Thank you, Mr. Chair.
First of all, I want to thank Mr. Butt, who is helping us and attending this meeting.
I have the same questions as my colleagues regarding section 100. I have two questions for Colonel Gibson.
The first concerns the fact that a person may be charged and receive a sentence greater than what might be imposed on an inmate, even if there was no criminal intent to allow him to escape. Reference was made to a terrorist, but we are not necessarily talking about a terrorist. It can be any person. It may simply be a private who has made a mistake in carrying out his duties and obeying orders given to him. I am not a lawyer, but I have a few notions, particularly relative to what lawyers call mens rea. I believe some lawyers here will be able to confirm that for me. I have a more general question as to whether it is possible to convict someone who has no criminal intent.
That is my first question for Colonel Gibson. Is this situation different in the military justice system? Do you accept something that would not be acceptable in the civilian justice system? It has previously been said that we want one thing from this bill: we want to do what has been recommended by witnesses who said they wanted military justice to be more similar to civilian justice because that is a global trend. We want to have the same degree of equity in the treatment of criminals, as other countries such as Australia and Great Britain are doing.
Would this difference between the treatment an accused might experience in a trial in a military court and the way he would be treated in the civilian justice system pose a problem, knowing the consequence—this is what we are interested in today—he would experience upon leaving the military? In the civilian system, he would attract a criminal record with all the consequences that has for his ability to find a job and to travel outside the country.
I am not a lawyer or a specialist, but how can we justify this difference in treatment?