National Defence Committee on May 10th, 2016

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I will share any remaining time with my colleague, Mr. Gerretsen.

Thank you to all four of you for being here, for your tremendous work, and for offering us your insight and counsel.

I'd like to start with a question for Professor Byers on the issue of fighter aircraft and the replacement thereof, and I'd like to start with anecdote.

I had the privilege of completing part of my civilian flight training right here in Ottawa, at Ottawa Aviation Services, in a little single-engine aircraft. At the time, Ottawa Aviation Services had a policy of suspending flight operations any time temperatures went below 20°C. They did that, not because of a general lack of capability of the aircraft, but because of the realization that if a student went down in the Gatineau hills as a result of engine failure, she or he would be in serious trouble. That's within a very tight radius of Ottawa. I appreciate your testimony on the single-engine versus twin-engine paradigm, especially given the unique nature of the work that these aircraft are going to be doing in the Far North, not here in the Ottawa area.

I'm wondering if you could complete for the committee the analysis of the replacement of the fighter aircraft, looking at interoperability, refuelling issues, runway length, and then, most importantly, the evolving threats that we face, both domestically and from foreign forces. Give us your insight on what the criteria should be for our next fighter aircraft.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I also have a personal interest in this, in that I have a 15-year-old son who wants to fly fighter jets.

Certainly, the Canadian Arctic is extraordinarily large. It's 40% of the second-largest country on earth. We have very extensive maritime zones. We have, at the moment, twin-engine fighter jets that we chose because of the safety provided by a second engine, just like the U.S. Navy chose the F-18, and has bought a lot of replacement Super Hornets, again for the second engine, because of the safety over hostile ocean—or Arctic, in our case.

If we were to choose a single-engine jet for the Arctic, we would have to substantially improve our Arctic search and rescue, so that we could get to pilots quickly if they had to parachute to safety.

Again, you might not hear this from the air force; it's a harsh reality. They're not looking at the fighter jet for Arctic security; they're looking at the replacement fighter jet for operations overseas. That's why they want particular planes.

We have a fleet of F-18s. The logical thing, from my perspective, is to do a fleet extension of Super Hornets, which could fulfill the exact same mission, require relatively little new training for mechanics and pilots. And, of course, we know that we can afford the Super Hornet. We don't know if we can afford—

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Just briefly, Professor Byers, on the two threats I mentioned, domestic and international, what, in your view, would be the capabilities of the Super Hornet to respond to either of those? Domestic being the threat of airborne, domestic terrorism that we studied in Colorado Springs and elsewhere...but also international interdiction threats against Russian long-range bombers and other air assets.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

Look, if you're happy with what the CF-18 has done in the last 30 years—and I am—clearly it's suitable for the North American mission.

In terms of the overseas mission, the decision that would need to be made is whether we want to be the tip of the spear on the first day of attack against an enemy that has highly capable surface-to-air radar and missiles. We haven't fulfilled that role. We leave it to allies. More recently, in places like Libya, our allies have used cruise missiles or drones for that mission.

There are also other serious questions as to whether or not our new fighter jets might be rendered obsolete in 15 or 20 years by unmanned fighter jets. Investing a massive chunk of our defence budget in an as-yet-unproven, fifth-generation plane that might become obsolete fairly quickly has always struck me as a bit of a gamble.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you for that. I'll pass the remaining time to my colleague Mr. Gerretsen.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

My question is also for Mr. Byers. General Hood came before this committee a number of weeks ago and commented that no U.S. Air Force F-16 has experienced an engine failure since 1991. And that's a single-engine aircraft.

First of all, do you concur with that comment? What's your response to it?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I think what the general was referring to is that the latest version of the F-16 has not yet experienced a catastrophic engine failure resulting in a crash, but the newest version of the F-16 has acquired relatively few hours so far. It's a bit like looking at the Saab Gripen that is produced in Sweden—it has relatively few hours of flight time, and so it's difficult to tell.

Again, fighter jet engines are massively more reliable now than they were 30 or 40 years ago. The F-35 will be more reliable than the F-104 Starfighter was. But it's a question of whether you actually factor in reliability and pilot safety as part of your consideration, all things being equal in terms of the choice of plane?

The Canadian situation is almost unique. Again, it's the second-largest country in the world, with massive Arctic and marine areas and relatively few airports. These planes do not glide well. It's all of these factors.

The same general pointed to the Norwegian situation. I've been to the Norwegian Arctic. They have incredible infrastructure. They have incredible search and rescue. They have chosen to fly single-engine fighter jets, but it's not the Canadian Arctic.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Byers, you and Mr. Fergusson both talked about the ballistic missile defence program. You seem to have competing views on it. You both mentioned that there's a cost associated with it.

