National Defence Committee on Dec. 9th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Good afternoon, colleagues.

As we continue our study of the defence of North America we have two witnesses, as individuals, appearing with us today. First is Mr. Whitney Lackenbauer, professor, Department of History, St. Jerome’s University; and second is Robert Huebert, associate professor; Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.

Mr. Lackenbauer, your opening remarks, please.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer, Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual]

Thank you for the opportunity to be here.

Climate change, newly accessible resources, new maritime routes, unresolved boundary disputes, announcements of new investments in military capabilities to defend sovereign rights—no wonder the Arctic has emerged as a topic of tremendous hype and deep-seated misperceptions over the past decade, spawning persistent debates about whether the region's future is likely to follow a cooperative trend or whether it's fated to spiral into unbridled competition and conflict.

Commentators differ in their assessments about the probability and/or timing of developments, as well as general governance and geopolitical trends. Some, like myself, contend that the Arctic regime is solidly rooted in cooperation. Others, with Dr. Huebert at the forefront, anticipate heightened competition and conflict.

These frameworks are very significant in shaping expectations for the Government of Canada and for the Canadian Armed Forces more specifically. If one expects that the region is on the precipice of conflict then constabulary capabilities are insufficient. On the other hand, official military statements that anticipate no conventional military threats to the region, but instead see an increase in security and safety challenges, point to the need for capabilities suited to a supporting role in a whole-of-government framework; the ideas you heard from General Beare and General Loos a few months ago.

Rather than rushing a spate of new investments in combat capabilities to meet an impending security crisis, as Rob might have us believe, official frameworks provide the Canadian Armed Forces with appropriate and responsible guidance to support other government departments in addressing security concerns and responding to non-military Arctic emergencies.

Although several expensive capital programs remain in project definition or design phases, or have been scaled back in the case of Nanisivik, this does not mean Canada faces a critical combat capability deficit that leaves us vulnerable in an increasingly hostile Arctic world. Delivering on promised investments aligned to the broader national strategy for our Arctic before rationally ramping up to fight some fantastical Arctic combatant, conjured to the scene because of preconceived cold war mentalities and international events unrelated to Arctic disputes, is a prudent and rational course.

My first point relates to international events and risk assessments. It's important for commentators and analysts to contemplate worst-case scenarios. This is the way of identifying potential military risks and vulnerabilities. An excessive fixation on remote potentialities and their misidentification as probabilities can lead to misallocated resources: intellectual resources and material resources. It can lead to unwarranted suspicion and paranoia. That very messaging can lead us into a security dilemma.

Despite all of the considerable ink that's been spilled on boundary disputes, and uncertainty surrounding the delineation of extended continental shelves in the Arctic, official statements by all of the Arctic states are quick to dispel the myth that these issues have strong defence components. They do not. Despite all of the political saber rattling with Russia over the Lomonosov Ridge and the North Pole, which generates punchy headlines in both countries, it's simplistic and erroneous to draw parallels between Russian aggression in the Ukraine and the establishment of the outer limits of its sovereign rights in the Arctic.

The Ukrainian crisis has shown that Arctic politics are not immune to international events. We need to be careful to distinguish between global security threats and Arctic-specific security threats. The Ukraine has broader implications for NATO and for global security, but I think it's erroneous to draw a direct connection between what's happening in the Ukraine and to set up that same intentionality on the part of the Russians when it comes to clarifying the Arctic. There's a real tendency to conflate international threats with Arctic-specific threats.

Of course Russian adventurism has important impacts on Canada and on defence. I want to emphasize that I do not see this as an Arctic issue. The country that has the most to lose through Arctic instability is Russia. They're going to be facing a lot of challenges in the months to come if oil and gas prices stay where they're at.

Despite the hostile diplomatic atmosphere that's been created by the Russian annexation of Crimea there is no indication that it or any other Arctic state intends to move away from the existing international framework when it comes to asserting sovereign rights or substantiating legal claims.

The opportunities associated with Arctic resources also fire up imaginations and lead us to frame sensational narratives of unbridled competition for rights and for Arctic territory, which have little grounding in reality. Despite the wealth of Arctic resources depictions of a race between circumpolar states arming in preparation for a resource-fuelled conflict are fundamentally misinformed.

Exploration activities are not occurring in a legal vacuum, in which states might perceive a need to compete for control and access. Each Arctic coastal state has expressed interest in encouraging responsible resource development within its jurisdiction consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Anything that deviates from it would create instability, thus impeding investment and slowing the pace of development, which goes against the expressed interests of the Arctic states.

