Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank you for inviting me to appear today. My presentation is about the future of NORAD and continental defence relations between Canada and the United States.
The idea underlying my comments is that the time has come to expand NORAD's role and deepen continental defence cooperation. With the end of the war in Afghanistan and the operational pause for the Canadian Forces in the coming years, it is time to become more involved in North American defence.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks the United States approached Canada about the possibility of expanding NORAD into a full-fledged continental defence command. The idea was rejected by Ottawa.
In 2005, the Canadian government also rejected a role for Canada in North American ballistic missile defence. Although much was done to strengthen our continental defence cooperation thereafter, notably in the area of military assistance to law enforcement and consequence management, the time is right to reverse these two previous refusals.
Specifically, as Canada undertakes a review of its defence policy, and as both Canada and the United States consider how best to spend their tighter defence budgets, it is an opportune moment to consider an expansion of NORAD to include a veritable binational approach to the defence of North America, on land, at sea, in the cyber-realm, and in the Arctic.
An expanded NORAD would arguably be more efficient and cost-effective than the current bilateral approach to continental defence cooperation in these areas. As well, an enlarged NORAD would be better prepared to address potential threats to the continent, particularly in the cyber-realm and in the Arctic.
An enlarged NORAD, moreover, would accord well with the government's commitment to the perimeter approach to continental security proposed in the beyond the border initiative. Since the early 1960s, NORAD has provided integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of ballistic missile launches against North America. It is this function that makes NORAD an aerospace defence command, rather than merely an air defence command.
As part of an August 2004 agreement between Canada and the United States, NORAD's ITWAA function has been allowed to assist the United States' missile defence system, despite the fact that the Canadian government has declined a role in that system.
In 2010, NATO issued its latest strategic concept. Included in the document was a commitment by the alliance to the ballistic missile defence of Europe and the United States. As a member of NATO, Canada has therefore endorsed missile defence for its allies, yet the Canadian government does not support an extension of those defences to Canada.
Canada's inconsistency on ballistic missile defence makes sense politically. There is no pressure to take part, and any government that requested a formal role in the system would face critiques. Yet Canada's current abstention acts as an obstacle toward closer cooperation within the existing NORAD construct, it restricts Canada's access to information and technologies that arguably serve the national interest, and it could make Canada more vulnerable in future decades as ballistic missiles proliferate.
The time has come to examine whether political expediency should continue to prevent Canada from taking part in this aspect of North America's aerospace defence and from joining its fellow allies in fully accepting the logic of maintaining BMDs.
In sum, continental defence relations between Canada and the United States are in good shape, but they could be better. With a review of the Canadian defence policy underway, the time is right to take a greater interest in this issue.
Thank you.