National Defence Committee on March 9th, 2015

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Colleagues, in the interest of time and with respect to our witness, we will open committee, and pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we will continue our study of the defence of North America.

We have one witness with us today from the Department of National Defence, Lieutenant-General J.A.J. Parent, deputy commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD.

The second witness who was scheduled to be with us today is unavailable due to his participation in arrangements for the repatriation of Sergeant Doiron.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman, when you're through.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair, for that information.

As I indicated to you just a moment ago, I was going to raise it as a point of order, because this would have been, of course, a very good opportunity for this committee and Parliament through him to hear some details about what happened in Iraq on Friday night. I obviously appreciate and understand that his involvement in the repatriation ceremony would take precedence over that and we fully respect that decision.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Just for your edification, we will reschedule. Captain Virgin is expected to attend in the days ahead.

I understand we will be wrapping up somewhat earlier because of previous commitments by our vice-chairs.

We have one bit of business to do before we adjourn, before five o'clock, to accommodate for those previous commitments.

General Parent, go ahead with your opening remarks, please, sir.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

I would like to extend greetings from your NORAD commander Admiral Bill Gortney.

As I begin, I would be remiss if I did not share with you how fortunate and humbled I feel to have the opportunity to serve our great country as a NORAD deputy commander. As such, I would like to begin by reminding the committee that, by agreement, NORAD has three missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. Since it's the newest, I'd like to begin with maritime warning.

Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways and approaches to the U.S. and Canada. It was added as a mission in 2006, and NORAD issued its first maritime advisory in 2010. Since then, it has grown to provide 14 advisories in 2013, 21 in 2014, and 1 so far in 2015. While maritime threats may develop over a longer time period, it's important to know that a seaborne threat can become an aerospace warning and defence issue with little warning. While barriers still exist, especially with regard to information sharing, maritime warning is a tremendous example of how the two nations came to an understanding of the mission gap and agreed that it could be resolved utilizing the proven cooperative mechanism established under NORAD.

Aerospace warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to manmade objects in the aerospace domain and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. Ultimately providing continuous, timely, and unambiguous warning of threats and maintaining the reliable means to communicate this warning are the hallmarks of NORAD, and we must continue to ensure that our systems remain relevant and capable.

Rounding out our mission set is aerospace control, which consists of providing surveillance and exercising operational control of the airspace of the U.S. and Canada. Critical to this mission is our continued effort to sustain the readiness of our forces.

Our current defence capabilities absolutely rely on well-trained crews and equally well-equipped and maintained aircraft. Additionally, as our understanding of the capabilities of potential adversaries comes into focus, we will require aerospace defence systems capable of tracking and engaging long-range aircraft, low observable cruise missiles, and even UAVs. We will not be able to outpace emerging threats without evolving and adapting to meet these challenges.

Over the past two years, NORAD has been tracking a variety of changes from both state and non-state actors that could challenge the concept and constructs of defence that were put in place, for the most part, in the last century.

I must be absolutely clear on this point. I am not trying to sound the alarm; however, the 9/11 commission chastised NORAD when it reported:

We recognize that a costly change in NORAD's defense posture to deal with the danger of suicide hijackers, before such a threat had ever actually been realized, would have been a tough sell. But NORAD did not canvass available intelligence and try to make the case.

In light of the changes that are occurring, we are now working to make a case for how NORAD should evolve to meet the requirements of the 21st century. Threats to our national security are becoming more diffuse and less attributable, and North America is increasingly vulnerable to an array of evolving threats, state or non-state, traditional or asymmetric, across all the domains of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Furthermore, regional conflicts can rapidly expand to have global implications and even impact the homeland. For example, as conditions in Syria worsened, we were concerned about the possibility of cyberattacks on North America.

I will now take a moment to highlight some of the significant changes that are under way.

Since the fall of 2011, we have seen a transformation in Russian military doctrine, operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is fielding more precise and capable air and sea launch cruise missiles and is participating in longer sea deployments and more complex exercises, especially in the far north. It has undertaken broad modernization programs in all major weapons systems to include submarine launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has increased the frequency of strategic force exercises, and annexed Crimea. While some elements of the old Soviet model apply, it's clear that Russia is working to make a break from the past regarding its military capabilities. We believe Russia is pursuing a new doctrine which draws on the strategic use of precise weapons to achieve strategic effects.

