National Defence Committee on March 27th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Good morning, colleagues.

We are here today pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) to continue our study of the defence of North America.

We have three witnesses with us today: Ms. Jill Sinclair, the assistant deputy minister of policy, Canadian armed forces; Major-General Christian Rousseau, chief of defence intelligence, Canadian armed forces; and from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Artur Wilczynski, director general, international security and intelligence bureau.

Colleagues, although we are all quite conscious of recent events in Crimea and Ukraine, I would urge you to focus your attention on the topic at hand, in light of the changed context of our large northern neighbour.

We will start with opening statements.

Ms. Sinclair, you have the floor for 10 minutes, please.

[Jill Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to appear and for the work that you're undertaking with your study on the defence and security of North America.

I was pleased to have been able to appear last year to speak to the committee about NORAD and I am pleased to be here again. I have a few brief and general comments to situate our discussion today.

My remarks today will situate your work on the defence and security of North America in the context of the Canada First Defence Strategy, defence and security cooperation with the U.S., NORAD, and emerging challenges in continental defence.

It all begins for us with the Canada First defence strategy, which is our capstone defence policy document set out in 2008. As you may know, we will be refreshing it, as was announced in the Speech from the Throne in 2013.

The Canada First defence strategy is the government's foundational defence policy statement. It lays out the roles and missions for the Canadian armed forces. Being a strong and reliable partner to the United States in the shared defence of the continent is among the key mission sets for the Canadian armed forces and an enduring role for the defence team.

Our partnership with the United States is unique. It shapes all aspects of our work. We cooperate at every level, from the operational to the strategic. We're interoperable with the U.S. military and exercise and share personnel on a systematic and regular basis. At the strategic level, we have a number of foundational arrangements with the United States for consultation and cooperation, from bilateral strategic policy dialogues to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Our ministers meet regularly in Canada, in Washington, at NATO and elsewhere in the world.

We have a very well-developed structure for our work. Since 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence , the PJBD, has met twice a year to discuss and advise on defence matters. The board now also includes the input of important security partners and stakeholders, including Public Safety Canada and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in addition to the State Department, Foreign Affairs, and the Coast Guard, and other players as required. It continues to be the most senior defence advisory body and plays a crucial role in fostering critical senior military and diplomatic contacts, as well as frank discussion on the range of dynamic issues affecting continental defence and security.

On the domestic front, our close cooperation is reflected in a wide array of bilateral institutions and agreements between Canada and the United States on the defence and military side. In fact, there are more than 800 arrangements that govern the day-to-day military relationship, including increasingly among the three key commands of our Canadian Joint Operations Command, NORAD, and the U.S. Northern Command, which together provide for the security and defence of North America in cooperation with each other.

NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command is core to the defence of the continent. For more than 55 years, binational cooperation through NORAD has encouraged unprecedented interoperability between the Canadian armed forces and the U.S. armed forces. There are currently nearly 300 Canadian Forces members posted to NORAD headquarters. We also have a number of Americans on exchange in Canada.

I spoke about treaty obligation and an operational military-to-military relationship. NORAD holds a distinctive place in the overall management of the strategic and operational Canada-U.S. defence relationship. It fulfills the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning missions. It undertakes it 24 hours a day every day. It also plays an important role in ensuring Canadian sovereignty and security, serving as a deterrent against potential attacks and providing a crucial surveillance capability.

But, defence at home begins abroad. The threat environment is dynamic and evolving and there are a range of challenges that we must be prepared to meet.

Beyond partnership with the U.S., success will lie in working collaboratively with both other government departments and international partners as the traditional divisions between security and defence continue to blur.

I will leave you with two examples to consider.

The first is cyber. Threats in cyberspace, as we know, know no boundaries, and while cooperation with the U.S. is crucial, we also work globally, including with the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand, as well as with our NATO partners.

