National Defence Committee on Dec. 9th, 2014

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Russia has also been standing up an Arctic command, including training special combat forces. If we go back to the previous administration, to the first notion of threat in our Arctic from the Russians, we had stood up the Canadian Airborne Regiment and were able to deploy 500 paratroopers rapidly anywhere in the Arctic until the Chrétien government disbanded it in 1995.

Now we have, as has been mentioned before, a smaller force there. Do you think that, in light of the special Arctic command that Russia is standing up with all the special combat training for their forces, we should be looking at more than what we already have in the Arctic?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think it's looking at the purpose of Russia's combat forces. If they're using them or envisaging them as expeditionary forces, I have no idea where they're going to go. We have enough difficulty historically in sustaining our own forces in our own Arctic, so the thought that the Russians are going to send land forces to parachute down on Canadian sovereign territory and effectively create World War III, to me is a very unlikely scenario, a highly improbable scenario.

What we have invested in or what we're focusing on—in terms of developing Arctic response company groups based around capabilities down south, exercised in the north, and guided, led, and trained by Canadian Rangers—in my mind is an appropriate measure to show that we are committed to defence and to creating very interesting and exciting training scenarios for members of the Canadian Armed Forces who get to go north and learn a bit about their country as well as develop their own capabilities that are deployable all around the world. It's also to show the flag, if nothing else, to convince Canadians that we're doing something urgent in the region. To me, that's sufficient.

So, again, the Canadian Airborne Regiment disbanding is a wonderful topic I'd love to debate from the standpoint of our having the capabilities to be able to respond to the very highly improbable, unlikely scenario of a Russian incursion. I think we would find that we would have a lot of allies who would come to our support as well to join us. But we certainly have the capabilities to go and meet any threat that I'd anticipate in that sense.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I would agree the land forces are more of a lesser importance. What the Russians are doing in terms of their land capabilities, that's more the constabulatory that I've talked about. We need to be watching what they do in terms of their sea-based and their aero-based.... What that means for us is we definitely need to be doing more in our surveillance capability. We need to make sure that programs such as....

What's the underwater listening device?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Northern watch.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Northern watch actually goes through...in terms of the procedure. We need to have an airframe replacement of the CF-18s when they basically end their productive life. So we need surveillance and we need a reaction capability from an aerospace perspective. RADARSAT Constellation and these types of systems that have been well in place have to be maintained and they have to be expanded. In other words, the plan we have is good; we have to do it, though.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Dr. Huebert, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, you wrote extensively about the Arctic Council, which is currently chaired by Canada, and potential conflicts that could occur within the council between Russia and other members. How did the relations on the Arctic Council change after Russia invaded Ukraine? Do you foresee potential trouble when Russia takes the chairmanship once again?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Yes and no. It's a typical academic answer. There's been a lot of good work that people have been able to continue to develop at the lower levels. The work to develop the business council is something I think Canadians will rightly look back on and be very proud of, and it has Russian participation.

Where we see a lot of the challenges though, that I've written about coming to unfortunate fruition, are with some of the issues that are dealing with a broader political environment. For example, we have the search and rescue treaty that the Arctic Council is very proud of, and is very rightfully proud of. The Russians didn't participate in the exercise this year. Under the terms of the treaty, I believe that was to be expected. They did not participate.

We also created, under Canadian leadership, an Arctic chief of staff group that was to meet. That, unfortunately, has now been indefinitely postponed.

We see the efforts to communicate, to discuss, to have confidence-building on the military side. I say that would be the most direct price that has been paid at the Arctic Council. In the longer term is the issue of what the Finns and Swedes do again. That's going to be the larger political issue.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Brahmi, go ahead. You have five minutes.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Lackenbauer, you talked about the connection that some people think exists between what is happening in Ukraine and the real danger in the Arctic. Those people think this could have an impact on the Arctic. I think many people agree with you that there is no connection between the two.

What do you think is Russia's perception of Canadian police officers training Ukrainian police officers, having Canadian boots on the ground? How do they feel about that? Do they see the act as aggressive or insignificant?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

From what I've been tracking, it's interesting. Canada has played an intriguing role in Russian threat perceptions relating to the Arctic. We've been mobilized by Putin since 2007 as the country or Arctic state that's arming, rebuilding, and preparing—to do whatever the Russian imagination wants to have us doing as a revisionist actor in the region—as though we are the country that's preparing for conflict along the lines Rob is suggesting, and that we're the country that's the catalyst for this arms race that's going on.

To Canadians this is shocking. We see ourselves as being reactive to events going on elsewhere. We're being created and constructed as that threat in Russia. As much as the language from 2009 to 2010 until early this year was getting more..... Even Minister Baird had a newspaper article at the beginning of the year stressing that as much as we disagree with Russia on issues like gay rights and other core areas, we typically get along with Russians in terms of the Arctic.

This seemed to do a quick turn after the aggression in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and the rhetoric has shifted. Putin expressed dismay that Canada was linking the two issues of Ukraine and the Arctic, and saying that it was a false connection. That's continued to play out in the Russia media as well that we're falsely conflating two separate issues, at least in the Russian mind. What they see as responding to legitimate nationalist interest in Crimea is in no way analogous to them taking offensive action in the Arctic when their interests are purely defensive. What we think of it and whether we believe it's credible is almost secondary to the fact that it has taken hold in Russia.

