Evidence of meeting #15 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 2nd session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
Russia, of course, is already in the Arctic. China is going to the Arctic, no problem, without Russian help. In my view there's a threat to Canada, if you like, in terms of increased traffic. I'm not sure of the link you're making between China—
Conservative
Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON
I mean the military threats of an alliance between the two countries. We had in the Second World War the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. Now history is repeating itself, as usual, and you see Russia and China, two similar regimes with expansionist intent.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
Yes, they both have expansionist interests. Are you asking about them working together? I don't see them working together.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I don't see them working together. Historically, of course, you know since 1949 it made sense that they worked together, and then they had a big break in 1962. I don't see two expansionist powers working together to the extent that they had different cooperative regimes—the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and those kinds of things. They're in joint exercises, but ultimately they will be pursuing their own interests in the Arctic. I don't see them working together in the Arctic.
Conservative
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I see them as individual threats but not as a combined threat, working together.
Conservative
Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON
So did you consider this combined threat eventually?
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I personally do not see China and Russia working together. Just historically, it would pass 50 to 60 years. We thought it would happen and it didn't happen, and I don't see it happening in the future.
Perhaps Professor Lagassé has a different perspective.
Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
The question for me is simply in terms of how the threat to North America might increase. We see that both powers arguably will continue with their conventional naval capabilities that could eventually potentially be of interest off the coast, or potentially even in the Arctic. So we have to be particularly aware, I would suggest, of developments in destroyer technology such that the air defence of destroyers will make it prohibitive for us to come close to certain ships.
Similar is the Russian capability in terms of surveillance in the north, with aircraft and even potential long-range bombers that continue to strafe with cruise missiles potentially as well.
Now this would never take place, as far as I'm concerned, in the context of a “bolt from the blue” attack. It's more a consideration of an event happening internationally whereby a threat to North America is used to leverage, potentially, the effect of having to turn. That's the main concern, I think. That's always been the concern, really, when it comes to North America, not a direct attack by a large power on the continent, but a threat of an attack against the continent that's being used to ward off a response from the allies in an event internationally. That's what we have to be more aware of, I would suggest, leaving aside the question of the alliance.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Peter Kent
Your time has just expired.
Mr. Larose, s'il vous plaît, you have five minutes.
NDP
Jean-François Larose NDP Repentigny, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'll be speaking in English. I was informed that there's a problem with the system.
I think one of the best tools we have is diplomacy. I can certainly say with great pride that many allies would have certain lessons to take from Canada on this.
That being said, the BMDs, the reports that we're getting is that they're not up to par. It was mentioned by the administration right now. It was looked at as to having a third site for them, and it was turned down for many reasons. One, it is very costly. Two, we don't know about countermeasures. They haven't really been tested that well. Three, what is factual and not speculation is the impact that it's having on international relations. That is always a question to be asked. What direction do we want to take? Would it not be a different one than we've always taken so far, one that I'm very proud of, where it's always been towards diplomacy?
You mentioned before, Mr. Lagassé, that there are no guarantees, even if we joined with them with the BMDs, that the U.S. would use their assets to defend Canada. So how much are we supposed to invest to have that guarantee if we should take that direction?
Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I would suggest as a first step, if one takes part in the system, that one at least get a commitment from the United States that it's part of the NORAD construct. Once that occurs, then it necessarily becomes an obligation for the command to defend the continent binationally. Therefore if we can arrive at a political agreement, and that would be a diplomatic agreement, then NORAD would be duty bound as a binational command to protect the continent equally, as opposed to focusing on some areas versus others.
On the other aspect of your question, diplomatically I think it's important to note we are effectively committed, except in terms of having the system defend us. So we have stated as part of our alliance in NATO that we support the system. That for me is the odd part, in that in the past we were militarily committed but diplomatically opposed. Now we're diplomatically supportive, but militarily opposed. So it's a strange situation that we find ourselves in, and it's simply to encourage us to have the courage of our convictions. If we truly believe that it's a destabilizing system in international affairs, then the question behooves us, I would suggest, to try to get our other NATO allies to reconsider as opposed to signing on without saying much about it.
NDP
Jean-François Larose NDP Repentigny, QC
With the current system how many missiles can it intervene theoretically, because this is just speculation?
Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I would suggest a very limited number, and it's only made for a very limited number. This is why, as much as there is speculation, Russia will always improve its ICBM and SLBM fleets and continue moving them and developing them and ensuring that it will always be able to overwhelm any North American system.
So it is a system primarily designed to deal either with accidental launches or to deal with the secondary attacks of a smaller power in the event of a confrontation with them. So it's really a system that's designed to prevent North America from being blackmailed. Similarly with Europe, if we ask, why is Europe so concerned about this? They're primarily concerned with particular states using the technology to threaten Europe, even if the issue at play is not even European in nature.