As with all other sectors of security, the Canadian armed forces depends more heavily than ever on cyberspace for command, control, communications, and other mission critical functions and must be able to protect its ability to operate in the face of rapidly evolving threats and vulnerabilities. Similarly, National Defence plays an important role in supporting whole-of-government efforts to strengthen national cyber security.

In Canada, cybersecurity is led by Public Safety Canada, but we work increasingly closely and coordinate with other partners as we seek to ensure seamless cooperation in assessing and responding to cyber threats to Canada.

The second thing I'd like to mention briefly is the Arctic. While threats to the Arctic aren't currently military in nature, National Defence works in close support with our whole-of-government partners that have the lead in the Arctic. We already work together with the U.S. through NORAD and through tri-command cooperation and other multilateral fora in support of these civilian departments and agencies that have the lead in the Arctic. We work more broadly with international partners, for example, through the northern chiefs of defence venue, which is where chiefs of defence work to discuss their cooperation and support of civilian lead agencies.

In conclusion, I'd like to say that the defence of North America is the sum of many parts, working together with Foreign Affairs—I'm delighted that Artur is here from DFATD—Public Safety, and other government departments, and in partnership with the U.S. and with other friends and allies to ensure we deal with threats to North America, whether traditional or emerging, like cyber, as far away from our shores as possible.

I would be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, ADM Sinclair.

General Rousseau, you have the floor.

[Major-General Christian Rousseau, Chief, Defence intelligence, Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair and members of Parliament, thank you very much for the invitation this morning.

It's my distinct pleasure to address you and provide our views on threats to North America. I'm glad to be sitting here with my confreres to help you in your deliberations and study of this very important topic.

Before I talk about possible threats to Canada, as we see them, I would like to provide some background to my role as Chief Defence Intelligence and Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Intelligence Command. My team's role consists in helping the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces make sound decisions in the exercise of their duties. Whether conducting operations in the Arctic, providing support to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games, responding to a terrorist threat, or carrying out oversees operations, the Canadian Armed Forces have need of the most accurate and up-to-date intelligence in order to achieve their military objectives and ensure the security and protection of their personnel.

Defence intelligence is also a key element in the ability of the Government of Canada to make informed decisions on defence issues, national security and foreign affairs. In carrying out our mandate, I can say with pride that our intelligence capability is world-class and offers the necessary tools—24 hours a day, 365 days a year—to give our leaders an intelligence advantage. Allow me to repeat that intelligence is the main factor in operational success.

Canada's defence intelligence relationship with the U.S. is one of the most important of our international defence partnerships. It is a long-standing relationship dating back to the Second World War and reinforced over the years through our binational command at NORAD, our partnership in NATO, and our participation in coalition operations like in the Balkans or Afghanistan.

A permanent liaison office in Washington manages the relationship for me. There are Canadian defence intelligence liaison and exchange personnel positioned in all the main agencies, components, and commands of the U.S. defence intelligence community.

I should also note here that we benefit from productive relationships with our national partners. You, and the Canadians whom you represent, may be certain that your intelligence organizations are promoting the interests of this country in the areas of defence and security.

Now I shall turn to the subject at hand, threats to North America.

Over the past year you have visited several defence-related locations, and I know that you plan to visit several more. I appreciate the opportunity to help situate the committee and your subsequent report in relation to what we see as the current threat environment. I focus the vast majority of my energy on foreign military threats and support to CF operations abroad.

We define threat as a combination of intent and capabilities. Having the desire to harm Canada but no capability to do so does not represent a threat from an entity. Once it has discerned the intent of a foreign actor to harm Canada, the intelligence apparatus will have as its job to track any advancement in capabilities and recognize when that entity becomes a threat.

Tracking or predicting changes in capabilities is sometimes challenging, but usually possible within a reasonable margin of error. Gauging current and evolving intent is more complicated, but still possible. Predicting future intent and staking one's security only on that prediction is highly risky. Whereas a state may not exhibit hostility while it is developing a capability, once acquired, that capability remains in its arsenal whatever changes happen in its political calculus and intent.

