It only occurs to me because of the questions you asked.
Gentlemen, we discussed this in Wainwright to some extent. It was the reality that you and I and others around this table lived in Afghanistan. One major distinction between recent missions--in Haiti, Libya, Afghanistan, and smaller missions to Africa, and even missions as recent as the one in the Balkans--and past missions, and certainly in contrast with Korea and the world wars, is that there's a new organizing principle in recent missions, which is that we are supporting the local government. We are not going into an environment where the UN has administrative authority—and Canada hasn't recently gone anywhere where it was an occupying power. We are there to support. That creates a whole new set of challenges for training and readiness, many of which you are meeting, obviously.
Could you summarize for us—and this relates to the question of working with other government departments—how much doctrine in training has changed to reflect the new reality that often in your operations centre, in your brigade headquarters, in your divisional headquarters, your main interlocutors are the ministers of the local government or the generals or the civil society or even the private sector of the host country? Many of the principal tests that you will face are winning their trust and confidence, working in partnership with them, identifying the ones that are effective and the ones that are not, and being on top of that aspect of the mission. Is that as close to the core of training and readiness and preparation as we would probably agree it should be?