The first point was that there are three examples to that kind of view. Currently we're spending around 1%, down from 1.4% maybe seven or eight years ago.
The first example is General Hillier's famous statement—everybody knows it—about the dark ages in the 1990s, but we were cutting everything. Defence cannot be exempted from cuts. They cut across the board.
Second, diplomats Burney and Hampson about a week ago in The Globe and Mail made the wrong comparison. They said Australia is spending 2%. Well, everybody in this room knows where we're sitting in the world. It's incomparable. Just look at the map. Australia has to spend more money on national defence than Canada does. That's very clear, because defence is an instrument of foreign policy, but it's a threat-based service the government provides.
Third, and this is an explosive dossier in the Canadian context, is the F-35s. Many people came out and gave us examples. The most prominent was Japan. Japan again is sitting in a place in the world. Of course they have to buy 100.
The criticism was why are we buying 65 aircraft whereas Japan and Australia are buying more than we are. Of course that is threat-based. If we're going to replace our fighter aircraft, there has to be some number, but those countries are not good examples.
Proceeding to the current situation regarding the navy shipbuilding and army equipment, there have been many cancellations and postponements in terms of army equipment and procurement process slippages in the case of navy shipbuilding. We are again in a situation post-Afghanistan in which I see really no urgency. It's not a carte blanche for the current government, but again I understand there may not be any urgency.
If you go further into the political argument, perhaps some of these have been sacrificed to balance the budgets.
This is the issue of demand for defence: how much do you want to spend on defence and when?
I'll pass to the next slide. The second point is on the governance of defence procurement. We seem to have settled on a sort of unsettleable governance form. Nobody else in the world has this. The process for the selection of the shipyards in Halifax and Vancouver in the huge navy shipbuilding strategy was applaudable. Everything went well, but nothing has been built yet. The secretariat is like three boxes, and perhaps if you add the Treasury Board, it's like four boxes side by side. For anything to go ahead, every box has to give you a green signal, which will delay the process.
In the next slide or two, we're going to see that many countries, such as Australia and Britain, which we can understand because we have similar types of governments, have moved away from this kind of governance structure.
Treasury Board, PWGSC, Industry Canada, and Defence: everybody has to say yes for this process to continue. I'll skip the details. Just imagine if one of the ADMs is replaced. It's going to take another six months for the new ADM to understand the process, the file. Delays will arise out of this structure of governance. That is a warning. In fact something has to be done. Perhaps somebody might listen to what I have to say.
Coordination is a need, so the secretariat is a coordinating mechanism. However well the coordination can be performed, the fact is you have four boxes in line. Moreover the secretariat doesn't change anything. The secretariat just tries to coordinate the four departments.
The first point was about how much you spend. The second point is on the structure of the governance in defence procurement. The third one is actually a significant sticking point in terms of how much money you spend. This is a buy Canadian policy. However much we complain about the buy American policy, which recently flared up....I don't recall.... In Vancouver, they are building the—