National Defence Committee on May 5th, 2016

[Peggy Mason]

Thank you. I'm very glad for the opportunity to clarify.

I did not make any reference to Canada's role at the United Nations and equate that in any way with the BMD discussion. There must have been a problem with the translation. No, I made no such comment.

One can make an argument on the arms control side—for example, with respect to North Korea and certainly with respect to Russia—that not participating in BMD might enhance our ability in a multilateral negotiation to play a constructive role, but no, there's no relationship with our role at the United Nations. When we run for the Security Council, one of the things we'll be judged on will be, of course, the kind of multilateral role we've played in arms control and disarmament, but again, that's a separate issue.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Perry, in discussions with our colleagues this week, we spoke about missile defence. It was raised that our participation might be political and that there would be a clear commitment. There was also discussion about participation in research and development, which would avoid astronomical costs for Canada. The Americans are aware of our financial constraints.

Do you think that would be a good way to be involved?

[David Perry]

There was a reference earlier to the fact that it would be inconceivable for it to cost nothing. In a past generation, that was entirely conceivable. That was apparently the deal that was offered to us before. Maybe that's a possibility and maybe it's not.

I think the Americans would look at our participation in that program in the context of our participation in a wider set of North American defence activities, including upgrading and modernizing NORAD and a modernization of the north warning system. I would imagine that right now, in concert not just with looking at that issue in isolation but across a series of other investments you're that going to make—including fighter aircraft to participate in our NORAD missions—we would have more opportunities right now to get favourable terms if we were interested in doing it in the sense of missile defence participation than we would have if were looking at that issue in isolation or at another time.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Yesterday, our chair and I had some questions. This week, the Americans gave a demonstration of interventions for reacting to missile launches.

Based on your experience and knowledge, would you say that the Americans would be able to intercept missiles launched at high altitude?

[David Perry]

I do. I don't think it's a 100% perfect system, but it has a limited ability to work. It's not designed to account for every conceivable possibility. To do that, you would need a much larger system, and a much larger system, I think, would potentially be destabilizing.

I would just point out that I think it's logically inconsistent to suggest on the one hand that the system doesn't work but also that it's going to be a threat to international stability on the premise that it does work. It has to be one or the other.

I happen to think that the system is effective in terms of working towards the type of threat specified. Beyond that, though, it's not going to be a conclusive security blanket, but it would provide Canadians, if we were to participate, some level of assurance that Canadians may have the chance to be defended against that type of missile. If we don't participate, there's none.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

I know that our study today is focusing on air strikes, but you spoke about antisubmarine warfare. We've been told that, ideally, we should intervene before the missiles have been launched, not after.

Do you think Canada has the equipment required for antisubmarine warfare?

[David Perry]

I think there are a number of things. One is enhancing our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity. We currently have a fleet of maritime patrol aircraft that has just been upgraded, but only 14 of the fleet have been upgraded. I think there's the potential to at least look at expanding that upgrade program to include the entire fleet, which would give us better coverage, particularly because when we first acquired those assets we weren't using them in an overland surveillance role like we are currently doing in the Middle East. Some of those aircraft are doing things that weren't factored into the analysis when the initial assessment about fleet size was made.

Beyond that, I think we need to build into our future surface combatants a sophisticated anti-submarine warfare suite and its capabilities because, as the Russians are demonstrating right now, they have advanced submarines, and they are continuing to develop that technology. Then, I think, the third major thing is that we need to life-extend our existing fleet of submarines and look quite seriously at ways forward to acquire new ones.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's perfect timing.

I'm going to turn the floor over to you, Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much for your presentations.

Ms. Mason, you talked a lot about identifying priorities and about the fact that we really don't have a threat, and you said that building defensive systems is cheaper and better. Can you tell us a bit more about what that would look like?

[Peggy Mason]

When I was talking about offensive systems, I was talking about the very negative international security and arms control consequences of pursuing missile defences. I'd like to make the point that in my view it's not inconsistent at all to argue that the BMD system, as it's currently configured, doesn't work, but that prudent Russian and Chinese defence planners must hedge against the possibility that it might someday work. That's what defence planning is all about.

I'm not advocating building a massive offensive system, but I would note that among the nine declared nuclear weapon states, we actually have a rather significant modernization program going on. What I was arguing was that the whole logic during the Cold War when the Soviet Union and the United States were facing off at each other—and I argue it holds true today—was that you don't invest in missile defences because they are so easily.... Missile defences are so hard to prevail; they have to be 100% accurate so that nothing can get through. As for offensive systems, the famous Nitze doctrine was that they're “cost-effective”.

The question of cost-effectiveness is at the margins. It will always be cheaper to build more offensive systems. If you go down the road of missile defence, even if you have a somewhat reliable system, which the current one is not, you're pushing on the other side, those who are concerned—Russia and China in particular—to hedge their bets by building more offensive systems and by building more manoeuvrable systems.

Part of the deal in the Cold War was not only that there were no missile defence systems except a very restricted one, but also, there was an agreement to ban the MIRVs, that one missile system that has many independently manoeuvrable warheads. On that, too, the Bush administration gave up when they abandoned the ABM treaty, and now China is pursuing that.