Both North Korea and Iran continue to invest in ballistic missile, nuclear, cyber, and other advanced weapons technologies. The advent of North Korea's successful space launch and previous nuclear tests have led us to consider North Korea's ballistic missiles as a practical and no longer theoretical threat, one that must be defended against.

Additionally, threats from terrorist organizations, while diminished, have by no means evaporated. Of special concern, with the growing likelihood of collusion, willing or not, between transnational crime organizations and terrorists based on the desire to traffic in weapons, drugs, people, etc., there is a growing opportunity for terrorists to use modern weapons such as cruise or even short-range ballistic missiles launched from shipping containers or the delivery of weapons of mass destruction from unmanned aerial vehicles or general aviation aircraft.

Adding to the complexity of these threats is the continuing retreat of sea ice in the north, which is turning the Arctic into an approach to the continent, one that could be exploited in an opportunistic way.

There is another area of growing concern: attacks launched by homegrown violent extremists. Whether or not they are inspired by international terrorist organizations, there is usually little intelligence or warning that could be used to put a stop to their attacks before they are carried out.

However, in the attack on Ottawa, NORAD quickly provided overhead combat air patrols and diverted aircraft to Trenton to maintain a high alert status to ensure any attempt to take advantage of the situation through the air would be foiled.

Despite the challenges, the NORAD Agreement, which came into being 56 years ago, is still the big idea for the defence of North America. The best way to defend and evolve the defence of the continent is cooperatively through the long-established experience of NORAD.

Ensuring the continued success of these missions and the ability to stay ahead of the threats to North America are a clear objective of the command. In December, our previous NORAD commander, General Jacoby, signed a completed NORAD strategic review and sent it to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The review noted that improved sensors, communications systems, and infrastructure may be required in the high north for NORAD to continue to be relevant and effective as we move deeper into the 21st century. The review also included an examination of current and potential future roles, missions, and command relationships. Beyond the review, NORAD is also running a number of exercises and tests in search of ways to mitigate and overcome the evolving challenges we face.

Finally, I can't tell you how proud I am to serve and have the watch with the soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen of Canada and the United States who selflessly serve our two great countries. Based on their extraordinary drive, professionalism and ingenuity, I'm confident our future is in good hands.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, General Parent.

We'll begin with our first round of questions in seven-minute segments beginning with Mr. Norlock, please.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witness for his attendance via the Internet today.

General, I'd like to start off with a major question that is general in some nature.

Given Canada's geography, we are faced with the difficult task of defending the second largest land mass in the world, with the longest coastline. Can you speak to this committee about the challenges this poses and how the NORAD partnership helps overcome these challenges? Since you mentioned it, might I ask you to speak about the newest part of your mission, maritime warning, being that we are in the country with the longest coastline?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Mr. Norlock, thank you very much for the question.

You touched on a very important point in your question, which is the tyranny of the distances in Canada. Speaking of distances, a lot of people don't know that there's more distance between the southern edge of Canada and the northern edge of Canada than there is east to west, because of the way we look at the map. Normally people think about Canada in terms of east to west, but going to the north is our biggest challenge in terms of distance.

Partnering with the U.S. has served us extremely well. A concrete example is that we don't have enough tanker aircraft to protect our north by ourselves. However, the U.S., through the NORAD Agreement, has placed on alert two U.S. tanker aircraft, which are aircraft that deliver fuel airborne. One is on the east coast in Bangor, Maine, and one is in Fairchild, Washington. When our fighters take off from either Bagotville or Cold Lake and they have to head up north, these tankers will also launch, and that allows us to extend our reach as far north as we can.

Distance also poses a challenge in terms of the forward operating locations up north, where they are still relatively south with respect to the extreme northern edge of Canada.

The other area where we benefit from the NORAD Agreement is in the use of airborne early warning aircraft, commonly known as AWACS, where they extend the reach of the radar.

It's a vast area both for the asymmetric threat, which is commercial airlines like those used in 9/11, and the symmetric threat from long-range munitions from Russia. NORAD definitely profits from the partnership with the U.S. to make sure we have the right capabilities.

I think I forgot about the maritime warning mission.

Binationally we do the maritime warning, which is fusing all the information from all the maritime stakeholders. Giving NORAD the maritime warning mission has allowed a conduit to fuse the information and intelligence of everybody interested in the maritime domain awareness. Bilaterally we have the Canadian Joint Operations Command and NORTHCOM, the navigation north command, that work together and are able to put the mechanisms in place to do the maritime control.