Arguably the best way to protect the Arctic in this context is to clarify environmental regulations, things such as drilling requirements and corporate liability laws and benefits to indigenous peoples and so on, not fixation on a military lens.

Of course, all of the talk about resource development is still highly hypothetical. We see constantly shifting scenarios. Just take the price of oil and gas in recent months as a real exclamation point showing how subjective and volatile Arctic development trends are in the face of global market supply and demand.

It's important to also note that the United States has come to very similar conclusions to the ones I'm presenting to you and that Canada has come to. The U.S. Department of Defense's Arctic strategy states that, given the dismal fiscal environment in that country, it's not surprising that U.S. policies are hesitant and non-committal about Arctic investments, because there is a high degree of uncertainty about what developments are going to occur in the region and when. They keep emphasizing that making premature, unnecessary investments, spurred by reactionary thinking, will deflect resources away from more pressing priorities. Their Arctic strategy also warns that:

Being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.

So you have a U.S. Arctic strategy and U.S. Navy Arctic road map that instead adopt a very broad definition of security that alludes to the benefits of burden-sharing across agencies and with international partners. The U.S. Navy road map predicts that the region will remain “a low threat security environment” for “the foreseeable future”. To realize its desired end state of peace and stability, the report stresses the need to invest in the unique and enduring partnership that the U.S. enjoys with Canada.

The reason I bring this up before you as Canadian parliamentarians is that once we get past the very limiting dialogue over sovereignty that tends to trap us in Canada, we actually see that Canadian and American interests and priorities in the Arctic, particularly in the defence and security realms, are very well aligned. We have a long-established partnership, in the form of NORAD, and a whole bunch of other thick bilateral relationships that allow us to jointly manage defence relationships in the region.

Despite pressures in some Canadian circles to nationalize Canadian Arctic defence, as if somehow working with our American allies detracts from our sovereignty, I think this thinking needs to be resisted, because this would mean a tremendous misallocation of defence resources to somehow beef up our independent defensive capabilities in the Arctic to meet that paper tiger sovereignty threat that doesn't exist today and has not really existed since the early days of the Cold War. We can certainly talk in the question period about how this relates to potential capabilities and platforms such as Arctic offshore patrol ships and so on.

Managing issues in a bilateral relationship with the U.S. rather than through a broader NATO framework is also very useful for Canada, because it facilitates agreeing to disagree on the status of the waters of Canada's Arctic archipelago in ways that otherwise might be much more difficult or even impossible to do in a committee of the whole.

Working with allies is key, but Canadian strategic documents also emphasize, as the Americans' do, that there is no conceivable military threat in the near future and that our primary focus should be on security and safety. Certainly strategic frameworks that have been generated by the Canadian military place an explicit emphasis on the security and safety aspects of the operation continuum, things that you heard from General Beare.

What this means or what this entails is a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, recognizing that it's often other government departments or agencies that have lead responsibilities for security and safety issues. What most commentators in the media and in academia overlook is how much work has actually been done to clarify and streamline relationships between involved departments.

The Department of National Defence is certainly leading from behind but it's playing a supporting role. Things like the Operation Nanook whole-of-government exercises and mechanisms like the Arctic security working group often operate outside the political or public eye, but I would argue these relationships are absolutely essential to allow us to respond effectively and appropriately to the sorts of hazards and threats that we're likely to see in the near future.

In speaking of relationships, I'd be remiss not to mention one of the most uniquely Canadian cornerstones of our Arctic defences, the Canadian Rangers. Full disclosure; I'm the honorary lieutenant colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group. The Rangers are a good example where having modest capabilities rooted in communities, rooted in relationships with northerners are essential. These relationships are the cornerstone of our behaving appropriately in our north. They represent a long-standing capability that serves as a force multiplier for southern units that have to go up and operate in a very austere and difficult environment. They're also a very critical bridge between the Arctic communities and other elements of the Canadian Forces, and I bring them up because they're a signature initiative of Prime Minister Harper. They've been expanded to 5,000, but we also need to remember that expansion is not just numbers on a sheet. It's ensuring that they have the support in the form of Ranger instructors and headquarters staff to allow them to accomplish their mission.