With that definition in mind, I can say that at this time we do not see a state actor that has both the capabilities and the intent to harm Canada militarily. We view the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and ballistic missiles against the North American continent, as worrisome. Such states of key concern as Iran and North Korea will likely continue in their attempts to acquire, develop, and improve weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them.

The dual-use nature of most biological and chemical-related technologies makes monitoring warfare programs and procurement involving these materials difficult. Furthermore, the ostensible civilian application of nuclear technology can mask its military application or intention.

Weapons of mass destruction attacks against North America could take many forms, including covert or non-traditional delivery, such as aircraft or vehicles by either states or non-state actors. It is important to note, however, we assess that only states could master the complexities of ballistic missile delivery systems.

In the case of lran, its current missile arsenal lacks the range and complexity to strike targets within North America. On the other hand, North Korea has expressly indicated that it wants to be able to target North America with its nuclear armed missiles. While it is actively developing ballistic missiles that could potentially reach North America, whether or not they have developed a practical nuclear weapon remains unclear.

My two areas of interest as CDI with regard to the cyber environment are the threats that affect the ability of the Canadian armed forces to operate and the cyber capabilities of foreign military actors. As mentioned earlier, the bigger picture of cyber threats, i.e., threats against Canada in general and threats emanating from non-military actors, are the purview of the Department of Public Safety.

The potential exists for foreign states to employ computer network exploitation capabilities in support of strategic intelligence collection. To be clear, they're using computers to spy on Canada. They may also use network reconnaissance in support of planned or anticipated computer network attacks, that is, looking at our computer system so that at the moment we would be defending ourselves or attacking, they would do a cyberattack, thereby rendering our command and control systems inoperable so that we cannot use the Canadian armed forces in an effective way. Also, they may use network attacks against private and government data and communications networks on which we rely. As CDI, we'd be interested in all such attacks, because they affect the ability of the Canadian armed forces to operate.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for the opportunity. I look forward very much to answering your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, General.

We now turn to DFATD and Mr. Wilczynski, please.

[Artur Wilczynski, Director General, International Security and Intelligence Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen members of the committee, I am very happy to be here today with you along with my colleagues from National Defence and from the Canadian Armed Forces.

I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today as part of your study on North American defence and, in particular, on the nature of your relationship with United States.

Defence and security cooperation has been ongoing between our two countries for a long time. It is rooted in common values and interests as well as our common desire to defend North America.

The whole-of-government approach to the relationship, as was indicated by Ms. Sinclair and General Rousseau, demonstrates and reflects the complexity, the depth, and the importance of the relationship that we have with the United States.

As director general of the international security and intelligence bureau at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, I am responsible for the management of the foreign policy dimension of Canada's defence and security relationships. This includes our relationship with key bilateral allies and partners, but also includes engagement with key multilateral organizations such as NATO and the OSCE and other institutions.

My bureau is also responsible for advancing Canadian positions to address international crime and terrorism, for assessing threats to our missions abroad, and for acting as a focal point within our department for intelligence matters.

As Ms. Sinclair mentioned, the North American Aerospace Defence Command, or NORAD, is pivotal in our defence relationships. It plays a critical role in the defence and security of North America by preventing air strikes on the continent, protecting sovereign airspace in Canada and the U.S., and providing maritime and aerospace warning capacity.

I'd like to add to what Ms. Sinclair said by informing the committee that Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada complements the engagement by National Defence and the Canadian Forces by also working directly with the NORAD commander. Our department provides a senior level policy adviser, or pol ad, to the commander to provide advice and information that informs the commander on broad Canadian policy objectives and to act as a liaison with our organization.

As Ms. Sinclair also noted, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence is yet another key pillar of our defence cooperation with the United States. It is a strategic policy body that oversees bilateral defence issues between our two countries. As someone who has participated in PJBD meetings from both Foreign Affairs and Public Safety perspectives, I can attest to the value that this important interdepartmental and inter-agency forum brings to the relationship. It serves as a touchstone that brings together senior officials, both civilian and military, to discuss key defence issues of mutual concern.