NORAD's role is to transmit simultaneously to the governments of both Canada and the United States a maritime advisory message or maritime warning message. Bilaterally NORTHCOM and the Canadian Joint Operations Command, with law enforcement partners, decide how to prosecute those warning or advisory messages.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much.

Since NORAD's original agreement in 1957, the threats facing North America have evolved significantly. In your opinion, what sort of regular measures are taken by NORAD, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure that NORAD remains a step ahead of any potential threat to the defence of North America?

Because it's such a broad question, I wonder if you could first do a broad response and then narrow it down to dealing with the new threat of terrorism and how NORAD might deal with a North American terrorist activity of any particular...since you mentioned it in your opening remarks. You can use an example or give us a scenario where something might occur.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Okay, sir. The threats have evolved in terms that it started with long-range aviation and evolved into ICBMs, and then before 9/11 we were looking at outside. After 9/11, we started looking not only outside the approaches to the continent but also inside, since on that day all the attacks came from within the United States.

In terms of the measures we can take, NORAD is assigned the mission by the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States. What we can do is provide a combined joint assessment of the threats and explain the capabilities and requirements to mitigate those threats. Once we give our ideas, then it's not really up to NORAD itself to decide how to deal with these threats, or to accept or not accept the risks of these threats.

In terms of terrorism, for maritime we have vessels of interest for which, based on the information we collect, we will do an advisory message or a warning message. Then these vessels will be inspected, visited mainly by a law enforcement agency, most of the time, and civilian authorities.

From the air, we are still concerned about the commercial aviation threat. The bin Laden papers, when he was killed, still mentioned a high interest by al Qaeda to use aviation against North America, particularly general aviation as well. The business jet type of aviation could be used as a missile. Since 9/11 we have measures in place where we exercise regularly detecting a potential track of interest, doing an interception, and having conferences where, if required, we would take down those tracks of interest.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, General.

Time, Mr. Norlock.

Mr. Harris, please, for seven minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General Parent, for joining us. You occupy one of the most senior positions in the Canadian Armed Forces and I congratulate you on your appointment.

I want to ask one question. This committee was in Washington and Colorado, I believe it was in 2013, as part of this study, and there was a lot of talk at that time about budget cuts, particularly in the U.S. with sequestration and rolling cuts going forward. Of course, we in Canada are now experiencing the same kind of thing.

I wonder if you could comment on whether or not these budget measures have affected the state of alertness of NORAD, the readiness posture, domain awareness, and other standards that you had been operating under and think are important to continue. Has there been a decline or decrease in any of those postures, domain awareness or other standards?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Mr. Harris, I thank you for your question, and it's good to see you again, sir.

I'm currently comfortable that NORAD has been protected with the highest level of priority to maintain our readiness and our capabilities to become an effective deterrent, and if necessary, to react to any aggression.

The NORAD readiness has been protected in the U.S. throughout sequestration and I can say the same in Canada. I think NORAD's priority with search and rescue is priority number one of the Canadian NORAD region and 1 Canadian Air Division. So far, there's been no decline in our state of readiness due to the budget cuts in both Canada and the U.S.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you very much, sir. I'm very glad to hear that.

You talked about the review that General Jacoby recently submitted. I was interested in the suggestion that there ought to be a greater level of sensors and awareness in the north. We had a witness from signals intelligence who told us that the three systems that Canada has in Alert in the north, Gander in the east, and Masset, B.C. in the west were sufficient to keep track of all the signals intelligence that was facing our shores. I think there's also another one in Alaska.

Is there a need for more and if so, where? I know that signals intelligence is only one aspect of sensors and awareness. Is this something that is top secret and classified, or can you tell us where the next steps ought to be taken in domain awareness?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

I think the SIGINT stations that you mentioned, from where I sit, are adequate. Where we sit we don't care where the information comes from, it's just that it gets to us and then we are able to the fusion of that information.

As far as domain awareness is concerned, we're starting to have a concern about the refurbishment and replacement of the north warning system, which is the line of radars along the Canadian air defence identification zone. We expect its life expectancy to be 2025 to 2030.

It really takes a long time to build in the north and given that we need to study what is the best system of systems to replace that system and refurbish it—it could be space-based, it could be land-based, it could be maritime-based—we need to talk about the replacement of the north warning system in the north now.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I thank you for pointing that out. I had made note of that. Thank you for the specificity in what you think is the priority.

