It's going to take a lot of resources and a lot of political will and the correct mechanisms injected at the right time along the spectrum of operations, based on conflict escalation and de-escalation. When I answered the question in that stark way, it's because the political aim is not matching up with the means and the ways.
In military parlance we talk about ends, ways and means, strategic thinking, where those three things are lined up. Ends are your political aim or your objective, the ways are what we would call peacekeeping in this conversation and the wider spectrum of peace operations, including diplomatic and development efforts augmenting both ends of that bump, and then we look at the means, and those are the resources we have available.
Give the political aim to the military representatives we had at the table earlier, and they'll define the resources required to meet the aim. That's what they do best. They're incredible planners so they can do that, they can execute the plan. The problem is that there's often that mismatch between the aim, the broader role that Canada wants to play in the international community, and what's happening on the ground. When those two things are mismatched, we often have people coming back from the field who say they don't understand why they couldn't make a difference, they didn't understand what they were doing, and that the rhetoric—they call it “the rhetoric”—that was provided to them in advance of deploying did not match up with the realities in the field.
I teach hundreds of Canadian officers, and I've trained people from all over the world on these subjects. When that disconnect happens, the field reality takes hold and you know that you cannot make a difference in the long-term development of a community, it's up to the community to do that themselves. We're coming at it from, again, the tip of Maslow's hierarchy. We need to manage our expectations to what these conflict mechanisms are capable of. That's why I answered no.