This efficient mechanism has served Canada well, providing us with favoured access to American political and military processes, and is an opportunity to deepen interoperability and cooperation in areas ranging from security in Mexico and Central America to the Arctic and to maritime domain awareness.

The United States is also Canada's main partner in the Arctic. Our two countries have long collaborated in the fields of science and technology, environmental protection, infrastructure development, search and rescue, border patrols and law enforcement and surveillance.

Neither Canada nor the United States perceives a military threat in the Arctic for the foreseeable future. Given the harsh terrain and environment, the Arctic is a region that commands cooperation, and Canada and the United States are partners in this respect. Our cooperation at the Arctic Council has been close, and the succession from Canada's current chairmanship to that of the United States in 2015 is an opportunity for us to advance in a number of key areas of common interest.

Canada and the United States are close partners in our defence engagements elsewhere in the world as well. Our partnership includes collaboration to enhance security in our own hemisphere and to address threats before they reach our shores, such as those posed by transnational criminal organizations in the trafficking of illicit substances.

Canada and the United States are leading security donors in the hemisphere, delivering programs to build the capacity of our partners in the Americas. We work closely with the United States in the planning and delivery of our anti-crime and counterterrorism capacity-building programs, ensuring that our efforts and those of the United States are mutually reinforcing

For example, together Canada and the United States have built capacity in the Caribbean for forensic ballistic tracking and information sharing. Most recently, Canada has delivered this training and equipment in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, while the United States has funded the installation of this equipment in Barbados.

Both Canada and the United States are allies in NATO. The alliance is a cornerstone of Canadian security and defence policy, is a major contributor to international peace and security, and binds the transatlantic security relationship between North America and Europe. Through NATO, we have worked side by side with the United States on important issues and operations such as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and Operation Unified Protector in Libya.

Like the United States, Canada is aware of the Asia-Pacific regions' ever-growing contribution to world prosperity. And in light of that, we are strengthening dialogue and cooperation with the region.

Last year, with our American partners, we launched the bilateral strategic dialogue on Asia. This mechanism provides another opportunity to have regular dialogue and to examine the cooperation between Canada and the United States, bolstering Canada's objectives in the region.

Our strong defence relationships rest on some of the best-integrated defence industries in the world.

We have established a range of cooperative mechanisms to support the joint development of defence technology, increase the interoperability of our forces, and ensure a ready supply of defence goods for both countries.

Canada and the United States enjoy a unique, multi-faceted, and dynamic defence relationship based on shared interests, common values, and a joint commitment to the defence of North America. This relationship remains a top priority for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.

Thank you. I'm happy to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, Director General Wilczynski.

We will now commence our opening round of questioning with seven-minute segments.

Go ahead, Mr. Chisu.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, witnesses, for being here today, and thank you very much for your valuable presentations.

The following question is for Ms. Jill Sinclair.

Can you outline how the Canadian armed forces' policies in the Arctic are continuing to evolve as this region becomes increasingly relevant, and also, looking at the recent developments with one of the members of the Arctic Council which is flexing its muscles not only somewhere else in the world but also in the Arctic, how they are increasing capabilities, modernizing capabilities, and paying attention in the north?

[Jill Sinclair]

Thank you for the question.

Over the last number of years, the government has systematically and assiduously invested in the Arctic and in our capabilities, obviously, from the Canadian armed forces perspective, defence, but also whole of government. I will cite just a few examples.