In an article in March, a deputy commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command, in a general quote, stated that of the challenges facing the tri-command, NORAD, CJOC, and NORTHCOM in the U.S., the major challenges are cybersecurity, defence against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents, and security and defence in the north.

I think we've talked about security and defence in the north, but I want to ask you how NORAD would be prepared for dealing with cybersecurity as one category, and the other is the defence against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents as a separate category. Perhaps you could briefly deal with those issues separately, with cyberdefence and the others, because it seems to me that some of those threats might be part of this aviation issue you talked about, the general aviation. Is that the focus of your concern about these issues? Could you elaborate?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Thank you, sir.

From the NORAD point of view, in our lane we're still concerned about the approaches. I would put air and maritime ahead of cyber, because that's our directed mandate, and to us it's a no-fail mandate.

In terms of cyber, in doing our maritime and aerospace mandate we have to operate with cyber systems, and we have to operate in a contested cyber environment. In those terms, we have to stay ahead of the threats in trying to outpace the threats so that our systems are not vulnerable to cyberattacks.

In terms of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents, those are agents that could be transported by air or in maritime approaches towards North America. We try to gather as much intelligence as we can on these potential agents, but for us it's about the approaches by air or by sea, whereas for CJOC it's by land.

In terms of the defence of the north, we think of the north in three sectors: safety, security, and defence. Safety is mainly the realm of maritime safety, of course, and air safety, and then there is the realm of the civilian agency and the search and rescue system. For security, it's more in the law enforcement agency realm that we're there in support, given the capabilities we have. Finally, on defence, when we talk of defence from the NORAD point of view, it's aerospace defence and maritime warning.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I have time for a brief question. Recently, of course, we have heard about the Russian intentions or potential intentions, but we've also heard witnesses say that they don't see a threat in the Arctic to Canada. Can I ask you whether or not you have reduced in any way your posture with respect to alertness and awareness of what might be transpiring in the northern part of Russia or in any of the other stances you've taken? Has there been a change one way or the other in response to anything that's happening?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

This is a great question, which we think about a lot. When you talk about threats, there are two elements in the calculus of threats, and they are capability and intent.

We've seen for several years now that in terms of capabilities the Russians are going through a full modernization program. They are building cruise missiles that have a longer reach, both precision-guided conventional and nuclear ones, as well as submarine-launched cruise missiles. The intent is the difficult part. Right now we don't see an intent of armed conflict in the Arctic, of Russia against North America; however, the intent can change very rapidly. Who would have thought in regard to Mr. Putin's intent that the next day after the Olympics he would invade his neighbouring country, the Crimea—

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, General.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

In terms of reduced posture—

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, General Parent.

That's time, Mr. Harris. I'm sure this question will be followed up.

It is a good question, and your answer is intriguing.

Mr. Chisu, please, for seven minutes.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, General, for your great testimony.

I was listening with great attention, especially when you were talking about the changes in the Russian military doctrine. This is the first time I've heard a witness speak explicitly about the real developments that are happening in the Arctic. I have been speaking for about two years now about these issues and nobody is listening, so thank you very much for your testimony.

You were speaking about how the Russian activities in the Arctic became quite significant. Can you expand on NORAD's Arctic operations? You were speaking about the surveillance, the observation of what is going on, the warning systems, and so on. Are there procedures in place if the intent of our great neighbour in the Arctic really is changing? For example, if you are detecting an enemy aircraft or a missile, are there procedures in place so that you have an answer quite quickly, and also so you not only are detecting the threat coming in, but you have reactions going on to annihilate the threat?

I don't know if you can elaborate on these things, but maybe generally you can. There are certainly other issues that you cannot elaborate on.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Thank you for your question, sir.

Russia's long-range aviation command is doing a lot of exercises. The way they exercise their bomber force, which is capable of carrying nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, is to launch from their sovereign territory, head into international waters, and land in the Arctic.

One issue is that they don't announce the exercises and they don't file flight plans. If aircraft come towards our territory and don't announce themselves or file flight plans, it is our responsibility to go and see who's approaching and try to detect what their intention is as they fly towards our land mass. We would go out and inspect less if they would communicate their intentions more and say exactly what they are doing and what their objectives are in doing those numerous flights towards the Canadian Arctic.