So as a wrap-up point, political statements are often generated in a heated atmosphere where, sure, we've taken a strident stand against Russian expansionism in Europe. Some of this may point to Rob's thesis that he's going to present, that there's a likelihood of conflict in the Arctic. But I think it's very important that regional priorities and threat assessments used to frame Arctic defence and security frameworks over the last decade in Canada remain sound. Our whole-of-government approach designed to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to non-combat security and safety scenarios should not be hijacked by a retreat to Cold War thinking.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Professor Lackenbauer.

Professor Huebert, 10 minutes, please.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

First of all, it's indeed my pleasure to be able to come here and to talk to you about a subject of such critical importance for Canada.

My talk will be based on the main premise that we are currently witnessing a fundamental transformation of the Arctic security environment. In many ways the types of transformation that we are seeing right now are akin to, and in many ways just as powerful as, when we saw the end of the Cold War and the factors, of course, that led in to that. I have three major points that I wish to address in explaining what the ramifications for Canada are for this transformation.

The first one, of course, is the foundation, which is what is causing this change and why we should view it as long-term, destabilizing, and of complete importance to Canadian interests.

Second, I want to talk about some of the indicators of this change. How do we know that it's just simple talk? How do we know that it's not rhetoric, that in fact what we are seeing within the Arctic region is indeed a transformation of a security regime, and that as much as I wish I could believe in Dr. Lackenbauer's optimism of cooperation and progress, unfortunately the indicators, at least through my assessment, suggest a different direction?

The last point, and what I would contend is the most important, is where are the pressure points? Where does Canada actually have to be paying attention in the long term and what does this mean in the context of the types of responses that we have to create?

For the foundation of why we are seeing this transformation there are four major factors. The first, and the one that has gathered the most attention, is of course the impacts of climate change. The reality of an ice cap that probably will be gone as a permanent ice cap is something that our children will be seeing in terms of a new globe. This is something as humans we haven't seen before.

Alongside of that is the recognition of new resources. I would disagree with my learned colleague in pointing out that resources have been developed. When we look at the production of diamonds within the Canadian Northwest Territories alone, we have seen the manner in which resources have already started to be developed. Mary River has started production in what is probably going to be the largest supply of iron ore in the world, full stop. So it has already begun.

The third factor is the interest of the international community. The fact that the Chinese, the Japanese, and the South Koreans are all now very interested in the Arctic, and many Europeans have become so, also highlights the changing nature of the field.

But perhaps the most important and the one that I would argue is the most overlooked is that there is a growing strategic importance of the Arctic to the Americans and Russians that goes beyond anything in regard to the current situation in Ukraine, and rather represents core strategic interests that regardless of climate change, regardless of resource development, are going to be the fundamental challenge that Canada will be facing.

What indicators do we have? We can look in terms of policies. There were no Arctic security policies amongst any of the Arctic countries until around 2006. Now everybody has one. Everybody, of course, says the good stuff at the beginning, we want to cooperate and it's an area of peace, etc., but all of them conclude their defence statements with, but by the way we will defend our national interests by unilateral means if necessary. So it's a two-way rhetorical comment.

We are also seeing clearly however that there are force developments. The Russians, particularly commencing in the second term of the Putin administration, have begun to reinvigorate their strategic deterrent capabilities, and that is focused on their submarine capabilities, both for their SSBNs and their SSNs. This, of course, has to be situated in the north by virtue of geography. The Russians do not station their older subs on their Pacific coast, even though they say they treat them as equals. That simply is not what they are doing in terms of the evidence.

We see the Americans developing their strategic capabilities, particularly their anti-strategic capabilities, in Alaska. So we are seeing indicators that go beyond just simply dealing with constabulatory issues in the Arctic, but rather larger strategic ones.

We are also seeing a conduct of exercises the likes of which we thought had ended at the end of the Cold War. Canada was first with the beginning of its operations back around 2002, but since that time countries such as Russia, the United States, and Norway regularly have winter exercises of up to 10,000 troops, which is a substantial effort and endeavour.

Where are the pressure points? Where should we be concerned, having set the stage in this context?

The first pressure point is, of course, oil and gas. This is the one everyone focuses on. This is the one, of course, they talk about, the rush to resources. I do agree with Dr. Lackenbauer that there is little evidence that we are going to see conflict over oil. Oil, of course, goes up and down in terms of price, and some people suspect, for example, that right now the Saudis are oversupplying not only to bring pressure on Russia—once again the larger geopolitical picture—but also to push out the independents and the medium-power industries in North Dakota that they claim are oversupplying the market. There are all sorts of interesting geopolitics in that.

