Thank you.
Mr. Chair and honourable committee members, thank you for the chance to speak to you today on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—commonly referred to as CBRN—threats to Canada in the context of our Canadian special operations forces role in responding to them.
To start, I will set the stage with an overview, first situating the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, or CANSOFCOM, into the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces. I will then talk about the role and evolution of the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit, known as CJIRU, which is our CBRN unit located in Trenton, Ontario. Finally, within the limits of operational security, I will talk about how CJIRU would respond to a CBRN scenario here in Canada.
To start with, CANSOFCOM was created in 2006. The command could be regarded as an emerging capability within the wider CAF and is the organization chiefly responsible for all aspects of Canada's special operations forces. The commander of CANSOFCOM reports directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff and is the Canadian Armed Forces functional authority for counterterrorism. CANSOFCOM's purpose is to force-develop, force-generate, and, where required, force-employ special operations task forces capable of achieving tactical, operational, or strategic effects desired by the Government of Canada.
The enterprise is composed of a national headquarters and five distinct subordinate units or organizations, including Joint Task Force 2, which is a Canadian Armed Forces counterterrorism unit, 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron, which is the command's rotary wing aviation squadron, as well as the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, which provides overt military SOF effects, including robust, flexible expeditionary forces. The command also has the Canadian Special Operations Training Centre, which is responsible for providing our common SOF-specific training as well as our command headquarters, located here in Ottawa.
Finally, the fifth unit that I would like to turn to is CJIRU, for a more detailed look at the CBRN component of what CANSOFCOM does.
When CANSOFCOM was established in 2006, the command incorporated existing capabilities, such as JTF2, for example. In other aspects, however, new units were formed or transformed into special operations forces. What was known at the time as the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company, part of the Joint Operations Group, was transitioned to become a specialized joint incident response unit focused on the CBRN threat.
The CJIRU was officially established in 2007. It is a highly skilled world-class formation of specialists that continues to evolve and grow toward a final operational capability for the Canadian armed forces.
The CJIRU has three key mandates. First and foremost, on the domestic front, the CJIRU supports the RCMP and the Public Health Agency of Canada in response to CBRN incidents. Second, the CJIRU also provides specialized CBRN support to CANSOFCOM forces both here in Canada and overseas. Finally, the CJIRU provides support to other CAF elements, including instruction, training, and education in any aspect of CBRN matters.
For operational security reasons, I am not in a position to provide in-depth details regarding the precise capabilities, mandate, or details regarding the conduct of operations; however, I can provide a general overview of the five roles that the men and women of CJIRU undertake.
First, they can sample and identify chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents. Simply confirming or denying the presence of these threats is paramount to the potential follow-on activities that may take place.
Second, the CJIRU can undertake CBRN surveillance, that is, to define the CBRN threat and determine the extent of the contamination.
Third, the CJIRU can perform decontamination and medical extraction. This is a rather precise and limited role. The CJIRU would not perform large-scale decontamination of an area or population. Rather, they can support the immediate force conducting operations in the area. For example, small teams of operators from the CJIRU would accompany counterterrorist forces during a mission in order to provide CBRN protection to other members of CANSOF.
Fourth, they can provide a CBRN incident command centre where they can coordinate and analyze all of the information related to a specific attack or threat, including modelling and projecting weather effects. This command centre would be complementary to the command and control centres of other government departments.
Finally, they can also perform CBRN explosive ordnance disposal, that is, destroying or rendering safe an explosive chemical, biological, or radiological device.
I'd now like to turn to how the CJIRU would be employed in reaction to a CBRN incident. It is important to note that special operations forces are not first responders. While we maintain very high readiness and are able to assist, the request for special forces as part of a Canadian Armed Forces request is a deliberate process. Disaster and emergency management is a scalable response that starts first with the organizations and first responders closest to the community where the incident occurs.
If an affected community or municipality cannot effectively manage the incident, normally they would seek additional capabilities from neighbouring communities. If more is needed, they would then seek support from the province, and only after those resources had been exhausted would the request come for support from the federal level.
Certainly there can be some scenarios under which CJIRU support could be asked for very quickly. In the case of police suspicion of an impending CBRN terrorist attack, a request for assistance could be made so that certain aspects of CJIRU's specialized skill sets could be deployed very quickly. CANSOFCOM has strong links with other government departments and agencies, and the whole-of-government team keeps each other informed about potential threats and concerns.
As well as supporting other SOF teams in a CBRN threat environment, the CJIRU, under the command and control of CANSOFCOM, provides direct support to other government departments and agencies through its position on the RCMP-led national CBRN response team. The national CBRN response team is led by the RCMP and supported by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the CJIRU. Some of the capabilities and roles are complementary between the CJIRU and the RCMP, whereas in other aspects the RCMP is the sole lead and authority, such as for forensics and evidence, as part of any response. The RCMP would certainly be the authority to expand upon the national team response remit.
In summary, the CJIRU is a key component of CANSOFCOM. They are a very agile and very specialized group who are highly trained and equipped to address CBRN threats. The unit is not a first responder element, and it is also not a large-scale consequence management organization. It is, however, very well situated to provide niche capability to sample and identify agents and toxins, determine the extent of potential contamination, and provide integrated support to other departments and agencies, from municipal to federal, and it is a capability of the Canadian Armed Forces that is still evolving.
I hope I have provided an adequate overview of the CJIRU's role within CANSOFCOM, the sorts of skills it can provide, and the ways in which it would be employed in an operational context.
With that, I would be pleased to answer your questions.