I'm curious, from your position on it, if either of you have a sense as to what the actual cost is going to be. That seems to either be a deterrent, quite often, or something that is encouraging us to go down that route.

Mr. Fergusson, would you like to provide an answer to that, first.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

The simple answer is, no one knows. You won't know until the doors open to enter into discussions with the United States. You won't know until those discussions then proceed to what Canada may be willing to contribute or could contribute to effectively get access.

The numbers that Professor Byers is using are mythical numbers. You can't take the value of investment in ground-based missile defence since roughly 1996 and say that somehow the U.S. is going to charge us a proportion of that. What if they will? Nor will they ask us to invest to pay back research and development costs. That's not going to be on. We're talking in terms of the Canadian investment, specifically what the cost to buy the product will be, and then you get into other sets of issues. Otherwise, no one knows.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

I want to give Mr. Byers an opportunity to respond.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I would love to hear it too, but unfortunately I'm going to have to pass the floor over to Mrs. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be sharing my time with Mr. Bezan.

This question is for Drs. Ferguson and Huebert. In what capacity should Canada be considering participation in BMD and cruise missile defence: detection, interception, or developing the science and technology?

Also, how beneficial would it be with respect to missile detection and interception to have Sweden and/or Finland on board?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Thank you very much. I'll go first, I guess.

It's almost to the point of being a no-brainer. When we look at missile proliferation, when we look at the technologies that are now being developed.... Adam made reference to the most recent Russian cruise missile. What the Russians and Chinese are also developing is a hyperkinetic cruise missile capability that is probably going to be about six or seven times the speed of sound. This is the new technological reality that we are talking about. The submarine factors are already coming into the context. To pretend that these type of technologies are not being developed with countries that have very different interests from Canada is just simply sticking our head in the snow, to be honest. Therefore, any type of participation, first and foremost with the Americans, is a complete essential to Canadian security.

In terms of working with our allies, it's not just going to be the Swedish and the Finns, it's also going to be the Norwegians. The Norwegians will be retrofitting their advanced ice-capable frigates to have an ABM capability. They're not saying this officially, but it's being discussed in all the open literature. They're going to a maritime-based ABM capability that they will then integrate with the Americans. This is what the future is becoming. I think that the essence of what we need to do is to provide security to Canadians against this type of threat.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Dr. Fergusson.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

From my perspective, first of all with regards to the Swedish and Finnish involvement, that raises the issue of course of what the future holds for the NATO-based American phased adaptive approach to missile defence and whether you want to add a site for further defence. That be actually a site to defend North America rather than Europe. So I don't think they're going to make one difference either way in terms of North American defence.

In terms of technologies, in terms of opportunities in the missile defence world, that train left the station two decades ago. Canada did not engage. The American research and development program is well advanced across the board in missile defence. The likelihood that there are any opportunities for Canadian firms or Canadian technology is extremely low. There may be some firms that are somewhat engaged on the margins as a function of the integrated nature of the Canada-U.S. defence technology and industrial base.

Cruise missile defence in terms of warning and identification of cruise missiles is a problem, which I think you probably heard from Admiral Gortney. There are numerous potentials in that area in terms of Canada's involvement in terms of the early warning. It's really about surveillance, reconnaissance, tracking, target identification, and cruise missile defence, which is vitally important. The capacity to intercept cruise missiles is already in place with the F-18s and will be in place with any replacement of the F-18.

About missile defence, it's difficult to know. I can tell you right now that, if Canada proposed an interceptor site in return for direct access to command and control of the defence of North America as a whole—a low probability of attack, but it's greater than zero—the United States would be interested in providing that capability in some form of negotiated arrangement.

Possibly as well, as I mentioned, tracking radars will be important if the United States proceeds down that path. They have alternatives, of course, in radar. They could put in offshore radar, as they have in the Pacific right now and off Alaska.

So there are some opportunities, but they're not great ones. I hope that answers your question.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I'm going to concentrate my question to Professor Huebert and the discussion you were having about the Russian and the Chinese threat, as well as about the unpredictable actors, such as North Korea and Iran, especially with Iran's testing of their ballistic missiles this past weekend.

