Peacekeeping has been in evolution for a long time. It's very rare in the contemporary period to deploy into a context where there's a perfect peace and all you're doing is implementing agreements. In almost all contexts, you have subgroups, partial groups or splinter groups that are attacking the peace or trying to undermine it. In what I described as the reform period, post-mid-nineties, peacekeepers had to be vigilant and fight back, push back against spoilers and others trying to undermine the peace. There is no such thing as a perfect static peace that you're just implementing.
Mali is farther out on that spectrum. You have actors who want to implement the peace, actors who are trying to negotiate that, and then others, like AQIM, who have no interest in the peace.
You have to be able to operate in those two realities simultaneously. On the one hand, there are groups you can work with to move forward on a political process while maintaining the threat of being able to deter spoilers, but, simultaneously, you have to be fighting back against AQIM and some other groups. These two realities are central to everything that happens in civil war management. Very rarely do we see perfect peace in which you're simply implementing the agreements of that peace.