Again, I'd go back to what I said earlier. In my work with the International Institute for Strategic Studies this year, for the first year, the strategic balance, which is really the referential tome when we look at the capabilities of nation states and others in traditional military domains, has started to look at cyberspace as one of those domains. Perhaps most interesting in the research that's been done is the range of countries that now develop active cyber capabilities, offensive cyber capabilities.
Why? As I said earlier, it's because it allows them to leapfrog a whole generation of industrial warfare. It lowers the threshold for being able to compete at a military political level that previously required an investment in manned materiel technique that was really reserved only for the most advanced countries. The question really is not who is the threat; it's who's not the threat, because the threshold is so low. I think if we don't want to be the Zulus faced with a Gatling gun, we do have to wake up and recognize that an investment in cyber as a capability of national security and national defence is a critical requirement and something that we do have to spend the time and resources to develop.
On the question of the Aegis of the destroyer, I can't really comment on that. I'm aware of it but it may well be as much a fanciful part of the Russians' information operation strategy around Ukraine as anything else.