What have we learned from Russia? Professor Lajeunesse talks about Russian posturing, but Russian posturing in Ukraine turned into an invasion, an occupation, and an illegal annexation, and they're escalating the aggression in the Baltic Sea. Do you see this potentially spilling into the greater geopolitical arena with, as you pointed out, the relationship between Arctic states, particularly the United States and Russia, and how it will impact us here?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I would totally agree, and I would even go further to suggest that the manifestation of Russian defence and willingness to use military force really starts not with the Ukrainian crisis but rather with the Georgian intervention. We saw at that point in time the Russians become clear about the defence of what they refer to as the “near abroad”, where they will use military force. We've seen it in Georgia, we've seen it in Ukraine, we are now starting to see what some refer to as “hybrid warfare” within the context of the Baltic states, Moldavia, and the list goes on.

As Adam has made very clear, the Arctic is also, in terms of both their statements and actions, part of this near abroad—in other words, a key strategic geopolitical location. That's not to say that the Russians will automatically resort to the use of force in defending their interests. They will try to co-operate, because it's obviously in their interest to do so. But when they make the calculations—as they did in Georgia, and as they did in Ukraine—that they in fact ultimately have to use some form of military force, through posturing, through the type of interactions they've been having with the Finns and Swedes in the last year, we can expect to see this.

In other words, it's not to say that it's the extremes of peace or war, but rather hardball politics. I think the period of co-operation that we've had in the Arctic for the last 10 years has really blinded us to the realities of what they will be doing, and I think we ignore that at our peril.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I appreciate those comments.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Garrison. You have the floor for the last question, after which we'll suspend. We'll have to ask the guests to leave very quickly, because we have a bit of committee business to do and we have to be out of here at four or five minutes after the hour.

I'll thank you in advance for your attendance.

Mr. Garrison, you have the floor.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

I want to go back to Professor Byers to talk about the priorities for recapitalization. I certainly share his concern about the massive need we have for recapitalization, whether we're talking about the army, the air force, or the navy.

Given that Canada doesn't have unlimited resources, I'm going to ask you to do a bit of a prioritization here and tell us what you think our priorities need to be in that recapitalization—and, obviously, where ballistic missile defence would fall, since it's unlikely to be free.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

On missile defence, a decade ago I worked very closely with former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy on the issue of missile defence. There was a lot of concern expressed by many of the same voices you've heard today and in previous sessions about how the United States needed Canadian participation, how they were pushing for Canadian participation, how we needed to have facilities in Canada.

When former prime minister Paul Martin said no, the Americans shrugged and worked around the issue and developed a capability that did not require Canada.

When Professor Fergusson says, “expand radar in Canada, probably at Goose Bay”, my response would be yes, and it could probably be placed in southern Greenland also. Be aware that there is pressure here, but it may not be not quite as real as some people would want you to think.

In terms of priorities, I think if you were to ask the U.S. defense secretary what his priorities would be involving Canada's capabilities, he would say, I want you to replace the CF-18s; I want you to replace the army trucks, so that you can actually deploy your army abroad in significant numbers; I want you to replace those supply ships, because right now you're completely dependent on the U.S. Navy, and we want you to be able to form task groups on your own—etc., etc.

Any ally of Canada looking at us objectively would say that participation in missile defence is way down the list, because so much else in our military is broken.

Thank you.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Professor Lajeunesse, you talked a lot about the Russian threat. I wonder whether you have a comment on Canada's joining ballistic missile defence as it would affect the Russian perception of Canada.

[Adam Lajeunesse]

Frankly, I don't think it would affect the Russian perception of Canada all that much, and even if it did, it wouldn't really matter. The Russian perception of Canada is as an appendage to the United States. From a geopolitical and from a military perspective, the Russians see Canada as a link to the U.S., so whether we are participating in missile defence or not is not going to have any real ramifications in our relationship with Russia, at least not in any meaningful way.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

There's been a lot of concern expressed—not at this table, but outside—about the impact of both ballistic missile defence systems and the proliferation of other weapons systems around the world.

I'll ask Professor Lajeunesse and Professor Byers, do you see any impact on the larger question of arms proliferation from Canada participating in the U.S. missile defence ?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

One thing that hasn't been mentioned and needs to be mentioned, because it's a decision that will need to be made by this government in all likelihood, is how Canada's new Canadian surface combatants will be equipped. There will be a push from the navy to make them Aegis class and to have the radar and the standard missile-3s that would enable them to provide missile defence capabilities, as the Norwegians are evidently planning to do.

That's a big ask that you'll get from the navy. Having that Aegis-class capability on a surface combatant will probably add somewhere in the range of half a billion dollars to the cost of that single vessel. This is a big one. It's coming.

How you think about missile defence in the North American context will necessarily bleed into that later debate.