The argument is that there is a lot of evidence of the negative consequences in arms control terms of going down this road and very little on the other side in terms of a positive benefit of this system.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

One of the things I would like to talk about a little more is identifying some of our priorities. We're put in this place, and I'm not convinced that there is an active threat. Can you tell us a bit about why you feel there isn't an active threat against us in terms of ballistic missiles?

[Peggy Mason]

Initially when the previous studies were done, the two countries that were pointed at were North Korea and Iran. Well, here today, no one is pointing at Iran. Why aren't they pointing at Iran? It's that Iran is no longer a threat in this area, or that it didn't have the capability such that it would have become a threat. That's not because ballistic missile defence works better, but because there was a huge international multilateral effort to provide Iran with both positive and negative incentives to back off the offensive nuclear weapon track.

Therefore, the international community now has significantly reduced a potential threat from Iran in the future. Likewise, it's worth pointing out that North Korea doesn't yet have the ballistic missile capability that would get them reaching North America. As for their nuclear capability, they exaggerate it greatly.

The evidence would suggest, in my view, that if you look at the absolute unreliability of the American missile defence system.... I mean, you have former directors recently writing and acknowledging that the radar system cannot distinguish between decoys and real ballistic missiles, so even a rogue state can defeat the system by having a couple of decoys. There is no radar that can do this, and it's not on the drawing board right now.

I'm not in any way suggesting that we should not be concerned and that we should not do everything we can to deal with the potential for North Korea to continue down this road, but it seems to be that there are more effective ways to do it, and we have a very powerful example before us in terms of Iran on how to do it right.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

One thing we have heard a lot about today concerns Russia. We know that with climate change we really are looking at the north and at what is happening there. With that context, what are your recommendations or thoughts on this?

[Peggy Mason]

Again, I draw on other witnesses here and in the past and on one of the authors of the NORAD perpetuity report, Dr. Charron, who have emphasized the importance of the Arctic for Canada in many ways, including security. Witnesses, including National Defence witnesses before this committee, have noted that, in stark contrast with the breakdown in relations with respect to Ukraine, in the Arctic context, in the context of the Arctic Council, cooperation has continued apace with Russia. In fact, we've had very good cooperation and would definitely want it to continue.

It's interesting that on the Arctic front, we share some interests vis-à-vis the United States. The best example there is the Northwest Passage. The United States declares those waters to be international waters that they can pass through; Russia and Canada both take a different view of the international law on that. There is also the Ilulissat Declaration with respect to the Arctic, emphasizing that even in a military context, everything possible should be done to cooperate.

I think it is very much in our interest to continue along this track. I would again argue that participation in BMD, with very little to help our security, might in fact undermine that cooperation with Russia.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for that answer.

We will move on the next questioner.

Mr. Spengemann, you have the floor for seven minutes. Feel free to split your time.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I'm going to try to keep it under seven minutes and defer the rest of the time.

I'm going to try to set this up as a bit of a comment and then get you to react. The level of debate we've had here really is very useful for the committee, and it also suggests that there be some further inquiry, that the BMD engagement be not simply thrown off the table, but moved forward.

I want to say that in terms of public perception and the actual value added by it as a Canadian mechanism to be engaged in, it needs to be compartmentalized; it needs to be confined, to be reduced in scope below what is currently perceived to be BMD.

The first thing I want to do is commend you, Ms. Mason, for your tremendous work on disarmament and non-proliferation. These must remain at the fulcrum, because it is in these areas that the real threats are.

By the same token, BMD has to be a combination basically of perfection in terms of its functionality, but also of confinement of its scale to its current level. The minute we scale up, it's going to be a political threat to Russia and China, and as you correctly point out, there will be a response strategically by those two countries. BMD, then, needs to remain in the paradigm of older technology and rogue states and of potential slippage into the hands of non-state actors, because technology that ended up pretty easily in the hands of North Korea and Iran may well in the future end up in the hands of a non-state entity.

The risk level, really, is a combination of likelihood and severity of impact, and even though the likelihood may not be great, the severity of impact would be tremendous. We should therefore work towards improving it, but we should definitely politically work to keeps its scale confined and, in the eyes of Russia and China, be very clear that it is being kept confined and aimed at rogue entities.

With that setup, what I would suggest is that there is a research and development opportunity for Canada in the area of perfecting the system. The committee received testimony on and in fact witnessed the demonstration of the system, to the point of seeing that the imperfection really lies, as my colleague has correctly pointed out, in the use of decoys and the inability of the defence system in the future potentially to recognize correctly what the re-entry vehicle is.

If research and development could be aimed at that point in the fulcrum, to better keep track in the future of the actual threat rather than decoys that have been deployed with other projectiles or even in the same projectile, there would be an opportunity for us to engage at potentially a reasonable cost but also to gain the credibility of being active on the file. What the seat really entails is an operational question. We have a tremendous seat at the table through NORAD, and we could deepen it, as you point out, Mr. Perry, through engagement on BMD.