How they perceive the Canadian involvement in responding to the Ukrainian crisis more generally is beyond my area of expertise. I have tracked how it's translated into Arctic perceptions and they see it as another example, as Putin has said, of Canada outstepping its legitimate backyard. He said that if Canada had responded to some act of aggression in the Arctic they would understand that Canada is an Arctic nation like they are. For Canada to come and be engaging in something in Ukraine—which I support, just to put it on the record—in his mind is something that is outstepping our proper purview or our area of interest.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Is there a difference between the perception of the Putin regime and that of Russian civil society? Russia is also perfectly entitled to ensuring its own immediate protection. We can therefore understand that it would be difficult for Russia to agree to the Sevastopol base becoming part of a NATO country, just like the Americans did not agree with Cuba having missiles. Is there a difference between the Putin regime, on the one hand, and Russian society in general, on the other hand?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

My honest answer is that I'm not sure. I'm not an expert on what's going on internally within Russia. Rob may be able to speak to this.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The one challenge we have with Russia and civil society is that when we talk about the Arctic we've seen very definitive steps by Putin to limit civil society. The one act we all are aware of is that Putin moved very strongly against their indigenous organization, RAIPON, delisting them in November of 2012. They subsequently were re-listed, but there have been reports that the Russian government is now trying to place their officials on their board of governance and other civil society movements within the north. What this seems to suggest overall is that the ability to draw the distinction between civil society within Russia and the Russian government is decreasing.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Leung. Five minutes.

[Chungsen Leung, Conservative, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me say that I feel that a lot of these discussions could be quite academic if we look at this possible scenario. We have the capability to do surveillance in the Arctic. We have the capability to assert our Arctic sovereignty. It's easy to put hard assets in there to make the preference. The day when another foreign country comes and plants its flag in our soil and says that they claim this for XYZ country is not going to happen.

My question has to do with enforcement of that sovereignty. If Japanese, Chinese, Russian, or Scandinavian fishing vessels happen to cross into the Arctic Ocean to take fish, either accidentally or realistically, or if they try to use the Northwest Passage to shorten their trading links from the Atlantic into the Pacific, what do we do about enforcement? Obviously with some civil society we could easily go in and negotiate it. With some countries where we don't have that ability to negotiate a treaty, how do we enforce our sovereignty in that area?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Well, the two examples that you give have to be enforced differently. For a vessel going through the Northwest Passage and not following Canadian laws and that would be, of course, through the NORDREG system and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, we would have to go through the courts to address that particular issue. That's what we said we will do and that's what we will follow through. We're not going to have any type of direct gunboat-type enforcement.

The fishing issue is more problematic. There is a study at the University of Ottawa that is trying to address the issue of how much fishers are, in fact, coming over into Canadian waters, particularly in the Davis Strait. Their suspicion is that, through the RADARSAT data, it's happening a lot more. For that type of enforcement to stop it, you physically have to go up and address the fishers. You are going to have to have a patrol capable of going into the Davis Strait to deal with the Greenlanders, the Faeroese, and the others we are starting to think are crossing over on a much more frequent basis. You need to have two different types of enforcement regimes. Both of them have to be pursued as vigorously as possible.

[Chungsen Leung, Conservative, Willowdale, ON]

But does that mean that our coast guard needs to be backed up by naval power?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

All of the above.... I don't believe that you draw distinction. There's often, do you do it coast guard or do you do it navy? As far as I'm concerned, when it comes to the Arctic paint them all pink and call them whole of government because you need that.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I disagree with that because again we do have mandates, and departments and agencies have their lanes that they are expected to stick to. The only way that this thing works is, if we're looking at this from the standpoint of North American defence, that the military have the ability to integrate and work with all partners in this whole-of-government comprehensive approach that doesn't just see it as “it's immaterial from a legal standpoint”. It actually matters a tremendous amount.

Before we face situations where we are perceiving a crisis—and you're talking about turbot wars as analogies to this—we actually have time because there's no clear and present danger or crisis facing us today to sort out the relationships and get them right. If there's nothing else you take away from my comments, it's to emphasize the importance of relationships and getting them right before a crisis comes so you can respond appropriately rather than reacting. I think it's very important that responses also allow the Canadian Armed Forces to stick in their place, to stick within their lanes, to operate within their mandate, and to not get forced by public perception or political perception to do things that are going beyond what we should expect from them as Canadians.

To me, this is where differentiating between security and sovereignty and safety is absolutely important. Enforcing the territorial integrity of Canada and ensuring that we're protected is, of course, a defence mandate and, of course, they're going to take a lead. But in many other cases it's important that we not put the responsibility on the Canadian Armed Forces under the defence umbrella to respond to threats and hazards that are not defence in nature.

[Chungsen Leung, Conservative, Willowdale, ON]

Let's look at a little bit of retention. In most of the countries we talk about—

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Quickly please.

[Chungsen Leung, Conservative, Willowdale, ON]

—we're talking about civil society, society that we can communicate with. What happens if North Korea tried to do this?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

That's where you have to have the capability to push back. Full stop.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much for following the chair's direction.

Mr. Sullivan, for five minutes please.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you to the witnesses.

You touched on it earlier, the use of the Northwest Passage as a transportation route. The Minister of Transportation five years ago thought it was a great thing that was going to be here very soon and this year she has said—and the words in the press were that she threw cold water on the idea—that there would not be a Northwest Passage any time soon. But with the ice pack melting and with global warming, it is coming.

What is it that the Canadian government will have to do in terms of its military—the Rangers, the military itself, and perhaps the coast guard—to properly create, maintain, monitor, and defend a seasonal but permanent Northwest Passage? We already have a fair amount of traffic from the Port of Churchill that transports something like a half million tonnes of grain every year. There's a proposal to move oil out of the Port of Churchill. There is some serious concern that we haven't mapped enough up in the north to really know what we're doing. What is it that, as a country, we should be doing to properly prepare ourselves for what is coming?