The problem that we will probably face will be environmental security. The activism of many NGOs as we've seen in both Russia and Greenland is, of course, to physically try to stop oil exploration. The challenge that Canada will face in that regard is that when oil drilling occurs in the Beaufort and Mackenzie Delta, and I'm completely convinced it will in the long term, will we be prepared to respond to the type of situation that both the Greenlanders and the Russians have had to face?

I'd like to go to the two major pressure points that I see. The second one is fish. The allocation of the seabed under article 76 does not touch the water column beyond 200 nautical miles. When the ice is eliminated, and on a permanent basis, and, as many suspect, fish stocks move north, we can anticipate that there will be international fishers who will become very interested in moving into this region. Combine that with the factor that world stocks are collapsing. Experts from both the University of Victoria and Dalhousie University have been very vocal in explaining that we are heading towards a fishing worldwide crisis. If in fact we have a limited stock moving north, I dare say that we will be facing a replication of the type of crisis that we faced with the Spanish in 1995, that the British and the Icelanders faced off their waters, and that we are starting to see increasingly worldwide.

But I'd like to finish by looking on what I see as the major challenge, the issue that no one wants to confront but will confound Canadian defence interests in the Arctic, and that is the changing strategic balance in the Arctic region. The Russians have three core strategic needs. The first is nuclear stability, and that means deterrence in our context. It is still their number one security policy, the maintenance of their nuclear deterrent capability. Their second major security statement is that they do not want to see the expansion of NATO. The third is to stop the American ABM systems. All three of these are core defence requirements and are in the Arctic.

To maintain their nuclear stability, their modernized nuclear stability, the Russians are rebuilding their submarine force. We helped them decommission a lot of their Cold War era...through the cooperation programs that we set up, through what is known as AMEC and the G...well, what was then the G-8. The Russians are now rebuilding and it is going to be north. They are rebuilding the bases that give them the infrastructure protection. Regardless of what happens in the north per se, this increases the challenge for Canada.

The crisis in the Ukraine has very much been sparked by Russian fears that the Ukrainians were going to join NATO. We have to recognize that this is not the first time the Russians have engaged in such activity. Going back to 2007, the Russian intervention in Georgia, many analysts contend, was the result of the Georgian open consideration of joining NATO. We can take the Russians at their word that they are fearful.

The question that you need to be watching right now is, what happens within the context of Finland and Sweden? Both countries have begun to increasingly consider the possibility of joining NATO. If they decide to do so, that means, then, that the members of the Arctic Council will have seven NATO members, and one non-NATO member. That does not bode well for future cooperation.

The third aspect, and this leads me to my last comment in terms of the development of American strategic capabilities in the Arctic, is that the two core defence initiatives of the Americans are first of all maintenance of the deterrence, but also protection of the homeland, particularly protection against the possibility of missile attack.

This is where this comes directly into the issue that is being considered vis-à-vis NORAD. Every time the North Koreans do something to unnerve the Americans, the American response, Democrat and Republican, is to increase the number of mid-course interceptors that are placed in Alaska at Fort Greely. This is about 70 miles away from the Canadian-American border of the Yukon. Every time the Americans do that it causes the Russians and Chinese to view this as being directed against them and not the North Koreans.

If we bring this all together, I wish I could believe we were headed for a cooperative era. I wish the last 15 years of impressive cooperation we've seen could continue. When you look beyond the Arctic and you begin to consider the strategic imperatives of both the Russians and the Americans—the requirements to pursue fish stock— and you combine that, my assessment is the Arctic is going to become a less cooperative regime. This developing international security regime is going to be more problematic and it is going to get worse before it gets better.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Professor Huebert.

We'll move now to our first round of questions in seven-minute slots. Mr. Norlock, please.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to the witnesses thank you for appearing today.

The first question, hopefully with a short answer, as sort of a retort from Mr. Huebert is for Mr. Lackenbauer, and thanks to the Library of Parliament for this question.

Jane’s Defence Weekly says Russia is in the process of renewing “70% or more of its weapons and equipment by 2020”. The Russian government is planning to raise defence expenditures by 32.8% in 2015; the largest annual increase in defence budget in 10 to 12 years. In addition there are new plans to further expand the Russian defence expenditures by 2025. Some of the funds are being used to bolster the military capabilities in the Arctic, which includes building new air bases and stationing additional troops in its polar regions, as well as expanding the size of its northern fleet. This is coupled with the information we just received from Mr. Huebert.

