What essentially occurred is that as we were more protracted in operations within Afghanistan the reserve became more operationalized. What I mean by that is that as we were force generating task forces to go out for deployment every six months around 2005-06 we started to see that almost 20% to 25% of those task forces were comprised of reserve soldiers. These task forces that went out, because of this component, we were then force generating an operational component. So the term “operationalization of the reserves” was a result of what we call line of operation 3, a more sustained, deliberate operation of which we would then find ourselves continually in a force generation mode 4.
We now consider ourselves more of an integrated force so that as we go through there remain specific capabilities for line of operations 1 and 2, both of which are domestic operations. We have specific role mission at task 4 for the reserves: our Arctic response company groups or territorial battalion groups, which I think you are aware of, and then line of operation 3, which again is the sustained mission. If one comes up, we would be expected to provide certain capabilities for that task 4 on a specific integrated role.