In addition to NORAD, which we've talked about, and its continuing work in terms of surveillance and awareness and domain awareness, we have forward operating bases up in the high north, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit, Inuvik. We have our joint task force north, where we have people deployed. We have a headquarters in Yellowknife. We have the investment in the Arctic offshore patrol ship, which will give us an armed seaborne surveillance capability. Construction will begin in 2015 on that. We have the Nanisivik refuelling facility, which will be up and running by 2017. It's on Baffin Island. We have the Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay. It was opened last August, I'm pleased to say. We've increased the number of rangers we have from 3,000 to 5,000, which gives us eyes and feet on the ground and people who are very familiar with the terrain. We have an ongoing series of exercises. The biggest ones are Nanook and Nunalivut, which you may have heard of. The Canadian armed forces exercise all year, winter and summer, to make sure we have our sovereignty presence and we have the capability. We also established northern chiefs of defence meetings a couple of years ago to make sure we had a venue for chiefs of defence of northern countries to cooperate.

We really have, I think, increased our presence in the Arctic not just in policy terms but in real terms. I would also add that with the RADARSAT Constellation that is supposed to be launched in 2018, Canada will then have four times a day surveillance of the Arctic. It will be the most surveillance and awareness capability of any country in the world.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much.

Now, I have a question for General Rousseau.

In addition to providing support to military operations, for which I was grateful when I was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the fusion centre, the Canadian Forces intelligence group, provides expertise on strategic threats to Canada and allied governments; indication and warning intelligence on international, political, and military activities; strategic and crisis coverage of regional security developments that may affect Canadian security interests; or engage Canadian Forces and scientific and technical intelligence with a defence or security focus. Threats such as terrorism and international criminal activities are monitored.

What sorts of threats could develop within North America that we are currently monitoring? I know the west coast is well covered by an intense cooperation between the United States and Canada. What is going on on the Atlantic coast, where we have Denmark and Norway? Eventually, somebody would be interested in that area in Canada.

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

Thank you, sir, for the question.

You talked about threats emanating within North America, and it would not be an issue for me. I very much look at supporting Canadian Forces in defending Canada from foreign actors. Any threats inside of Canada would be dealt with internally, by RCMP or CSIS.

In terms of some of the other powers, state actors out there who would have competing views of the world, I would come back to my initial context. In the world where we look at capabilities and intent, we do not see a current military threat to North America. There are competing requirements or demands in terms of economics or things like that, which would not be a military issue. The military, in its support to whole of government, does provide some situational awareness of maritime approaches to Canada and air approaches to Canada, but it's very much to support, not in the view that we think there's a military threat approaching Canada.

Did you want to add something?

[Jill Sinclair]

Sure. Thank you.

If I might say a supplementary word, I think the question points to the very interesting dynamic, and Artur talked about this a bit. When you look at the defence of North America and the threats to North America, so many of them are not military. It's illegal migration. It's drug flows.

With regard to the integration of all of the key government actors working together to look at all those threats, and that includes cyber threats, we have something called the marine security operations centres. We have one on the east coast and one on the west coast, and the RCMP has one on the Great Lakes. What's interesting about that, and it's sort of a microcosm of how to deal with the security of North America, is that Canadian Forces, DND, Canada Border Services Agency, Fisheries, the Coast Guard, Transport Canada, and RCMP all sit together in a fusion centre to basically take stock of what's going on on the maritime approaches or in the Great Lakes.

I would just posit that because I think it's interesting to keep that broader sense of how you actually defend North America and where do the threats come from. They are not all military.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much.

The time has expired, Mr. Chisu.

Ms. Michaud, please.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I would like to thank the witnesses for their presentations.

I will take advantage of this opportunity to get more details on the role that you play in terms of cyber-security and cyber-defence.

How does the mandate of your respective organizations differ from that of the Communications Security Establishment of Canada? What is your relationship with the CSEC? It is a bit unclear to me. What is the nature of your collaboration? How far do your mandates extend, both in terms of defence intelligence, and compared to the International Security and Intelligence Bureau? If you could provide me with some information on that subject, it would be greatly appreciated.

[Artur Wilczynski]

I will answer first.

Several departments are involved in this file. As was mentioned in our presentations, it is really the Department of Public Safety which is in charge of cyber-security. We work closely with all organizations in our field to advance the interests of Canadians in the area of cyber-security.