I'll leave it there for you each to comment for a couple of minutes on your reactions.

[David Perry]

I'll pick up on a couple of things there.

The math that you're illustrating, I think captures the fact that this is not a destabilizing system. There are less than 50 interceptors at present that physically have to hit an incoming missile. The Russians have thousands of ballistic missiles of their own, and the Chinese have multiple hundreds. Just based on the sheer math and the way they're going to be employed, right now I don't see how this could be more widely destabilizing.

I think the use of that system, even against a rogue state, to deal with the different decoy issues is one where you.... You don't have a lot of ability to defend yourself against many different types of attacks, just because of the limitations and the strict math. If there were an opportunity for Canada to participate in terms of research and development, I think that would be an added bonus, but I think the main reason to do this is to provide for the security of Canadians.

To touch on something that was raised earlier about the issue of the threat and whether or not this is a direct threat to Canada, the traditional definition is that a threat is a mix of capability and intent. The North Koreans have the capability. Maybe right now we don't think they have the intent to actually directly target Canada, but again, I would say that it's more than 8,000 kilometres across the Pacific, and Victoria—I checked just before coming—is about 130 kilometres from Seattle as the crow flies, while I think that for Vancouver it's under 250 kilometres.

I don't think it's unreasonable to think that even if you're aiming for Seattle, where there are major industrial-based considerations with the Boeing plant in the region and with major United States military installations in that region.... If Seattle is viewed as a strategic target by some rogue state, I don't think it's at all implausible to think that one of those missiles may end up on the Canadian side of the border even if the intent were to go further south. We don't know what could happen in terms of the North Koreans' intent in the future, and that may change, but if you don't have a capability or any ability on your own to have any possibility of defending yourself against that, then you're left to the fortunes of others.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Ms. Mason, I'm wondering if we've narrowed the debate a bit further through the two comments that Mr. Perry and I have made.

[Peggy Mason]

Well, I want to talk a bit more about the state of the system. I've honed in on the problem of the radar and the fact that it's acknowledged that there is no ability to discriminate. Experts like Philip Coyle say that there will never be such an ability to discriminate, but I also want to go back to the other side of it, and that's the interceptor missile, the so-called kill vehicle.

It has managed to intercept an incoming missile in prescripted circumstances. Well, should North Korea or another rogue state decide to embark on a suicide mission and launch a missile at North America, they are not going to provide the trajectory. Therefore, there will be significant problems 30 years down the road and billions and billions of dollars later, even with the kill vehicle. There have been a number of U.S. General Accounting Office reports saying that the current kill vehicle interceptor missile can't be fixed and that, essentially, an entirely new design is required, so I think we still have some serious questions there.

Again, I come back to the point that something being destabilizing is in the eyes of the holder. As for us saying that Russia and China need have no fears, it's their perspective that matters. We already have tangible evidence that both Russia and China feel that they have to hedge against the system. We are talking about the United States, after all, with its tremendous capability, so from their perspective, whether or not the system works now or whether or not the system is said to be narrowly focused, they have to be concerned that there might be a capacity to scale it up quickly. They can't sit back and do nothing in the hope that.... They can't just rely on the words of the United States.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

That's where politics comes in. That's where diplomacy comes in. To some extent, we have to be open. That goes back to your work, right, to the negotiations that took place on disarmament and non-proliferation. We have to weave this into it and say, “Look, we need to protect ourselves against the residual threat, however small, and here, our books are open and we're not scaling it up.” I think the scale question is a very important one.

I'm not sure if I still—

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's about your time. Thanks very much.

We're going to move on to five minutes of questions. We need a couple of minutes at the end for committee business, so I would ask people to be really disciplined on their timing.

I'm going to give the floor over to you, Mr. Rioux.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Perry, you mentioned in your presentation that the first priority is to know Russia's intentions.

Is Russia a threat to Canada? Could it be? What do you think Russia's intentions are?

[David Perry]

If I understood this—and the translation wasn't picking it up fully, so I apologize in advance—you're talking about the threat from Russia and their intentions.

I would say that Russian intentions in the North American context right now are unclear. Again, to go back to the idea of a threat's capability and intent, they clearly have the capability right now. They've just demonstrated it operationally. What they've done in Eastern Europe, I think, has demonstrated a willingness to use their recently acquired force to change the status quo in that particular area of the world. They've done so again in Syria.

Those exact same capabilities, which can also be nuclearly armed—this would get into the wider strategic stability equation—can be deployed on their aircraft that have resumed flights towards Canadian airspace over the last 10 years. Some of those flights have been timed, as an example, with the visits of senior Ukrainian officials to Canada. Unless it's just a happy coincidence on their part, to me at least, this indicates that they're using those flights as a way of strategically signalling unhappiness with what we're doing in other parts of the world.

Even if the premise isn't that they're going to launch an attack on Canadian soil, I think part of what they're doing is exerting an influence to affect our strategic thinking. It's not just about what we're doing in North America, but about what we're doing elsewhere. If the Russians don't like what we're doing, they now have a capability to very seriously change our way of viewing something unrelated to strictly North America.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Okay, thank you.