How do you continue to defend your claim that this is nothing we should worry about especially with Mr. Putin and some of his most recent expansionist policies in eastern Europe?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Great. Thank you for the question.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Remember, leave time for Mr. Huebert.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Absolutely.

Russian increases in expenditures are largely aspirational. It's wonderful for Mr. Putin to have these bold plans. Whether or not he can pay for them and finance them I think is still very much in doubt.

New air bases are taking out of mothballs old Cold War air bases and infrastructure. The troop redeployments they are shuffling around in my view are a lot of smoke and mirrors for the domestic Russian audience. These are not offensive capabilities that can be deployed anywhere in the Arctic. Where are they going to go and what are they going to take over? There's nothing to do with it without potentially risking World War III, which is certainly not in Russia's grand strategic interest.

When it comes to their northern fleet, these recapitalization plans have been bantered about for more than a decade now. This is dealing with the deteriorating capabilities since the end of the Cold War. Even if they realized their most wild aspirations for their northern fleet it would still be a shadow of its former self. This is about them maintaining credibility as a global player.

I don't see the northern fleet, while it's deployed in an Arctic context, being an Arctic capability. So much of what we're seeing the Russians doing there is a defensive aspect, but I don't see an offensive dimension to it that should worry Canadians at this point.

We have commentators and analysts who are going to be monitoring these developments and a lot of my conclusions are based upon Mr. Putin being a rational actor. Maybe some of his actions would raise some doubts about that.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

My response is to look at where the dollars go. Following Jane, following the other open sources, we see that it's not talk. They have already recommissioned three new nuclear power submarines. Presumably they have been having trouble with the missile, but they seem dedicated to spend the resources. They are building three more as we talk. They are building two new attack submarines.

If you start drilling down to details, it's not rhetoric, it's not talk. They are going through....and it's their strategic balance. Have a look in terms of where they are making the investments.

We also see them making the investment on their air capabilities particularly in terms of cruise missiles. This is why an aircraft that's built in 1958—the Tupolev 95s—people laugh at them, but it's a question of what they are carrying. It's going from the KH55s to the KH101s and KH102s that pose the greatest problem for the NATO forces.

I see the exact opposite. I see difficulties. They are going from having an economy the size of the Netherlands in the 1990s to reasserting themselves as a great power. There are all sorts of challenges. They have had false starts. The dedication they have given from 2007 until 2014 undermines their determination to eventually regain that military capability.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

I believe Mr. Huebert mentioned the movement of fish stocks because of warming waters in the north and the availability of basic food, you know, the smaller fish, bigger fish.

My thoughts are as follows. When countries are in trouble, especially autocratic regimes or regimes that have dictators, like China and the communist party ruling the country, with huge populations that need to be fed, future wars or conflict will be not so much over oil or other resources but about food and fresh water. That being the case, there are other nations that we've left out. I'm particularly referring to China, which is a sleeping giant in its need to feed a burgeoning middle class that will want more meat, more vegetables, and more of the things that we in the rest of the western world have and that I am sure they aspire to. I don't leave out Russia because Russia's economy is tremendously weak. Usually, in dictatorial countries when these happen they look to pick a fight somewhere to take their people's mind off the problems they really face.

Starting with you, Mr. Huebert, a very short statement....

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

You have a minute and a half.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Take the minute and a half and divide it by two.

Mr. Huebert and then Mr. Lackenbauer.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

We're already seeing where the future is going.

The Russians and the Chinese have stopped an international effort to create what's called marine protected areas in Antarctica to preserve the fish stock there. Canada and the United States are the only two countries that have imposed...and said there is an issue, to step back and understand what is happening with the fisheries. We are the only two countries currently supporting moratoriums on commercial fisheries in our Arctic waters. We're not calling it moratoriums in Canada but it's a de facto moratorium. There are your divides right there.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think what Professor Huebert is leaving out, though, is the reason why the moratorium is declared is there is no evidence either way to support the idea of fish stocks in the high Arctic basin. Everything else is scripted according to international law. If there are pressure points I don't anticipate that they're going to emerge in the Arctic. These sorts of battles are going to be picked out in areas where there are proven and very well-established fish stocks. Again, we're operating in hypothetical situations that are several decades out. The moratorium is in recognition that we simply have no evidence either way about fish stocks. Of course, we're going to keep monitoring it but I don't think that's a primary fixation, short to medium term.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Mr. Norlock.

Ms. Michaud, you now have the floor.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My thanks to the witnesses for their presentations.