So it's really a system that's designed simply to try to reduce blackmail, try to prevent accidental launches. It's not designed in any way to try to defend North America or Europe against Russia—or China, for that matter.
NDP
Jean-François Larose NDP Repentigny, QC
Thank you.
Ms. Sloan, you mentioned the Arctic, the seas. I don't know if you have any take on defending the sovereignty of our land concerning, let's say, the Rangers that exist right now, better equipment, deployment time, and old equipment that was brought back from Afghanistan that isn't necessarily adequate right now for our own territory.
How much more are we going to see the impact of the environmental crisis situations with the environment and how much do we need to adapt to that? I know there are a few questions, but....
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I think the big environmental change on territory in the north is around mining. The concern there is terrorism, smuggling, those sorts of things. It's already opening up. That's obviously something that Canada is going to have to be watching for. It's still more of a coastal maritime issue because the land mass is still huge. I don't see a large need to defend actual land mass except for along the coast where the mining has access to the Northwest Passage, etc.
NDP
Jean-François Larose NDP Repentigny, QC
Okay, you don't necessarily see that the Rangers would need more equipment, more training.
You mentioned drones. Do you include that within the sea and also within the land? What's your take on it?
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I don't have a number but the Rangers have been augmented a fair bit in recent years under the Harper government, and given, again, that a bucket of money can only go so far, I wouldn't spend more resources in that area. I think it's the right way to go with the Nanisivik naval facility and also the Canadian Armed Forces arctic training centre that's been set up.
The important thing for the Rangers is that they be able to go over the land and exhibit sovereignty, and in some cases, deal with threats and disasters, but it's not where I would put a limited pool of resources at this time.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Peter Kent
Thank you, Professor Sloan.
Thank you, Monsieur Larose.
Mr. Bezan, please, you have five minutes.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake, MB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and sharing their ideas and experience with us.
I want to just go back to Mr. Harris' comment on the Cold War, and as someone of Ukrainian heritage, I am quite concerned about what is happening in Ukraine, in the Crimean peninsula, the illegal action, and the completely inflammatory language coming from Russia at this point in time to other territories outside of Ukraine as well. I felt the chill of what could possibly be a new Cold War yesterday when I was placed on the list with a number of other colleagues in the House of Commons. It is a great concern to all of us that we are entering a new era with the Putin regime, and as long as he's there, Russian imperialism is alive and well. As a neighbouring state to Russia, we have to be quite concerned about that mentality.
I was interested in the discussion we are having on the Arctic because this is not only an area in which we want to demonstrate our sovereignty and demonstrate our interest, but also we have our responsibility under NORAD. Now that NORAD has been expanded to be both maritime and air, I want to get more feedback as to whether or not we have enough radar and satellite capabilities to properly protect the North American continent, whether or not we have enough from an air force standpoint to do the proper surveillance there.
We have already started talking about Arctic/offshore patrol vessels, and you mentioned, Dr. Sloan, the issue of the submarines. Apart from what we can do with our own submarines, what about submarine surveillance in the Arctic?
I put that to both of you.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
Some of you may have looked at a book I wrote a few years ago. My information is a little bit out of date, but I think that the NORAD capabilities in the north are really quite limited. We have the north warning system, which is along the 70th parallel, and when you go north you're looking at satellite coverage. The most important satellite coverage—again, my information might be dated—is Canada's RADARSAT and Polar Epsilon and the RADARSAT Constellation, which was promised and may or may not be going forward. It is absolutely critical to have those three or five satellites, low-based, looking down at the Arctic at all times.
Canada is further ahead in that area than the United States. The United States had a whole program in place and then the funding was cut, etc., and it was actually looking at one time within the last couple of years at Canada's RADARSAT Constellation. We need to move forward on that, and that is the highest level of surveillance. Then the lower level is unmanned aerial vehicles, which I think are critical. They're the answer to providing real-time continuous surveillance over a large barren area.
Then further down, of course, we have the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, which are in disrepair and old and won't be replaced, as we found out maybe about three weeks ago.
Underwater, I believe we have put in place acoustic systems. It's a delicate thing because oftentimes the submarines we're looking for are American Trident submarines, but our defence R and D has experimented with underwater acoustic systems for tracking submarines.
Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I would generally agree with my colleague. The extent to which surveillance could be enhanced through lower-cost systems would certainly be something for us to consider at this point in time. The added advantage of UAV systems is that they tend to be more quickly replaceable and therefore they can keep pace with technological developments as they go forward.
Similarly, were we to try to work with the United States in a more coordinated fashion when it came to the Arctic, they would be able to invest more with us in developing additional space-based and radar capabilities to enhance that. One might even argue that were we to take a binational approach to the Arctic, we would arguably have a better understanding of where submarines are using their assets, even if they do not divulge to us precisely where their submarines are. It would to some degree give us a better understanding of the threats and the nature of those ships that are approaching us.