In my office, for example, we work on cyber-security only to a limited extent. However, our department works to promote Canada's broader interests where the Internet is concerned, for example in terms of freedom of access, which is a multidisciplinary field, or in terms of promoting human rights.

All of this occurs in a context of interdepartmental cooperation, and each of our organizations provides a complementary perspective to help advance Canadian interests.

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

I will continue along the same lines.

As I explained at the beginning, my main mandate is to help the Canadian Forces in their job. There are always cyber-actors who try to keep us from doing our job. Maintaining the security of our own networks is what interests us above all. We also want to understand how military forces outside of Canada who could one day become a threat use cyber-security.

Representatives of Communications Security Establishment Canada have both knowledge and expertise. It sometimes happens that we consult them to know what they think of a given subject. However, we are not responsible for them, and vice versa. It is a partnership, really.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I suppose that there is still a sharing of information or common strategies that could be implemented by the different organizations.

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

If we find that an Internet user from another country is using particular tactics or techniques, we will check with our national and international partners to find out if they have already dealt with that type of threat or attack. So in that sense, we work together. We ask them if they know that type of activity coming from one cyber-actor or another, and how they reacted to best coordinate their defence.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Would it be advisable to increase the role that the Department of National Defence plays in cyber-security in Canada, or in your opinion, is the current system sufficient?

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

This is how the responsibilities are currently divided.

I am only responsible for the security of our networks and for responding to threats. I try to understand what external actors are doing in order to better meet the needs of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

As for the needs of the rest of the Government of Canada or the needs of Canadian industry, they are not a part of my current mandate. So I cannot really say if they are being well served by the current system.

[Jill Sinclair]

I would like to add a few comments on the subject.

Seamlessness of whole-of-government cooperation in cyber is absolutely essential, so to your question about cooperating and sharing information, according to our mandates and in the appropriate ways we share. We share in terms of identifying what the threats are in terms of bringing our common expertise to the table in terms of dealing with the responses.

The Canadian Forces in the last number of years, I think like other militaries around the world and just about every organization of government or business, for that matter, have recognized that the cyber threat is increasing. We have about 200 people at the moment who are engaged in various elements of the cyber effort for the Canadian Forces. In 2012 we established a director general of cyber, basically looking at the requirements for the Canadian Forces, what's the environment, what do we need by way of expertise, how do we continue to protect our own networks so that, as General Rousseau said, we remain resilient and robust in case there's a threat, and how do we take a deliberate and careful approach to integrating cyber-intermilitary operations.

It is very much a work in progress. It is one of the most whole-of-government efforts, I think, that exists around the federal government, also working, of course, through Public Safety, with private industry and also with the territories and provinces.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you.

Now I would like to move on to another subject.

During our last meeting, we heard from different witnesses who told us, among other things, about a ballistic missile defence system. Notably, Professor Philippe Lagassé told us that if Canada maintained the condition that the Prime Minister set out in 2005, namely that Canada would not become a member of a system unless no costs were associated with it, then Canadians might accept joining such a system.

Given the growing threats that we may have to face, do you think that the United States would be ready to agree that Canada would make no additional investment? Of course, we already have resources that are invested directly or indirectly in the system. However, if the United States had to invest considerably more money in this system, I wonder to what extent they would agree to Canada's participation in this project without more or less reciprocal investments.

I would like to hear your opinion on this question, because I found professor Lagassé's perspective fairly unrealistic.

[Jill Sinclair]

Perhaps I'll begin, Mr. Chair, and then I'll ask my colleagues to supplement.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

A short response, please.

[Jill Sinclair]

Absolutely.

The government's position was taken in 2005, and it wasn't cost related. It was that we would not participate in ballistic missile defence, and that's the extant position, as General Rousseau said.

Since that time the missile defence issue, in terms of who could have capability, has changed a bit, but the government's position is very clear: since 2005 we are not part of ballistic missile defence.