My first question is for Mr. Huebert. Mr. Lackenbauer, please feel free to add to the answer afterwards.

I find it interesting that we are talking about climate change at this committee. We don't often, if ever, talk about it here. There are probably some explanations for that, particularly because of the way the government is handling the oil and gas regulations. However, my question has to do with a different issue.

Here it is. In your view, what impact does climate change have on Canada's Arctic security and military operations? I am particularly thinking of the ice melt, but there are other consequences.

Could you comment on those concerns?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

There are two factors.

There's the impact that it's having on human security. In other words, we are seeing a transformation for the livelihood of everyone who lives in the Arctic, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, the likes, I would contend, that we have not seen before. A way of life is undergoing a complete and utter transformation, also being brought on by other factors of globalization.

From a traditional security perspective the answer is simple: access. We're going to have to deal with the types of comings...of the international community, the likes of which we have not seen before. Franklin was stopped by impacts of climate change. We had some of the worst ice ever when John Franklin was trying to go through the Northwest Passage. We're in the opposite era now. We are seeing the diminishment of ice and the same types of pressures that drove John Franklin to try to find the Northwest Passage are already bringing the Chinese. Look at what the Chinese are doing in Greenland. Look at what's happening in Iceland. Have a look in terms of the new international types of cooperations and I daresay challenges that will be coming. So it's access.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Thank you for the question. I'm glad you highlight something that I think is much more short- and medium-term than a lot of the discussions we have.

Looking at threats and hazards, military threat assessments, whole-of-government threat assessments, Public Safety across to Environment Canada emphasize a great deal more uncertainty brought about, which is a common theme between Rob and myself. This means activities associated with resource development. I don't see a defence dimension to the diamond industry that Rob brought up as a case for why we should be fearful of the Arctic, but there are certainly public safety and criminal dimensions to heightened resource developments that I think are borne of increasing access. I differentiate that from defence threats, which is an important distinction that's often not made. Many of the threats and hazards that are real right now relate to changing conditions: unpredictability for hunters living in communities, for people who rely upon ice conditions to travel between communities; more wave action, because there's not as much ice cover in the Beaufort Sea, affecting communities and leading to more coastal erosion; permafrost deteriorating. I bring this up in the context of this committee because given the modest capabilities that the Government of Canada and other governments have in the Arctic, it doesn't take long before the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces get a call as the capable organization to come and deploy to deal with an emergency.

I think focusing on climate change, focusing on the uncertainty, and focusing on the real, local impacts that are affecting Canadians today is an appropriate way of realizing and justifying why we need to enhance Canadian Armed Forces' capabilities. It's not to fight these imaginary wars that are conjured up somewhere potentially in a fantastic future. There are real reasons to develop capabilities now, but they relate to community security.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you very much for your very thorough and informative answer. That brings me to my next question.

What impact would climate change have on the work of the Rangers, with whom you are very familiar? Could you elaborate on that?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Certainly. Rangers are a long-established organization. They've been around since 1947. They have worked out a really incredible balance between national security dimensions to their role and also community interests and looking out for their communities.

Certainly their ongoing operations are a challenge, like they are for all other northerners in terms of their activities on the land. There's increased unpredictability, trails.... Seasonal cycles that were well known are now being thrown into question. Certainly they're being called out with increasing frequency for ground search and rescue, where they're playing a supporting role to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. But nevertheless, as the organized group in communities, they're being called out with greater frequency. At the same time, resource development and other things are also giving them opportunities for jobs competing for their time.

In terms of the Rangers, it's making sure that they have the tools, but as well having the support from Ranger instructors, having the support from staff to allow them to do their jobs.

The Rangers are part of the Canadian Armed Forces family, a very essential part of it. Again, we can't assume that just because they've done everything as they've done for decades, that without increased support and without attention they're going to be able to continue to do it in the future. I think they are on the front lines of seeing that a lot of the threats and hazards and challenges associated with the 21st century Arctic are not the need to retool them as primary reservists and to prepare to fight wars; it's to be able to respond appropriately to the challenges they are facing at a grassroots level.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you very much.

I will now turn to a different topic.

Recently, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released a report on Arctic offshore patrol ships. In that report, he pointed out that, unfortunately, the government will not likely be able to deliver on its promise of providing six to eight ships for $2.8 billion by 2024. There will only be four or even three ships, if more delays come up.

In your view, what would be the impact of a potential drop in the number of Arctic offshore patrol ships on the navy's capabilities in that part of the country?