Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.
I understand that this committee has sought information from a variety of academics and practitioners on the subject of the defence of North America on an ongoing basis. My assumption is that I'm being asked to make comments on NORAD and its role in the defence of North America based on the study that Jim Fergusson and I, with other academics, completed. My remarks today will focus on what is working vis-à-vis NORAD, and the current challenges it faces, especially with respect to the Arctic.
In 2006, NORAD was signed in perpetuity, and a new mission, maritime warning, was added to the air warning and control mission. The justification for the new mission was that 9/11 had proven that defence of the homeland was paramount and that threats could originate from a variety of sources, even from within North America.
NORAD is now undergoing a review of its ability to remain relevant to new threats given current command policies, current mission challenges, potential evolving or emerging roles, and missions and partnerships. This high-level review, consisting of approximately a dozen working groups, is called “NORAD Next”.
This is timely, given that the new maritime warning mission means that organizations other than military-to-military ones, which is the hallmark of the air warning and defence missions, are required to provide information so that NORAD can create a North American-wide maritime picture in addition to its air picture. However, while NORAD Next is preparing for 2030, our study focused on the here and now and what is working and not working for NORAD.
I'll begin with what is working. The binational partnership that is NORAD is incredibly important to both countries, but especially for Canada because of the geostrategic significance of this partnership and for the training opportunities and information it receives. NORAD can provide all-domain awareness and has the benefit now of an air and maritime picture of potential threats to all of North America.
Still, there are areas of concern that I wish to highlight. I have chosen to focus on the Arctic given my research area of expertise.
Arguably, the Arctic has always been a critical focus of NORAD. Indeed, during the Cold War, NORAD was focused on the threat emanating from the direction of the Arctic, hence, the logo of NORAD has a broadsword facing northward.
There is a fierce debate in Canada about whether or not the Arctic is subject to increased threats, especially from states like Russia and China, because the Arctic has garnered more attention for a variety of reasons, including melting ice, maritime boundary issues, and resource extraction. First, none of these activities in and of themselves are defence threats to the Arctic automatically, and second, there are many things the Canadian government can do that can help ensure increased traffic and attention in the Arctic is of benefit to Canada, such as better infrastructure, more services, and more navigational aids.
Based on the unclassified information I have reviewed, we can say that, yes, there have been Russian sorties of late, but this is not new, nor is it new for NORAD. Indeed, this is its bread and butter. What is of concern, however, is the aging NORAD infrastructure and general rust-out, especially with respect to the north warning system, which is made up of long-range and short-range radars. The north warning system is coming to its end of life, and some would argue that it is located too far south.
The north warning system provides critical information not only to allow NORAD to detect threats, but also to provide valuable constabulary information to both Canada and the U.S. We need this information to continue to be fed to Canadian Joint Operations Command, or CJOC, U.S. Northern Command, and NORAD.
Whether the north warning system remains in its present or some other form—for example, perhaps space-based—the cost of replacing or reinventing a north warning-like capability will be in the billions of dollars, and governments tend to be chary of such capital outlays, especially during uncertain economic times and when trying to replace infrastructure and capital across the country.
Often it is reported that melting ice leads to automatic increases in shipping and resource extraction in the Canadian Arctic, but (a) there is no direct causal relationship, and (b) increased traffic is not a NORAD-only concern.
A number of projects are tracking the amount of traffic in the Arctic. I'm involved with one: the Arctic marine use and transportation project, run by Jackie Dawson at the University of Ottawa. It will map for Canada the ultimate route for ships to follow in using the Northwest Passage, to limit the impact of shipping on Arctic ecology, benefit northern communities, and be safe for ships, given the incredibly difficult navigational realities of the Arctic. Such predictability would be a boon for NORAD, which could then separate the predictable law-abiding vessels from those they and other departments flag for warning.
Other concerns include the need for more communication infrastructure in the north, both for civilian and classified military use. We will need to ensure that these assets can be protected from cyber-attacks.
The NORAD maritime warning mission is new and is not as mature and well resourced as the air warning and control functions. This is why Dr. Fergusson and I have applied for funding to study this mission specifically.
According to testimony by General Jacoby, the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in February of this year, the number of maritime warnings issued by NORAD increased from 8 in 2012 to 14 in 2013.
We do not have any idea of what percentage of all potential threats this represents or how many potential threats were dealt with at the national level before a NORAD warning was warranted. Still, another set of eyes on the North America-wide, all-domain picture is another opportunity to protect the homeland or to put Canada first, the number one priorities of both the U.S. and Canada.
Finally, the bifurcated command arrangement between the Canadian NORAD region, or CANR, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command needs to be considered. CJOC represents the amalgamation of several former commands. It is nearly two years old and is now being tested because of combat operations outside of Canada in addition to the need to conduct domestic missions. CANR, via 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg and the joint force air component commander, is historically well linked to NORAD, but CJOC is still making and perfecting links with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and CANR as a result of this new maritime warning function.
Finally, I'm conscious that with last week's events in Ottawa and Quebec, despite those being ground events, NORAD was put on heightened alert, which was important given that at the time there was uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the threat. It demonstrates the continued importance of this binational agreement that binds the U.S. and Canada inextricably to the defence of North America.
Mr. Chair, these are my opening remarks. I'd be happy to answer any questions.