I would totally agree, and I would even go further to suggest that the manifestation of Russian defence and willingness to use military force really starts not with the Ukrainian crisis but rather with the Georgian intervention. We saw at that point in time the Russians become clear about the defence of what they refer to as the “near abroad”, where they will use military force. We've seen it in Georgia, we've seen it in Ukraine, we are now starting to see what some refer to as “hybrid warfare” within the context of the Baltic states, Moldavia, and the list goes on.
As Adam has made very clear, the Arctic is also, in terms of both their statements and actions, part of this near abroad—in other words, a key strategic geopolitical location. That's not to say that the Russians will automatically resort to the use of force in defending their interests. They will try to co-operate, because it's obviously in their interest to do so. But when they make the calculations—as they did in Georgia, and as they did in Ukraine—that they in fact ultimately have to use some form of military force, through posturing, through the type of interactions they've been having with the Finns and Swedes in the last year, we can expect to see this.
In other words, it's not to say that it's the extremes of peace or war, but rather hardball politics. I think the period of co-operation that we've had in the Arctic for the last 10 years has really blinded us to the realities of what they will be doing, and I think we ignore that at our peril.