only one to raise concerns about this. The Criminal Lawyers' Association expressed grave concerns about it. They were opposed to the giving of a criminal record to people who were charged and convicted under a summary trial, objected to the procedures and to the constitutionality of it.

Mr. Justice LeSage, himself, in his report, said:

...I have very real concerns about obtaining a criminal record from a summary trial conviction. The issue of criminal records flowing from convictions at summary trial must be reviewed. The very damage that flows from a criminal record and the potential effect on a person’s life is far too severe a consequence for most offences tried by summary trial. I am fully supportive of the summary trial as an efficient and effective method of maintaining discipline. However, because the summary trial, although constitutional for its purposes—

—and I think he's again talking in the general way—

—does not provide the panoply of safeguards of a civilian criminal trial, the unintended consequence of acquiring a “criminal record” at a summary trial should occur only in exceptional circumstances.

Now we're not talking about exceptional circumstances here. I suppose one might argue that if we're getting 94% out of 100%, the other 6% must therefore, by definition, be exceptional. I don't think that's the case. There's no particular special circumstances. For example, the mere shoving of a person is an assault. If one decided to charge someone with assault, you could get a conviction, possibly even in a criminal court. But I doubt very much that every shoving match that occurs in the military is dealt with by a charge of assault, just as every time something like that happens in a school yard or a school, the police are called. But I think it could be recognized that this kind of behaviour could be a discipline issue; fighting, shoving, even striking someone could be a discipline issue, but not necessarily one that ought to attract a criminal offence.

Mr. Alexander referred to the eight offences that we're talking about that are Criminal Code offences. If there are only eight offences that we're talking about, then you make a choice.

You invoke the police in a civilian trial system to ensure that what is regarded truly as a criminal offence ought to be treated as such, handled by the civilian authorities. A person gets all of the rights that they're entitled to under our Constitution and under the law, and if they're convicted, they end up with the consequences of that.

If it's going to be regarded as a disciplinary matter, we've all agreed that it's important to have a military discipline system, one that is, as Justice LeSage said, “an efficient and effective method of maintaining discipline” through the summary trial process. It's fast; it can be dealt with in a matter of days, not in the kind of time that a civil trial might take. It can restore unit cohesion, restore morale, restore discipline in a swift way and an appropriate way, and the punishment might be greater than one would get for the same offence in society.

We understand that may be required to maintain that discipline and efficiency. It's not being done because it should be. No one says soldiers should be punished more than civilians. That's not the purpose of it, not to provide a greater punishment.

Mr. Alexander's argument about treating them more leniently by not getting criminal records doesn't hold water in this context. Because the purpose of making it tougher on the individual is to ensure that the unit cohesiveness, the discipline, and the morale is maintained, not to punish them for the rest of their lives with a criminal record.

That's not the point here at all. The issue is the punishment that you're given, the process by which you get there, doesn't have the same constitutional protections, and therefore as Justice LeSage says, ought not to attract the unintended consequence in many respects of having a criminal record. Clause 75, with the G-2 amendment, goes some way to recognizing it, and it has taken a couple of years. It's taken the last iteration of this bill, Bill C-41, Bill C-15, and two years of arguments to get to the point where it was accepted. It was accepted in the last Parliament mainly because it was a minority Parliament. I would venture to say, given the makeup of the last Parliament and the makeup of this committee, there's no possibility that the changes to clause 75, which are now there, would have got through. If they didn't get through then, they'd be unlikely to be passed by this committee.

It's all very well to talk about ten years to get here, or six years or seven years or three iterations or whatever, but we would never have got here if it wasn't for the arguments that were made in the past two years. We're now here, but we're here obviously because the recognition of the consequence of a criminal record is a serious matter and the government and Parliament has now decided to do something about that, not everything, but something about that, and that something is contained in Bill C-15, clause 75.

We are putting forth the proposition or the argument that we must go further, that we must prevent people from getting a criminal record when they don't have due process of law, which every other citizen outside of the military has access to if they are going to obtain a criminal record. That's the distinction we're making here. We're saying to the men and women who sign up to the military that they could come out of here with a criminal record without due process of law. Every other person in our society who is going to end up with a criminal record has the constitutional guarantees, has the ability and the right to a fair and independent tribunal with the right procedural protections that are enshrined in our Constitution, and the procedures, laws, cases, and all the things that have been put into our law as the law progressed.

As retired Justice Létourneau said, the law has changed. The law changes as time goes on. There's been a development in the law and in the application of the Charter of Rights to our criminal law and our system. He suggested that the military justice system has not kept up with that. I have to agree with him; we are trying here to help it catch up in this particular aspect. Yes, we have a military justice system that may need a fundamental review but we have an opportunity here to say we want to make sure in the meantime that we don't give people criminal records who don't have legal protection.

If the concern is, and I know it is, that some people who perhaps should have a criminal record are not going to have one, well then there is a solution. That solution is to have them charged in the civil system. If someone commits a sexual assault against a minor on a base or a rape, then they can be tried civilly and prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and they will have the consequences associated with that. But we don't want to have a system wherein the only people in our system of justice who don't have access, as of law, to the procedural protections of our Constitution are the people who are serving our country in the military. That's a situation we'd find ourselves in if we don't pass this amendment here today.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Ms. Gallant.